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Ilya Somin is Professor at the George Mason University School of Law. Somin writes regularly for the Volokh Conspiracy law and politics blog at the Washington Post. He is also the author of The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain (2015), and coauthor of A Conspiracy Against Obamacare: The Volokh Conspiracy and the Health Care Case (2013).
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Ilya Somin is Professor at the George Mason University School of Law. Somin writes regularly for the Volokh Conspiracy law and politics blog at the Washington Post. He is also the author of The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain (2015), and coauthor of A Conspiracy Against Obamacare: The Volokh Conspiracy and the Health Care Case (2013).
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- 2nd edition
- Seitenzahl: 312
- Erscheinungstermin: 15. Juni 2016
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 228mm x 151mm x 22mm
- Gewicht: 452g
- ISBN-13: 9780804799317
- ISBN-10: 0804799318
- Artikelnr.: 44382597
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- 2nd edition
- Seitenzahl: 312
- Erscheinungstermin: 15. Juni 2016
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 228mm x 151mm x 22mm
- Gewicht: 452g
- ISBN-13: 9780804799317
- ISBN-10: 0804799318
- Artikelnr.: 44382597
Ilya Somin is Professor at the George Mason University School of Law. Somin writes regularly for the Volokh Conspiracy law and politics blog at the Washington Post. He is also the author of The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain (2015), and coauthor of A Conspiracy Against Obamacare: The Volokh Conspiracy and the Health Care Case (2013).
Contents and Abstracts
Introduction
chapter abstract
The Introduction provides an overview of the book's arguments, and places
the debate over political ignorance in historical context, going back all
the way to the origins of democracy in ancient Greece.
1The Extent of Political Ignorance
chapter abstract
This chapter summarizes the alarming extent of political ignorance in the
United States, up through the most recent election cycles in 2012 and 2014.
It also shows that the problem of ignorance is not of recent origin, and
that political knowledge levels have increased very little, if at all, over
the past fifty to sixty years.
2Do Voters Know Enough?
chapter abstract
This chapter compares actual levels of political knowledge with the
requirements of several widely accepted normative theories of democratic
participation: retrospective voting, Burkean trusteeship, representation of
public opinion on policy issues, and deliberative democracy. It finds that
voter knowledge falls short of the requirements of all of them, even the
least demanding. The chapter also describes some situations where voter
knowledge might actually be harmful, but argues that such cases are
relatively rare. It further explains why the disproportionate political
power of the affluent (who have greater knowledge, on average, than the
poor and middle class) should not lead to complacency about political
ignorance.
3The Rationality of Political Ignorance
chapter abstract
This chapter explains why political ignorance is the result of rational
behavior by voters. It also shows that voters have little incentive to
avoid bias and irrationality in their evaluation of the political
information they do know-a phenomenon known as "rational irrationality."
The combination of rational ignorance and rational irrationality is much
worse than either would be alone, and makes political ignorance a difficult
problem to solve. It also leaves voters vulnerable to demagoguery and
deception.
4The Shortcomings of Shortcuts
chapter abstract
Many argue that political ignorance is not a serious problem, because
voters can offset it by relying on information shortcuts. This chapter
reviews the major types of shortcuts, and concludes that they are less
effective than advocates claim and often actively counterproductive. The
shortcuts analyzed include retrospective voting, information from everyday
life, party identification, reliance on opinion leaders, and others. The
chapter also rejects claims that voter ignorance is irrelevant because of
the so-called miracle of aggregation.
5Foot Voting vs. Ballot Box Voting
chapter abstract
This chapter explains why people have stronger incentives to seek out
information and use it more wisely when they "vote with their feet" in the
private sector or in a federal system than when they vote at the ballot
box. Both rational ignorance and rational irrationality are far less
prevalent in the former settings. The informational advantages of foot
voting over ballot box voting strengthen the case for limiting and
decentralizing government power. The chapter also addresses influential
objections to foot voting, such as claims that it is undermined by moving
costs, that it will lead to a race to the bottom, that it is bad for
minorities, and that it will exacerbate an already dangerous "Big Sort,"
under which we become ever more ideologically segregated.
6Political Ignorance and Judicial Review
chapter abstract
This chapter explains why widespread political ignorance strengthens the
case for forceful judicial review. Strong judicial enforcement of
constitutional limits on government power can help facilitate foot voting
by limiting and decentralizing government power. In addition, political
ignorance undercuts the main standard objection to judicial review: the
so-called countermajoritarian difficulty, which holds that judicial review
is harmful because it goes against the will of democratic majorities. In a
world of widespread political ignorance, much of the legislation courts
might strike down does not meaningfully reflect the will of the people.
7Can Voter Knowledge Be Increased?
chapter abstract
This chapter assesses a variety of proposals for increasing voter
knowledge, including education, reforming media coverage of politics,
structured deliberation, jurylike "sortition" mechanisms, and paying voters
to increase their knowledge. It argues that none of these proposals are
likely to achieve major progress in the foreseeable future. Some proposed
election reforms, most notably mandatory voting, might even make things
worse.
Conclusion
chapter abstract
The Conclusion summarizes the themes of the book, and also considers
prospects for the future. Although political ignorance is an
extraordinarily difficult challenge to overcome, there is reason to hope
that we can mitigate it by limiting and decentralizing the power of
government. Over time, voters might come to have a better understanding of
their own limitations, and perhaps become more willing to channel their
frustration and skepticism about politics into efforts to reduce its role
in society.
Introduction
chapter abstract
The Introduction provides an overview of the book's arguments, and places
the debate over political ignorance in historical context, going back all
the way to the origins of democracy in ancient Greece.
1The Extent of Political Ignorance
chapter abstract
This chapter summarizes the alarming extent of political ignorance in the
United States, up through the most recent election cycles in 2012 and 2014.
It also shows that the problem of ignorance is not of recent origin, and
that political knowledge levels have increased very little, if at all, over
the past fifty to sixty years.
2Do Voters Know Enough?
chapter abstract
This chapter compares actual levels of political knowledge with the
requirements of several widely accepted normative theories of democratic
participation: retrospective voting, Burkean trusteeship, representation of
public opinion on policy issues, and deliberative democracy. It finds that
voter knowledge falls short of the requirements of all of them, even the
least demanding. The chapter also describes some situations where voter
knowledge might actually be harmful, but argues that such cases are
relatively rare. It further explains why the disproportionate political
power of the affluent (who have greater knowledge, on average, than the
poor and middle class) should not lead to complacency about political
ignorance.
3The Rationality of Political Ignorance
chapter abstract
This chapter explains why political ignorance is the result of rational
behavior by voters. It also shows that voters have little incentive to
avoid bias and irrationality in their evaluation of the political
information they do know-a phenomenon known as "rational irrationality."
The combination of rational ignorance and rational irrationality is much
worse than either would be alone, and makes political ignorance a difficult
problem to solve. It also leaves voters vulnerable to demagoguery and
deception.
4The Shortcomings of Shortcuts
chapter abstract
Many argue that political ignorance is not a serious problem, because
voters can offset it by relying on information shortcuts. This chapter
reviews the major types of shortcuts, and concludes that they are less
effective than advocates claim and often actively counterproductive. The
shortcuts analyzed include retrospective voting, information from everyday
life, party identification, reliance on opinion leaders, and others. The
chapter also rejects claims that voter ignorance is irrelevant because of
the so-called miracle of aggregation.
5Foot Voting vs. Ballot Box Voting
chapter abstract
This chapter explains why people have stronger incentives to seek out
information and use it more wisely when they "vote with their feet" in the
private sector or in a federal system than when they vote at the ballot
box. Both rational ignorance and rational irrationality are far less
prevalent in the former settings. The informational advantages of foot
voting over ballot box voting strengthen the case for limiting and
decentralizing government power. The chapter also addresses influential
objections to foot voting, such as claims that it is undermined by moving
costs, that it will lead to a race to the bottom, that it is bad for
minorities, and that it will exacerbate an already dangerous "Big Sort,"
under which we become ever more ideologically segregated.
6Political Ignorance and Judicial Review
chapter abstract
This chapter explains why widespread political ignorance strengthens the
case for forceful judicial review. Strong judicial enforcement of
constitutional limits on government power can help facilitate foot voting
by limiting and decentralizing government power. In addition, political
ignorance undercuts the main standard objection to judicial review: the
so-called countermajoritarian difficulty, which holds that judicial review
is harmful because it goes against the will of democratic majorities. In a
world of widespread political ignorance, much of the legislation courts
might strike down does not meaningfully reflect the will of the people.
7Can Voter Knowledge Be Increased?
chapter abstract
This chapter assesses a variety of proposals for increasing voter
knowledge, including education, reforming media coverage of politics,
structured deliberation, jurylike "sortition" mechanisms, and paying voters
to increase their knowledge. It argues that none of these proposals are
likely to achieve major progress in the foreseeable future. Some proposed
election reforms, most notably mandatory voting, might even make things
worse.
Conclusion
chapter abstract
The Conclusion summarizes the themes of the book, and also considers
prospects for the future. Although political ignorance is an
extraordinarily difficult challenge to overcome, there is reason to hope
that we can mitigate it by limiting and decentralizing the power of
government. Over time, voters might come to have a better understanding of
their own limitations, and perhaps become more willing to channel their
frustration and skepticism about politics into efforts to reduce its role
in society.
Contents and Abstracts
Introduction
chapter abstract
The Introduction provides an overview of the book's arguments, and places
the debate over political ignorance in historical context, going back all
the way to the origins of democracy in ancient Greece.
1The Extent of Political Ignorance
chapter abstract
This chapter summarizes the alarming extent of political ignorance in the
United States, up through the most recent election cycles in 2012 and 2014.
It also shows that the problem of ignorance is not of recent origin, and
that political knowledge levels have increased very little, if at all, over
the past fifty to sixty years.
2Do Voters Know Enough?
chapter abstract
This chapter compares actual levels of political knowledge with the
requirements of several widely accepted normative theories of democratic
participation: retrospective voting, Burkean trusteeship, representation of
public opinion on policy issues, and deliberative democracy. It finds that
voter knowledge falls short of the requirements of all of them, even the
least demanding. The chapter also describes some situations where voter
knowledge might actually be harmful, but argues that such cases are
relatively rare. It further explains why the disproportionate political
power of the affluent (who have greater knowledge, on average, than the
poor and middle class) should not lead to complacency about political
ignorance.
3The Rationality of Political Ignorance
chapter abstract
This chapter explains why political ignorance is the result of rational
behavior by voters. It also shows that voters have little incentive to
avoid bias and irrationality in their evaluation of the political
information they do know-a phenomenon known as "rational irrationality."
The combination of rational ignorance and rational irrationality is much
worse than either would be alone, and makes political ignorance a difficult
problem to solve. It also leaves voters vulnerable to demagoguery and
deception.
4The Shortcomings of Shortcuts
chapter abstract
Many argue that political ignorance is not a serious problem, because
voters can offset it by relying on information shortcuts. This chapter
reviews the major types of shortcuts, and concludes that they are less
effective than advocates claim and often actively counterproductive. The
shortcuts analyzed include retrospective voting, information from everyday
life, party identification, reliance on opinion leaders, and others. The
chapter also rejects claims that voter ignorance is irrelevant because of
the so-called miracle of aggregation.
5Foot Voting vs. Ballot Box Voting
chapter abstract
This chapter explains why people have stronger incentives to seek out
information and use it more wisely when they "vote with their feet" in the
private sector or in a federal system than when they vote at the ballot
box. Both rational ignorance and rational irrationality are far less
prevalent in the former settings. The informational advantages of foot
voting over ballot box voting strengthen the case for limiting and
decentralizing government power. The chapter also addresses influential
objections to foot voting, such as claims that it is undermined by moving
costs, that it will lead to a race to the bottom, that it is bad for
minorities, and that it will exacerbate an already dangerous "Big Sort,"
under which we become ever more ideologically segregated.
6Political Ignorance and Judicial Review
chapter abstract
This chapter explains why widespread political ignorance strengthens the
case for forceful judicial review. Strong judicial enforcement of
constitutional limits on government power can help facilitate foot voting
by limiting and decentralizing government power. In addition, political
ignorance undercuts the main standard objection to judicial review: the
so-called countermajoritarian difficulty, which holds that judicial review
is harmful because it goes against the will of democratic majorities. In a
world of widespread political ignorance, much of the legislation courts
might strike down does not meaningfully reflect the will of the people.
7Can Voter Knowledge Be Increased?
chapter abstract
This chapter assesses a variety of proposals for increasing voter
knowledge, including education, reforming media coverage of politics,
structured deliberation, jurylike "sortition" mechanisms, and paying voters
to increase their knowledge. It argues that none of these proposals are
likely to achieve major progress in the foreseeable future. Some proposed
election reforms, most notably mandatory voting, might even make things
worse.
Conclusion
chapter abstract
The Conclusion summarizes the themes of the book, and also considers
prospects for the future. Although political ignorance is an
extraordinarily difficult challenge to overcome, there is reason to hope
that we can mitigate it by limiting and decentralizing the power of
government. Over time, voters might come to have a better understanding of
their own limitations, and perhaps become more willing to channel their
frustration and skepticism about politics into efforts to reduce its role
in society.
Introduction
chapter abstract
The Introduction provides an overview of the book's arguments, and places
the debate over political ignorance in historical context, going back all
the way to the origins of democracy in ancient Greece.
1The Extent of Political Ignorance
chapter abstract
This chapter summarizes the alarming extent of political ignorance in the
United States, up through the most recent election cycles in 2012 and 2014.
It also shows that the problem of ignorance is not of recent origin, and
that political knowledge levels have increased very little, if at all, over
the past fifty to sixty years.
2Do Voters Know Enough?
chapter abstract
This chapter compares actual levels of political knowledge with the
requirements of several widely accepted normative theories of democratic
participation: retrospective voting, Burkean trusteeship, representation of
public opinion on policy issues, and deliberative democracy. It finds that
voter knowledge falls short of the requirements of all of them, even the
least demanding. The chapter also describes some situations where voter
knowledge might actually be harmful, but argues that such cases are
relatively rare. It further explains why the disproportionate political
power of the affluent (who have greater knowledge, on average, than the
poor and middle class) should not lead to complacency about political
ignorance.
3The Rationality of Political Ignorance
chapter abstract
This chapter explains why political ignorance is the result of rational
behavior by voters. It also shows that voters have little incentive to
avoid bias and irrationality in their evaluation of the political
information they do know-a phenomenon known as "rational irrationality."
The combination of rational ignorance and rational irrationality is much
worse than either would be alone, and makes political ignorance a difficult
problem to solve. It also leaves voters vulnerable to demagoguery and
deception.
4The Shortcomings of Shortcuts
chapter abstract
Many argue that political ignorance is not a serious problem, because
voters can offset it by relying on information shortcuts. This chapter
reviews the major types of shortcuts, and concludes that they are less
effective than advocates claim and often actively counterproductive. The
shortcuts analyzed include retrospective voting, information from everyday
life, party identification, reliance on opinion leaders, and others. The
chapter also rejects claims that voter ignorance is irrelevant because of
the so-called miracle of aggregation.
5Foot Voting vs. Ballot Box Voting
chapter abstract
This chapter explains why people have stronger incentives to seek out
information and use it more wisely when they "vote with their feet" in the
private sector or in a federal system than when they vote at the ballot
box. Both rational ignorance and rational irrationality are far less
prevalent in the former settings. The informational advantages of foot
voting over ballot box voting strengthen the case for limiting and
decentralizing government power. The chapter also addresses influential
objections to foot voting, such as claims that it is undermined by moving
costs, that it will lead to a race to the bottom, that it is bad for
minorities, and that it will exacerbate an already dangerous "Big Sort,"
under which we become ever more ideologically segregated.
6Political Ignorance and Judicial Review
chapter abstract
This chapter explains why widespread political ignorance strengthens the
case for forceful judicial review. Strong judicial enforcement of
constitutional limits on government power can help facilitate foot voting
by limiting and decentralizing government power. In addition, political
ignorance undercuts the main standard objection to judicial review: the
so-called countermajoritarian difficulty, which holds that judicial review
is harmful because it goes against the will of democratic majorities. In a
world of widespread political ignorance, much of the legislation courts
might strike down does not meaningfully reflect the will of the people.
7Can Voter Knowledge Be Increased?
chapter abstract
This chapter assesses a variety of proposals for increasing voter
knowledge, including education, reforming media coverage of politics,
structured deliberation, jurylike "sortition" mechanisms, and paying voters
to increase their knowledge. It argues that none of these proposals are
likely to achieve major progress in the foreseeable future. Some proposed
election reforms, most notably mandatory voting, might even make things
worse.
Conclusion
chapter abstract
The Conclusion summarizes the themes of the book, and also considers
prospects for the future. Although political ignorance is an
extraordinarily difficult challenge to overcome, there is reason to hope
that we can mitigate it by limiting and decentralizing the power of
government. Over time, voters might come to have a better understanding of
their own limitations, and perhaps become more willing to channel their
frustration and skepticism about politics into efforts to reduce its role
in society.