Much of what we take to be meaningful and significant in life is inextricably linked with our capacity to experience emotions. Here, Jonathan Mitchell considers emotional experiences as sui generis states to be given their own place within our mental economy, and proposes an original view of emotional experiences as feelings-towards-values.
Much of what we take to be meaningful and significant in life is inextricably linked with our capacity to experience emotions. Here, Jonathan Mitchell considers emotional experiences as sui generis states to be given their own place within our mental economy, and proposes an original view of emotional experiences as feelings-towards-values.
Jonathan Mitchell is a British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellow at the University of Manchester. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Warwick, and previously studied philosophy at the University of Sheffield. He was also the holder of a Global Excellence Stature Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship at the University of Johannesburg. His research focuses on the intersection between phenomenology, philosophy of mind, emotion, and value.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction 1: Experiential Modes and Face Value Contents (a framework) 2: The Evaluative Content View of Emotional Experience 3: The Content Priority View 4: The Nature of Emotional Experience 5: The Role of the Body and Action-Readiness 6: The Intelligibility of Emotional Experience Conclusion
Introduction 1: Experiential Modes and Face Value Contents (a framework) 2: The Evaluative Content View of Emotional Experience 3: The Content Priority View 4: The Nature of Emotional Experience 5: The Role of the Body and Action-Readiness 6: The Intelligibility of Emotional Experience Conclusion
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