Daniel Greco argues that the landscape of epistemology looks quite different when viewed through the lens of idealization and model-building. We should accept that theorizing in epistemological terms is inescapably idealized, and that we can know a wide variety of facts with certainty despite our cognitive limitations.
Daniel Greco argues that the landscape of epistemology looks quite different when viewed through the lens of idealization and model-building. We should accept that theorizing in epistemological terms is inescapably idealized, and that we can know a wide variety of facts with certainty despite our cognitive limitations.
Daniel Greco completed his AB in philosophy at Princeton University, his MPhil in Philosophy at Cambridge University, and his PhD in philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was a Bersoff Faculty Fellow at NYU and since then he has taught at Yale University. His research is primarily in epistemology, but includes points of overlap with philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and metaethics. He has won both the Karl Popper Prize and the Young Epistemologist Prize.
Inhaltsangabe
Acknowledgments Introduction 1: Idealization and Modeling 2: Modest Modeling 3: Modeling With Possible Worlds 4: Certainty and Undercutting 5: Belief and Credence 6: Inter-Level Coherence 7: Common Knowledge 8: Ideal and Non-Ideal Epistemology Bibliography
Acknowledgments Introduction 1: Idealization and Modeling 2: Modest Modeling 3: Modeling With Possible Worlds 4: Certainty and Undercutting 5: Belief and Credence 6: Inter-Level Coherence 7: Common Knowledge 8: Ideal and Non-Ideal Epistemology Bibliography
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