Robert Franzese / Peter Mooslechner / Martin Schürz (eds.)

Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities

Monetary Policy and Wage Bargaining Institutions in EMU
Herausgegeben:Franzese, Robert; Mooslechner, Peter; Schürz, Martin

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This important collection presents an authoritative selection of papers on "Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities" This publication is intent on building bridges between economics and the other social sciences. The focus is on the interaction between monetary policy and wage bargaining institutions in European Monetary Union (EMU). Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities is written by acknowledged experts in their field. The outcome is a broad analysis of the interactions of labour market actors and central banks. The volume addresses the recent changes in EMU. An important theoretical, empirical, and policy-relevant conclusion that emerges from Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities is that even perfectly credible monetary conservatism has long-term real effects, even in equilibrium models with fully rational expectations.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Springer / Springer Netherlands / Springer US
• Artikelnr. des Verlages: 978-1-4020-7536-0
• 2004
• Seitenzahl: 288
• Erscheinungstermin: 31. Dezember 2003
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 241mm x 160mm x 21mm
• Gewicht: 597g
• ISBN-13: 9781402075360
• ISBN-10: 1402075367
• Artikelnr.: 14047847

Inhaltsangabe

1. Editorial. 2. Strategic Interactions of the ECB, Wage Bargainers, and Governments; R. Franzese. 3. Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities; P. Hall, D. Soskice. 4. Wage and Wage-Bargaining Institutions in EMU: A Survey of the Issues; L. Calmfors. 5. Multiple Wage Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area; D. Soskice, T. Iversen. 6. Strategic Wage Setting in a Monetary Union; L. Cavallari. 7. Interest Groups, Enlargement of EMU and Labor Market Reform; M. Neugart. 8. Does Price Stability Exacerbate Labor Market Rigidities in EMU? S. Holden. 9. Communication, Coordination and Common Knowledge in Monetary Policy: Implications for the Euro Area; D. Stasavage. 10. The European Central Bank: Implications of the Appointment Process for Monetary Policy; K. Chang. 11. Who is Afraid of the Big Bad Central Bank? Union-Firm-Central Bank Interactions and Inflation in a Monetary Union; A. Muscatelli, P. Tirelli, Carmignani. 12. Institutional Complementarities and Conflicts between Wage Bargaining Institutions and an Independent Central Bank; P. Mooslechner, M. Schürz.