Stephen Hetherington

How to Know

A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Some key aspects of contemporary epistemology deserve to be challenged, and How to Know does just that. This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative, a practicalist conception of knowledge.
- Presents a philosophically original conception of knowledge, at odds with some central tenets of analytic epistemology
- Offers a dissolution of epistemology's infamous Gettier problem -- explaining why the supposed problem was never really a problem in the first place.
- Defends an unorthodox conception of the relationship between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, understanding knowledge-that as a kind of knowledge-how.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Wiley & Sons
• 1. Auflage
• Seitenzahl: 304
• Erscheinungstermin: 17. Mai 2011
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 231mm x 155mm x 23mm
• Gewicht: 545g
• ISBN-13: 9780470658123
• ISBN-10: 0470658126
• Artikelnr.: 33239030

Autorenporträt

Stephen Hetherington is Professor of Philosophy at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. He has previously published six books, mostly in epistemology. These include Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge (2001), Reality? Knowledge? Philosophy! (2003), Self-Knowledge (2007), and Yes, But How Do You Know? (2009). He has also edited two books, including Epistemology Futures (2006).

Inhaltsangabe

Preface and acknowledgements 1. Knowledge: The standard analytic conception 2. Knowledge
that as knowledge
how 3. Gettier? No problem 4. Is this a world where knowledge has to include justification? 5. Knowledge
that as how
knowledge 6. Knowledge: A practicalist conception References

Rezensionen

"In his latest book, How to Know, Stephen Hetherington forcefully challenges the orthodox conception of knowledge that has come to dominate nearly all contemporary discussions of knowledge. Hetherington's project is not merely critical, however. Instead he proposes a novel alternative theory of knowledge that he calls Practicalism, a theory that says that at root, all propositional knowledge (knowledge that) is ultimately reducible to practical knowledge (knowledge how). ... Presuppositions and supposed platitudes in philosophy deserve to be challenged. Hetherington's highly original and insightful book does just that. Whether or not one accepts all aspects of Hetherington's alternative positive proposal, epistemologists will have much to gain from engaging with the details of his substantial contribution to the field." (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 28 February 2012)