Formal Models of Crisis Bargaining offers a groundbreaking guide to modern crisis bargaining theory and is essential reading both for advanced undergraduates (providing comprehensive coverage of the field for the first time) and graduates and researchers (as a vital learning tool for those wishing to conduct original research).
Formal Models of Crisis Bargaining offers a groundbreaking guide to modern crisis bargaining theory and is essential reading both for advanced undergraduates (providing comprehensive coverage of the field for the first time) and graduates and researchers (as a vital learning tool for those wishing to conduct original research).
William Spaniel's research focuses on interstate conflict, nuclear weapons, and terrorism. He uses game theoretical models to develop new insights on these phenomenon. He received a PhD in political science from the University of Rochester in 2015. Before arriving at the University of Pittsburgh, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He has authored many books, including Bargaining over the Bomb, and coauthored Militant Competition, both published by Cambridge University Press. His YouTube channel covers current affairs in international relations and receives millions of views each month.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Introduction: why war? Part I. Complete Information Models: 2. War's inefficiency puzzle 3. Power and commitment problems 4. Preventive war and bargaining over power 5. Hidden commitment problems Part II. Incomplete Information Models: 6. Uncertainty over costs 7. Uncertainty over power 8. Cheap talk and incentives to misrepresent 9. Military mobilizations and costly signals 10. Manipulating the peace premium 11. Mechanism design 12. Fighting and learning Part III. Appendices: 13. Discounting 14. Derivatives of implicit functions 15. Mechanism design primer.
1. Introduction: why war? Part I. Complete Information Models: 2. War's inefficiency puzzle 3. Power and commitment problems 4. Preventive war and bargaining over power 5. Hidden commitment problems Part II. Incomplete Information Models: 6. Uncertainty over costs 7. Uncertainty over power 8. Cheap talk and incentives to misrepresent 9. Military mobilizations and costly signals 10. Manipulating the peace premium 11. Mechanism design 12. Fighting and learning Part III. Appendices: 13. Discounting 14. Derivatives of implicit functions 15. Mechanism design primer.
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