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Information Operations (IO) is a broad construct that only formally entered the United States military's collective lexicon in the 1990s. IO as initially conceived was too broad to be operationally relevant as it lumped together many disparate disciplines. Since that time, each military service and the Joint Staff developed and evolved their own doctrinal concepts for IO based on their individual organizational culture and real-world experience. Consequently, each of the services developed a different view of the core and supporting activities that fall within the broad construct of IO. Perhaps more importantly, each service developed unique perspectives on the overarching role IO plays at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. This situation begs the question: if each service has a different doctrinal concept for IO, can a joint force commander (JFC) effectively employ IO at the operational level?