This landmark classic marks the beginning of a new approach to Indian philosophy. While older approaches were born from the assumption that critical thinking was unknown to the East and all philosophical endeavor was assumed to be a manifestation of religious doctrine or a form of mysticism, Matilal brilliantly succeeds in dispelling these assumptions and so opens up the rich traditions of Indian philosophical analysis to the modern reader.
This landmark classic marks the beginning of a new approach to Indian philosophy. While older approaches were born from the assumption that critical thinking was unknown to the East and all philosophical endeavor was assumed to be a manifestation of religious doctrine or a form of mysticism, Matilal brilliantly succeeds in dispelling these assumptions and so opens up the rich traditions of Indian philosophical analysis to the modern reader.
Bimal Krishna Matilal (1935-91) was Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, All Souls College, Oxford. Jonardon Ganeri is Recurrent Visiting Professor of Philosophy, King's College London, and Global Professor, New York University.
Inhaltsangabe
* Preface to the New Edition: J. Ganeri * Preface to the First Edition * Chronological Table of Philosophers * l. Perception and Language * 1.1. General remarks on the problem * 1.2. Early Nyaáya theory of perception * 1.3. The rise of idealism * 1.4. Bhartrhari's theory of knowledge: 'Construction'(vikalpa) * 1.5. Di ága's theory of perception * 1.6. Word-meaning as 'exclusion' (apoha) * 1.7. Di aga and modem reductionism * 2. Individuals, Universals, and Perception * 2.1. A critique of the Di aga school * 2.2. Material bodies and their atomic constituents * 2.3. 'Inseparable' relation (s mav ya) * 2.4. The law of contradiction and the 'delimitors' * 2.5. Universals as meanings of general terms * 2.6. Uses of articles and quantifiers: 'Modes' of reference * 2.7. The problem of 'real' universal (j ti) * 2.8. The notion of 'propositional' perception * 2.9. Non-qualificative perception in Navya-ny ya: 'Simple' properties * 2.1 0. Terms and propositional assertions * 3. Early Grammarians on Philosophical Semantics * 3.1. Preliminary remarks * 3.2. The notion of 'substance' : P nini's rule 1.2.64 * 3.3. 'Substance' and 'quality': P nini's rule 5.1.119 * 3.4. Two aspects of meaning: Vy di and V japy yana * 3.5. Bhartrhari's definition of 'substance' * 3.6. Vy di's theory of meaning * 3.7. An analysis of Vy di's theory in modem terminology * 4. Empty Subject Terms in Logic * 4.1. Non-referring expressions in language * 4.2. The riddle of 'non-being' * 4.3. The status of 'example' in Indian logic * 4.4. The Ny ya-Buddhist controversy * 4.5. The epistemological significance of the controversy * 4.6. The implicit Ny ya semantic principle * 4.7. Interpretation of existence and negation * 4.8. The pan-fictional approach of Buddhism * 5. Negation and the M dhyamika Dialectic * 5.1. The M dhyamika attitude-'emptiness' * 5.2. Two levels of truth * 5.3. The indeterminacy of the phenomenal world * 5.4. The paradox of 'emptiness' * 5.5. Sophistry and the semantical paradoxes * 5.6. Two aspects of negation * 5.7. 'Mysticism' and the M dhyamika school * Bibliographical References * Index
* Preface to the New Edition: J. Ganeri * Preface to the First Edition * Chronological Table of Philosophers * l. Perception and Language * 1.1. General remarks on the problem * 1.2. Early Nyaáya theory of perception * 1.3. The rise of idealism * 1.4. Bhartrhari's theory of knowledge: 'Construction'(vikalpa) * 1.5. Di ága's theory of perception * 1.6. Word-meaning as 'exclusion' (apoha) * 1.7. Di aga and modem reductionism * 2. Individuals, Universals, and Perception * 2.1. A critique of the Di aga school * 2.2. Material bodies and their atomic constituents * 2.3. 'Inseparable' relation (s mav ya) * 2.4. The law of contradiction and the 'delimitors' * 2.5. Universals as meanings of general terms * 2.6. Uses of articles and quantifiers: 'Modes' of reference * 2.7. The problem of 'real' universal (j ti) * 2.8. The notion of 'propositional' perception * 2.9. Non-qualificative perception in Navya-ny ya: 'Simple' properties * 2.1 0. Terms and propositional assertions * 3. Early Grammarians on Philosophical Semantics * 3.1. Preliminary remarks * 3.2. The notion of 'substance' : P nini's rule 1.2.64 * 3.3. 'Substance' and 'quality': P nini's rule 5.1.119 * 3.4. Two aspects of meaning: Vy di and V japy yana * 3.5. Bhartrhari's definition of 'substance' * 3.6. Vy di's theory of meaning * 3.7. An analysis of Vy di's theory in modem terminology * 4. Empty Subject Terms in Logic * 4.1. Non-referring expressions in language * 4.2. The riddle of 'non-being' * 4.3. The status of 'example' in Indian logic * 4.4. The Ny ya-Buddhist controversy * 4.5. The epistemological significance of the controversy * 4.6. The implicit Ny ya semantic principle * 4.7. Interpretation of existence and negation * 4.8. The pan-fictional approach of Buddhism * 5. Negation and the M dhyamika Dialectic * 5.1. The M dhyamika attitude-'emptiness' * 5.2. Two levels of truth * 5.3. The indeterminacy of the phenomenal world * 5.4. The paradox of 'emptiness' * 5.5. Sophistry and the semantical paradoxes * 5.6. Two aspects of negation * 5.7. 'Mysticism' and the M dhyamika school * Bibliographical References * Index
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