This book reveals the role that credit played in the raising of British war loans between 1793 and 1815. It shows how, paradoxically, the government's creditors had very little "real" money to lend and were often reliant for their own solvency upon the very government to which they were lending.
This book reveals the role that credit played in the raising of British war loans between 1793 and 1815. It shows how, paradoxically, the government's creditors had very little "real" money to lend and were often reliant for their own solvency upon the very government to which they were lending.
Simon Sherratt is an economic historian interested in the National Debt, government loan-contracting, credit and "money creation."
Inhaltsangabe
1. Context: The Financial Revolution 2. The Bank of England and the Suspension of Cash Payments (1797 1821) 3. Government Loan Contracting, 1793 1810 4. The House of Rothschild 5. Taxation 6. Peace and Its Consequences, 1815 1821 7. Conclusion
1. Context: The Financial Revolution 2. The Bank of England and the Suspension of Cash Payments (1797 1821) 3. Government Loan Contracting, 1793 1810 4. The House of Rothschild 5. Taxation 6. Peace and Its Consequences, 1815 1821 7. Conclusion
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