Division General Staff: Can it Employ the Objective Force?
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In 1917, General Pershing dictated General Orders, No. 8 creating the staff organization of the American Expeditionary Forces and subordinate army corps and division staffs. The new structure was developed in response to modern field conditions and was originally derived from a comprehensive study of French and British army staffs. Although doctrine and organization of the United States Army have changed significantly and repeatedly, the divisional staff structure has remained remarkably consistent. This monograph examines headquarters staff organization in relation to the modern field conditi...
In 1917, General Pershing dictated General Orders, No. 8 creating the staff organization of the American Expeditionary Forces and subordinate army corps and division staffs. The new structure was developed in response to modern field conditions and was originally derived from a comprehensive study of French and British army staffs. Although doctrine and organization of the United States Army have changed significantly and repeatedly, the divisional staff structure has remained remarkably consistent. This monograph examines headquarters staff organization in relation to the modern field conditions within which the Objective Force will operate. Modern field conditions are rapidly changing as the twenty-first century begins. The nature of the Objective Force reflects a transformation in U.S. Army organization and operation. The Army will be an extremely versatile, combined arm maneuver force expected to perform a variety of roles and missions. As a result, the staff, the mechanism that enables commanders to command and control their forces, must also be examined to determine if this ninety year old structure is suitable for effective employment of the Objective Force. The hierarchical, functional organization and bureaucratic legacy of headquarters staffs no longer maximize the overall combat effectiveness and efficiency of Army forces. Current staff organization lacks the agility to rapidly employ the Objective Force. Nor is it modular, adaptable, interoperable or echeloned enough to achieve synchronized, integrated and lethal operations under modern field conditions. In order to determine whether the current division-level general staff organization can employ the Objective Force, a discussion of modern field conditions or the Current Operating Environment (COE) is included as is an outline of basic organizational theory. A survey of the evolution of the United States Army's division staff structure provides a means to identify trends, shortfalls, and successes in s
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