What is a desire? Our wants must often compete with our beliefs about what we ought to do. This book defends "desire as belief", a view in which desires are a special subset of our normative beliefs, and in which we can accept orthodox models of human motivation while also making room for normative beliefs to play a role in our decision-making.
What is a desire? Our wants must often compete with our beliefs about what we ought to do. This book defends "desire as belief", a view in which desires are a special subset of our normative beliefs, and in which we can accept orthodox models of human motivation while also making room for normative beliefs to play a role in our decision-making.
Alex Gregory is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He has published most frequently on the nature of desire, but also on other issues such as the nature of normative reasons, the nature of disability, and questions about wellbeing.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction 1: What is Desire-as-Belief? 2: Desire and Motivation 3: Normative Belief and Motivation 4: Desire and Rationality 5: Irrationality 6: The Guise of the Normative 7: Desire and Feeling 8: Uncertainty and Reasoning 9: Representing Reasons 10: Desires and Reasons 11: Conclusion Appendix A: Lewis on Desire-as-Belief
Introduction 1: What is Desire-as-Belief? 2: Desire and Motivation 3: Normative Belief and Motivation 4: Desire and Rationality 5: Irrationality 6: The Guise of the Normative 7: Desire and Feeling 8: Uncertainty and Reasoning 9: Representing Reasons 10: Desires and Reasons 11: Conclusion Appendix A: Lewis on Desire-as-Belief
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