This book theorizes illiberal constitutionalism by interrogation of the Rule of Law, democratic deterioration, and the misuse of the language and relativization of human rights protection, and its widespread emotional and value-oriented effect on the population.
This book theorizes illiberal constitutionalism by interrogation of the Rule of Law, democratic deterioration, and the misuse of the language and relativization of human rights protection, and its widespread emotional and value-oriented effect on the population.
Tímea Drinóczi is Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Law at Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil. Since 2017, she has also been a Doctor of the Academy of Sciences of Hungary. Professor Drinóczi has been a visiting professor in law schools in Plzen, Brno, Cologne, Graz, Istanbul, and Osijek, and has presented papers at several conferences all over Europe, in Hong Kong, Nanjing, Seoul, and Santiago. She served as a professor at the University of Pécs, Faculty of Law, Hungary, and Kenyatta University School of Law, Nairobi, Kenya. Agnieszka Bie¿-Kaca¿a is Professor within the Department of Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law and Administration at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toru¿, Poland. Professor Bie¿-Kacäa has been a visiting professor in law schools in Athens, Prague, and Maastricht. Together, Professors Drinóczi and Bie¿-Kacäa have presented papers at several conferences all over Europe, and in Hong Kong and Santiago de Chile.
Inhaltsangabe
Part I. Introduction - Ambitions and Comparison I. Ambitions II. Why Hungary and Poland III. Insight into the book Part II. Terms - Constitutionalism, illiberal(ism), and constitutional democracy I. Constitutionalism in the term "illiberal constitutionalism" II. Illiberal(ism) III. Constitutional democracy Part III. Identity - Unbalanced constitutional identity: emotions and values I. Historical and emotional trajectory II. Post-communist past and beyond III. Possible root cause: the combination of the above Part IV. Limits - Comparative perspective I. The Emergence of llliberal Constitutionalism II. A comparative perspective - looking for constraints III. Contextualization: the European Rule of Law as a constraint on public power Part V. Limits - Constraints in constitutional design and identity I. Illiberal legality II. Illiberal Democracy III. Illiberalization of Human Rights Part VI. Stability - How "illiberal limits" emerge and work I. Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible constitution II. Illiberal judicialization of politics III. Pushing the limits and bouncing back IV. Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional democracy Part VI. Conclusions 1. Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal 2. Illiberal constitutionalism is a deterioration from liberal constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point yet 3. In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail 4. Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and weakly constrained manner 5. Lessons learned, mostly, for others ...
Part I. Introduction - Ambitions and Comparison I. Ambitions II. Why Hungary and Poland III. Insight into the book Part II. Terms - Constitutionalism, illiberal(ism), and constitutional democracy I. Constitutionalism in the term "illiberal constitutionalism" II. Illiberal(ism) III. Constitutional democracy Part III. Identity - Unbalanced constitutional identity: emotions and values I. Historical and emotional trajectory II. Post-communist past and beyond III. Possible root cause: the combination of the above Part IV. Limits - Comparative perspective I. The Emergence of llliberal Constitutionalism II. A comparative perspective - looking for constraints III. Contextualization: the European Rule of Law as a constraint on public power Part V. Limits - Constraints in constitutional design and identity I. Illiberal legality II. Illiberal Democracy III. Illiberalization of Human Rights Part VI. Stability - How "illiberal limits" emerge and work I. Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible constitution II. Illiberal judicialization of politics III. Pushing the limits and bouncing back IV. Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional democracy Part VI. Conclusions 1. Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal 2. Illiberal constitutionalism is a deterioration from liberal constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point yet 3. In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail 4. Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and weakly constrained manner 5. Lessons learned, mostly, for others ...
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