Isabela Mares is Professor of Political Science at Yale University. She has written extensively on a range of topics in comparative politics and political economy, including democratization, clientelism and corruption, taxation and fiscal capacity development, social policy reforms in both developed and developing countries. She is the author of The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development (New York: Cambridge University Press), for which she won the Gregory Luebbert Award for best book in Comparative Politics (awarded by the American Political Science Assciation, 2004), she also won the First Best Book in European Studies award (Council for European Studies, 2004) and received an Honorable Mention from the American Political Science Association. At Yale, Isabela Mares is teaching courses in political economy, welfare state development, democratization and democratic erosion, and an interdisciplinary graduate course on Micro-historical Analysis in Comparative Research. Lauren E. Young is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at UC Davis. She received her Ph.D. in political science with distinction from Columbia University and was a postdoctoral scholar at the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford, and the Center for Global Development (CGD) (non-resident). She is a member of the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) network and a co-organizer of the California Workshop on Empirical Political Science and the 2019 WPSA Autocratic Politics pre-conference. Her research aims to understand how individuals make decisions when faced with the threat of violence. She has been published in the American Political Science Review, Annual Review of Political Science, the Journal of Peace Research, and Comparative Political Studies.
Inhaltsangabe
Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations List of Figures 1: Introduction 2: Disaggregating clientelism: resource constraints and information signals 3: Context and research design 4: Policy favors 5: Policy coercion: social conflict and control 6: Economic coercion: conflict and forbearance 7: Vote buying: Nontargeted and unmonitored 8: Conclusion Appendices Appendix A: Qualitative Interviews Appendix B. Locality Surveys Appendix C Survey Experiments Notes References Index
Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations List of Figures 1: Introduction 2: Disaggregating clientelism: resource constraints and information signals 3: Context and research design 4: Policy favors 5: Policy coercion: social conflict and control 6: Economic coercion: conflict and forbearance 7: Vote buying: Nontargeted and unmonitored 8: Conclusion Appendices Appendix A: Qualitative Interviews Appendix B. Locality Surveys Appendix C Survey Experiments Notes References Index
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