Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Physical Training Programs in Light Infantry Units: Are they Preparing Soldiers for the Rigors of Combat?]( "Physical Training Programs in Light Infantry Units: Are they Preparing Soldiers for the Rigors of Combat?")
Physical Training Programs in Light Infantry Units: Are they Preparing Soldiers for the Rigors of Combat?59,99 €![Offensive Operations in Mountainous Terrain]( "Offensive Operations in Mountainous Terrain")
Offensive Operations in Mountainous Terrain59,99 €![Limitations of Surprise in Offensive Action in Mountainous Terrain]( "Limitations of Surprise in Offensive Action in Mountainous Terrain")
Limitations of Surprise in Offensive Action in Mountainous Terrain59,99 €![Human Powered Vehicles in Support of Light Infantry Operations]( "Human Powered Vehicles in Support of Light Infantry Operations")
Human Powered Vehicles in Support of Light Infantry Operations59,99 €![Winning Teams: Mobilization-Related Correlates of Success in American World War II Infantry Divisions]( "Winning Teams: Mobilization-Related Correlates of Success in American World War II Infantry Divisions")
Winning Teams: Mobilization-Related Correlates of Success in American World War II Infantry Divisions59,99 €![Counterair Operations in the Light Infantry Division]( "Counterair Operations in the Light Infantry Division")
Counterair Operations in the Light Infantry Division59,99 €![A Qualitative Analysis of the Asam Program: Is It Properly Preparing Our Future Mobility Leaders?]( "A Qualitative Analysis of the Asam Program: Is It Properly Preparing Our Future Mobility Leaders?")
A Qualitative Analysis of the Asam Program: Is It Properly Preparing Our Future Mobility Leaders?59,99 €
This study explores the experiences of the Army's only World War II era divisional unit designed specifically for employment in mountainous terrain, the 10th Mountain Division. It examines the reasons for its activation, its organization, training, and combat performance. Using this as a historical precedence, it then analyzes the current training programs for operations in mountainous terrain, drawing parallels between the training of the 10th of 1944 and that of the light infantry divisions of 1987. Investigation reveals that a rapid deployment force must be ready today to fight in any terrain to which they deploy. With this requirement comes a responsibility to conduct the training necessary for them to fight and win in any of the likely environments. Virtually every contingency area for the United States contains extensive mountain ranges. Light infantry divisions do not have to be terrain specific in their training, but historical evidence proves the necessity of their being terrain adaptable. Although most divisions currently train in desert, jungle, urban and forested terrain, almost none conduct training in mountainous terrain. The experiences of the 10th Mountain Division and Fifth Army in World War II illustrate the absolute necessity of units training in mountain operations if they are to be successful in combat in mountainous terrain. This thesis concludes that the Army leadership cannot ignore the peculiar requirements of combat in mountainous terrain. Rapid deployment forces, specifically light infantry divisions, must begin a concerted program of training in mountainous terrain. The problem is identified. Facilities are available for training. The risk of not beginning such a program is too high to ignore the problem any further.