Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.
Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.
Uri Bar-Joseph is a Professor at the School of Political Science, Haifa University, Israel. He concentrates on strategic and intelligence studies, especially focusing on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israeli security policy. In addition to numerous refereed journal articles and book chapters, he wrote six books, the most recent of which is The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel (2016). Rose McDermott is the David and Mariana Fisher University Professor of International Relations at Brown University and a Fellow in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has held fellowships at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Women and Public Policy Program, all at Harvard University. She has been a fellow at the Stanford Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences twice. She is the author of four books, a co-editor of two additional volumes, and author of over a hundred academic articles across a wide variety of disciplines encompassing topics such as experimentation, emotion and decision making, and the biological and genetic bases of political behavior.
Inhaltsangabe
Contents Introduction Part One: The Theoretical Framework Chapter I. Surprise Attack: A Framework for Discussion Chapter II. Examining the Learning Process Part Two: The Empirical Evidence The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow Case Study I: The Failure Case Study II: Success: The Battle for Moscow The Second Dyad: The USA in the Korean War Case study I: Failing to Forecast the War Case Study II: Failure II: The Chinese Intervention of Fall 1950 The Third Dyad: Intelligence Failure and Success in the War of Yom Kippur Case Study I: The Failure Case Study II: The Success Chapter VI. Conclusions
Contents Introduction Part One: The Theoretical Framework Chapter I. Surprise Attack: A Framework for Discussion Chapter II. Examining the Learning Process Part Two: The Empirical Evidence The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow Case Study I: The Failure Case Study II: Success: The Battle for Moscow The Second Dyad: The USA in the Korean War Case study I: Failing to Forecast the War Case Study II: Failure II: The Chinese Intervention of Fall 1950 The Third Dyad: Intelligence Failure and Success in the War of Yom Kippur Case Study I: The Failure Case Study II: The Success Chapter VI. Conclusions
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Shop der buecher.de GmbH & Co. KG Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg Amtsgericht Augsburg HRA 13309
