Alvin E. Roth (ed.)

Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining

Herausgeber: Roth, Alvin E.

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Seitenzahl: 404
• Erscheinungstermin: 25. August 2005
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 24mm
• Gewicht: 653g
• ISBN-13: 9780521022743
• ISBN-10: 0521022746
• Artikelnr.: 22456237

Inhaltsangabe

Preface; 1. Editor's introduction and overview Alvin E. Roth; 2.
Disagreement in bargaining: models with incomplete information Kalyan
Chatterjee; 3. Reputations in games and markets Robert Wilson; 4. An
approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to
bargaining Robert W. Rosenthal; 5. Infinite-horizon models of bargaining
with one-sided incomplete information Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Jean
Tirole; 6. Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete
information Ariel Rubinstein; 7. Analysis of two bargaining problems with
incomplete information Roger B. Myerson; 8. Sequential bargaining
mechanisms Peter C. Cramton; 9. The role of risk aversion in a simple
bargaining model Martin J. Osborne; 10. Risk sensitivity and related
properties for bargaining solutions Stef Tijs and Hans Peters; 11.
Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable population: a survey of
recent results William Thomson; 12. Toward a focal-point theory of
bargaining Alvin E. Roth; 13. Bargaining and coalitions K. G. Binmore; 14.
Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining Sergiu Hart; 15. A comment
on the Coase theorem William Samuelson; 16. Disclosure of evidence and
resolution of disputes: who should bear the burden of proof? Joel Sobel;
17. The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives Vincent P.
Crawford.