This book discusses current challenges in moral epistemology through the lens of higher-order evidence. Fueled by recent advances in empirical research, higher-order evidence has generated a wealth of insights about the genealogy of moral beliefs. This volume explores how these insights impact the epistemic status of moral beliefs.
This book discusses current challenges in moral epistemology through the lens of higher-order evidence. Fueled by recent advances in empirical research, higher-order evidence has generated a wealth of insights about the genealogy of moral beliefs. This volume explores how these insights impact the epistemic status of moral beliefs.
Michael Klenk works at the intersection of metaethics, epistemology, and moral psychology. His published papers on these topics in Synthese, Ratio, the Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, and the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, among others. He works at Delft University of Technology and held visiting positions at St. Gallen and Stanford University.
Inhaltsangabe
Change in Moral View: Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology Michael Klenk Part I: Higher-Order Evidence against Morality 1. Evolutionary Debunking, Self-Defeat and All the Evidence Silvan Wittwer 2. Moral Intuitions Between Higher-Order Evidence and Wishful Thinking Norbert Paulo 3. Debunking Objective Consequentialism: The Challenge of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology Paul Silva 4. Disagreement, Indirect Defeat, and Higher-Order Evidence Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman Part II: Rebutting Higher-Order Evidence against Morality 5. Higher-Order Defeat in Realist Moral Epistemology Brian C. Barnett 6. Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence Marco Tiozzo 7. Debunking Scepticism Michael Huemer Part III: Broader Implications of Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology 8. Moral Testimony as Higher-Order Evidence Marcus Lee, Neil Sinclair, & Jon Robson 9. Higher-Order Defeat in Collective Moral Epistemology J. Adam Carter & Dario Mortini 10. The Fragile Epistemology of Fanaticism Joshua DiPaolo Part IV: Permissible Epistemic Attitudes in Response to Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology 11. How Rational Level-Splitting Beliefs Can Help You Respond to Moral Disagreement Margaret Greta Turnbull & Eric Sampson 12. Epistemic Non-Factualism and Methodology Justin Clarke-Doane
Change in Moral View: Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology Michael Klenk Part I: Higher-Order Evidence against Morality 1. Evolutionary Debunking, Self-Defeat and All the Evidence Silvan Wittwer 2. Moral Intuitions Between Higher-Order Evidence and Wishful Thinking Norbert Paulo 3. Debunking Objective Consequentialism: The Challenge of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology Paul Silva 4. Disagreement, Indirect Defeat, and Higher-Order Evidence Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman Part II: Rebutting Higher-Order Evidence against Morality 5. Higher-Order Defeat in Realist Moral Epistemology Brian C. Barnett 6. Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence Marco Tiozzo 7. Debunking Scepticism Michael Huemer Part III: Broader Implications of Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology 8. Moral Testimony as Higher-Order Evidence Marcus Lee, Neil Sinclair, & Jon Robson 9. Higher-Order Defeat in Collective Moral Epistemology J. Adam Carter & Dario Mortini 10. The Fragile Epistemology of Fanaticism Joshua DiPaolo Part IV: Permissible Epistemic Attitudes in Response to Higher-Order Evidence in Moral Epistemology 11. How Rational Level-Splitting Beliefs Can Help You Respond to Moral Disagreement Margaret Greta Turnbull & Eric Sampson 12. Epistemic Non-Factualism and Methodology Justin Clarke-Doane
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