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The design of federal states from Russia and the Ukraine to Canada and the European Union typically develops from a false set of assumptions regarding the institutional building blocks of such a state. Rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, the authors argue that a number of institutional variables, not normally associated with federal design, can be critical in determining federal success. (The variables are the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment.)
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The design of federal states from Russia and the Ukraine to Canada and the European Union typically develops from a false set of assumptions regarding the institutional building blocks of such a state. Rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, the authors argue that a number of institutional variables, not normally associated with federal design, can be critical in determining federal success. (The variables are the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment.)
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 398
- Erscheinungstermin: 29. Januar 2016
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 21mm
- Gewicht: 575g
- ISBN-13: 9780521016483
- ISBN-10: 0521016487
- Artikelnr.: 21448910
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 398
- Erscheinungstermin: 29. Januar 2016
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 21mm
- Gewicht: 575g
- ISBN-13: 9780521016483
- ISBN-10: 0521016487
- Artikelnr.: 21448910
1. Federations and the theoretical problem: 1.1 Why Federalism
1.2 Definitions
1.3 The long search for stability
Federalism as nuisance
Federalism as engine of prosperity
Riker as intermediary
1.4 The fundamental problem of stability
1.5 Basic premises and conclusions
2. Federal bargaining: 2.1 Alliances versus federations
2.2 The private character of public goods
2.3 Equilibrium selection and redistribution
2.4 The 'federal problem'
2.5 Bargaining for control of the center
2.6 Allocating jurisdictions
2.7 Three levels of institutional design
3. Two cases of uninstitutionalized bargaining: 3.1 The Czechoslovak dissolution
3.2 The Soviet dissolution
3.3 The feasibility of success in initial bargaining
3.4 Secession: the special road to renegotiation
4. Representation: 4.1 Two alternative models of Federalism
4.2 A national venue for bargaining
4.3 Within versus without
4.4 Direct versus delegated representation
4.5 Other parameters of design
4.6 Bilateral decision making and the case of Russia
5. Incentives: 5.1 Institutional enforcement
5.2 The court
5.3 Some simple rules of constitutional design
5.4 Voters versus elites
5.5 Desirable imperfection and a democratic as if principle
6. Political parties in a federal state: 6.1 An extreme hypothesis
6.2 Parties in a democracy
6.3 The idealized party system
6.4 Integrated parties
6.5 Integration outside the United States
Australian Federalism and the role of parties
Canada
6.6 India
Leadership incentives
Rank and file incentives
The party and Federalism
1967 and thereafter
7. Institutional sources of federal stability I: 7.1 Introduction
7.2 Level 2 and the federalist
7.3 Level 3 institutions
7.4 Australia, Canada, Germany, and India revisited
Germany
Canada
Canada vs Australia and India
7.3 Local and regional design parameters
8. Institutional sources of federal stability II: 8.1 Electoral mechanisms and societal structures
Representation
Ethnicity
Defining federal subjects
Number of local jurisdictions
Authority over local governments
8.2 Bicameralism
Symmetry
Presidential authority
Presidential selection
Electoral connections
8.3 Level 1 and the scope of the federal mandate
8.4 Level 0 - things beyond design
9. Designing Federalism: 9.1 Russia
Electoral arrangements
Regional autonomy
Constitutional matters
Parties and the current status quo
9.2 The European Union
Background
The role of parties
The puzzle of the collusion
France versus Britain
EU institutional design
9.4 Conclusion.
1.2 Definitions
1.3 The long search for stability
Federalism as nuisance
Federalism as engine of prosperity
Riker as intermediary
1.4 The fundamental problem of stability
1.5 Basic premises and conclusions
2. Federal bargaining: 2.1 Alliances versus federations
2.2 The private character of public goods
2.3 Equilibrium selection and redistribution
2.4 The 'federal problem'
2.5 Bargaining for control of the center
2.6 Allocating jurisdictions
2.7 Three levels of institutional design
3. Two cases of uninstitutionalized bargaining: 3.1 The Czechoslovak dissolution
3.2 The Soviet dissolution
3.3 The feasibility of success in initial bargaining
3.4 Secession: the special road to renegotiation
4. Representation: 4.1 Two alternative models of Federalism
4.2 A national venue for bargaining
4.3 Within versus without
4.4 Direct versus delegated representation
4.5 Other parameters of design
4.6 Bilateral decision making and the case of Russia
5. Incentives: 5.1 Institutional enforcement
5.2 The court
5.3 Some simple rules of constitutional design
5.4 Voters versus elites
5.5 Desirable imperfection and a democratic as if principle
6. Political parties in a federal state: 6.1 An extreme hypothesis
6.2 Parties in a democracy
6.3 The idealized party system
6.4 Integrated parties
6.5 Integration outside the United States
Australian Federalism and the role of parties
Canada
6.6 India
Leadership incentives
Rank and file incentives
The party and Federalism
1967 and thereafter
7. Institutional sources of federal stability I: 7.1 Introduction
7.2 Level 2 and the federalist
7.3 Level 3 institutions
7.4 Australia, Canada, Germany, and India revisited
Germany
Canada
Canada vs Australia and India
7.3 Local and regional design parameters
8. Institutional sources of federal stability II: 8.1 Electoral mechanisms and societal structures
Representation
Ethnicity
Defining federal subjects
Number of local jurisdictions
Authority over local governments
8.2 Bicameralism
Symmetry
Presidential authority
Presidential selection
Electoral connections
8.3 Level 1 and the scope of the federal mandate
8.4 Level 0 - things beyond design
9. Designing Federalism: 9.1 Russia
Electoral arrangements
Regional autonomy
Constitutional matters
Parties and the current status quo
9.2 The European Union
Background
The role of parties
The puzzle of the collusion
France versus Britain
EU institutional design
9.4 Conclusion.
1. Federations and the theoretical problem: 1.1 Why Federalism
1.2 Definitions
1.3 The long search for stability
Federalism as nuisance
Federalism as engine of prosperity
Riker as intermediary
1.4 The fundamental problem of stability
1.5 Basic premises and conclusions
2. Federal bargaining: 2.1 Alliances versus federations
2.2 The private character of public goods
2.3 Equilibrium selection and redistribution
2.4 The 'federal problem'
2.5 Bargaining for control of the center
2.6 Allocating jurisdictions
2.7 Three levels of institutional design
3. Two cases of uninstitutionalized bargaining: 3.1 The Czechoslovak dissolution
3.2 The Soviet dissolution
3.3 The feasibility of success in initial bargaining
3.4 Secession: the special road to renegotiation
4. Representation: 4.1 Two alternative models of Federalism
4.2 A national venue for bargaining
4.3 Within versus without
4.4 Direct versus delegated representation
4.5 Other parameters of design
4.6 Bilateral decision making and the case of Russia
5. Incentives: 5.1 Institutional enforcement
5.2 The court
5.3 Some simple rules of constitutional design
5.4 Voters versus elites
5.5 Desirable imperfection and a democratic as if principle
6. Political parties in a federal state: 6.1 An extreme hypothesis
6.2 Parties in a democracy
6.3 The idealized party system
6.4 Integrated parties
6.5 Integration outside the United States
Australian Federalism and the role of parties
Canada
6.6 India
Leadership incentives
Rank and file incentives
The party and Federalism
1967 and thereafter
7. Institutional sources of federal stability I: 7.1 Introduction
7.2 Level 2 and the federalist
7.3 Level 3 institutions
7.4 Australia, Canada, Germany, and India revisited
Germany
Canada
Canada vs Australia and India
7.3 Local and regional design parameters
8. Institutional sources of federal stability II: 8.1 Electoral mechanisms and societal structures
Representation
Ethnicity
Defining federal subjects
Number of local jurisdictions
Authority over local governments
8.2 Bicameralism
Symmetry
Presidential authority
Presidential selection
Electoral connections
8.3 Level 1 and the scope of the federal mandate
8.4 Level 0 - things beyond design
9. Designing Federalism: 9.1 Russia
Electoral arrangements
Regional autonomy
Constitutional matters
Parties and the current status quo
9.2 The European Union
Background
The role of parties
The puzzle of the collusion
France versus Britain
EU institutional design
9.4 Conclusion.
1.2 Definitions
1.3 The long search for stability
Federalism as nuisance
Federalism as engine of prosperity
Riker as intermediary
1.4 The fundamental problem of stability
1.5 Basic premises and conclusions
2. Federal bargaining: 2.1 Alliances versus federations
2.2 The private character of public goods
2.3 Equilibrium selection and redistribution
2.4 The 'federal problem'
2.5 Bargaining for control of the center
2.6 Allocating jurisdictions
2.7 Three levels of institutional design
3. Two cases of uninstitutionalized bargaining: 3.1 The Czechoslovak dissolution
3.2 The Soviet dissolution
3.3 The feasibility of success in initial bargaining
3.4 Secession: the special road to renegotiation
4. Representation: 4.1 Two alternative models of Federalism
4.2 A national venue for bargaining
4.3 Within versus without
4.4 Direct versus delegated representation
4.5 Other parameters of design
4.6 Bilateral decision making and the case of Russia
5. Incentives: 5.1 Institutional enforcement
5.2 The court
5.3 Some simple rules of constitutional design
5.4 Voters versus elites
5.5 Desirable imperfection and a democratic as if principle
6. Political parties in a federal state: 6.1 An extreme hypothesis
6.2 Parties in a democracy
6.3 The idealized party system
6.4 Integrated parties
6.5 Integration outside the United States
Australian Federalism and the role of parties
Canada
6.6 India
Leadership incentives
Rank and file incentives
The party and Federalism
1967 and thereafter
7. Institutional sources of federal stability I: 7.1 Introduction
7.2 Level 2 and the federalist
7.3 Level 3 institutions
7.4 Australia, Canada, Germany, and India revisited
Germany
Canada
Canada vs Australia and India
7.3 Local and regional design parameters
8. Institutional sources of federal stability II: 8.1 Electoral mechanisms and societal structures
Representation
Ethnicity
Defining federal subjects
Number of local jurisdictions
Authority over local governments
8.2 Bicameralism
Symmetry
Presidential authority
Presidential selection
Electoral connections
8.3 Level 1 and the scope of the federal mandate
8.4 Level 0 - things beyond design
9. Designing Federalism: 9.1 Russia
Electoral arrangements
Regional autonomy
Constitutional matters
Parties and the current status quo
9.2 The European Union
Background
The role of parties
The puzzle of the collusion
France versus Britain
EU institutional design
9.4 Conclusion.