Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Sink or Swim: The Marine Corps Capacity to Conduct a Marine Expeditionary Brigade Amphibious Assault using Expeditionary Maneuver Wa]( "Sink or Swim: The Marine Corps Capacity to Conduct a Marine Expeditionary Brigade Amphibious Assault using Expeditionary Maneuver Wa")
Sink or Swim: The Marine Corps Capacity to Conduct a Marine Expeditionary Brigade Amphibious Assault using Expeditionary Maneuver Wa59,99 €![The Royal Norwegian Air Force in the Post Cold War Era: Effectiveness in Expeditionary Operations]( "The Royal Norwegian Air Force in the Post Cold War Era: Effectiveness in Expeditionary Operations")
The Royal Norwegian Air Force in the Post Cold War Era: Effectiveness in Expeditionary Operations59,99 €![Cannon Fodder or Corps D'Elite? the American Expeditionary Force in the Great War]( "Cannon Fodder or Corps D'Elite? the American Expeditionary Force in the Great War")
Cannon Fodder or Corps D'Elite? the American Expeditionary Force in the Great War59,99 €![Would the Formation of a Combat Maneuver Corps Support the Transformation of the Australian Army as Envisaged in the Hardened and Networked Army Conce]( "Would the Formation of a Combat Maneuver Corps Support the Transformation of the Australian Army as Envisaged in the Hardened and Networked Army Conce")
Would the Formation of a Combat Maneuver Corps Support the Transformation of the Australian Army as Envisaged in the Hardened and Networked Army Conce59,99 €![Should the Current Direct Support Artillery Battalions of the Heavy Division be Organic to the Maneuver Brigade?]( "Should the Current Direct Support Artillery Battalions of the Heavy Division be Organic to the Maneuver Brigade?")
Should the Current Direct Support Artillery Battalions of the Heavy Division be Organic to the Maneuver Brigade?59,99 €![Strategic Deployment: An Analysis of How the United States Army Europe Deployed VII Corps to Southwest Asia and the 1st Armored Division to]( "Strategic Deployment: An Analysis of How the United States Army Europe Deployed VII Corps to Southwest Asia and the 1st Armored Division to")
Strategic Deployment: An Analysis of How the United States Army Europe Deployed VII Corps to Southwest Asia and the 1st Armored Division to59,99 €![Analysis of the Twenty-Nine Capabilities of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)]( "Analysis of the Twenty-Nine Capabilities of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)")
Analysis of the Twenty-Nine Capabilities of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)59,99 €
The entry of the United States into World War I in April 1917 found the U.S. Army and Signal Corps totally unprepared for operations on the Western Front. This research effort proves conclusively that the U.S. Army Signal Corps overcame this unpreparedness and was ultimately effective in support of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) division and below maneuver units during World War I. This conclusion was validated by studying the organization, doctrine, training, and technology used by Signal Corps division level units prior to the declaration of war through the immediate post-World War I period. The 1st and 2d Infantry Division signal units are studied during the battle of Soissons (July 1918) and the Meuse-Argonne (October 1918) in order to evaluate their effectiveness in support of division maneuver elements. The U.S. Army Signal Corps provided relatively dynamic signal support at division level by the time the Armistice ended hostilities on 11 November 1918. The progression of signal support within the 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions clearly shows the growth and development of signal organization, doctrine, training, and technology as applied to an AEF infantry division.