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This book critically analyses the ultra vires and common law theory and argues that neither offers a suitable explanation for the courts' judicial review jurisdiction. Instead, the author puts forward the theory that parliamentary supremacy is not absolute and does not operate in a hard and fast way but, rather, functions in a more flexible way and that the courts will balance particular Acts of Parliament against competing statutes or principles. McGarry argues that this new conception of parliamentary supremacy leads to an alternative theory of judicial review which significantly differs from both the ultra vires and common law theories.