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The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal broke out when the international situation was unfavorable for the Communists, and it grew faster than anticipated. The Government of Nepal's (GoN's) effort was not well planned; however, many of the counterinsurgency (COIN) principles established by Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, were employed. Some of the principles were partially effective in the initial stage, but most of the principles were not. The main reasons behind the GoN's ineffectiveness in the COIN campaign are as follows: the GoN demonstrated a lack of commitment to defeat the insurgency, there was a lack of resources, and a lack of adequate international support. The lack of commitment by the GoN led to its failure to formulate a well defined COIN strategy. The GoN received support from various countries, but the resources available were inadequate. Hence, the overall COIN effort of GoN was less effective until 2001. The unstable political situation leading to lack of strong commitment of the state, and unreliable support of international community in terms resources impacted the overall COIN effort. In overall, the political factors, lack of resources and international support were the key COIN principles which resulted in the failure of the COIN effort.