Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Forcible Entry Contingency Operations: Effective Employment of Tactical Aerospace Power in Support of the Joint Task Force Commander]( "Forcible Entry Contingency Operations: Effective Employment of Tactical Aerospace Power in Support of the Joint Task Force Commander")
Forcible Entry Contingency Operations: Effective Employment of Tactical Aerospace Power in Support of the Joint Task Force Commander60,99 €![Communist Insurgencies and the Relevance of the Concepts of Center of Gravity and Decisive Points]( "Communist Insurgencies and the Relevance of the Concepts of Center of Gravity and Decisive Points")
Communist Insurgencies and the Relevance of the Concepts of Center of Gravity and Decisive Points59,99 €![Defining Decisive: Toward Developing a Doctrinal Understanding of Decisive Operations and Decisive Points for the 21st Century Force]( "Defining Decisive: Toward Developing a Doctrinal Understanding of Decisive Operations and Decisive Points for the 21st Century Force")
Defining Decisive: Toward Developing a Doctrinal Understanding of Decisive Operations and Decisive Points for the 21st Century Force59,99 €![Rear Operations: Protecting the Points of Decision]( "Rear Operations: Protecting the Points of Decision")
Rear Operations: Protecting the Points of Decision59,99 €![Rapid, Decisive Operations: The Execution of Operational Art by a Standing Joint Task Force]( "Rapid, Decisive Operations: The Execution of Operational Art by a Standing Joint Task Force")
Rapid, Decisive Operations: The Execution of Operational Art by a Standing Joint Task Force60,99 €![Command and Control: Does Current U.S. Army Tactical Command and Control Doctrine Meet the Requirement for Today's High Intensity Battlefie]( "Command and Control: Does Current U.S. Army Tactical Command and Control Doctrine Meet the Requirement for Today's High Intensity Battlefie")
Command and Control: Does Current U.S. Army Tactical Command and Control Doctrine Meet the Requirement for Today's High Intensity Battlefie60,99 €![U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap]( "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap")
U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap60,99 €
Since 1989, the US Army has taken part in many operations that are something other than war. Peacekeeping or Stability and Support Operations (SASO) have abounded for U.S. Army forces. In each operation, tactical commanders used U.S. Army doctrine to include the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) to provide a framework to forces available to achieve the desired endstate. Doctrine and the MDMP require that commanders determine decisive points to be leveraged by the use of force to degrade the enemy's center of gravity. The decisive points as used in tactical doctrine are rich in conventional battlefield overtones. The problem set or operational design varies considerably between an operation on a conventional battlefield and that of Stability and Support Operations. This monograph analyzes U.S. Army doctrine in relation to the decisive point to determine whether the doctrinal decisive point continues to support the tactical commander involved in SASO. Beginning with an introduction to the theoretical problem, this monograph presents the decisive point and its relationship to operational design. The ingredients of operational design are decisive points, centers of gravity, and culmination. Each ingredient relates to one another in the context of operational design. This paper analyzes decisive points by reviewing the genesis of decisive points from theory, developed by such as authors as Clausewitz, Jomini, and Schneider. The current doctrinal references to decisive point are compiled, compared to their theoretical beginnings and examined in terms of clarity towards supporting tactical commanders in non-conventional settings such as SASO. With the theoretical backdrop of decisive points available, this monograph examined the actual historical information about decisive points identified by commanders during Stability and Support Operations in Bosnia. Information about decisive points and operational methods analyzed in relation to time and operational design. Fi