Brad Roberts

Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Brad Roberts is Director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. From 2013 to 2014 he was a William J. Perry Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. From 2009 to 2013, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 352
• Erscheinungstermin: 9. Dezember 2015
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 236mm x 158mm x 25mm
• Gewicht: 598g
• ISBN-13: 9780804796453
• ISBN-10: 0804796459
• Artikelnr.: 43709739

Autorenporträt

Brad Roberts is Director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. From 2013 to 2014 he was a William J. Perry Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. From 2009 to 2013, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
1The Evolution of U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture Since the End of the Cold
War
chapter abstract
This chapter traces the evolution of U.S. nuclear policy and posture from
the Cold War to today. It reviews the thinking behind the three Nuclear
Posture Reviews conducted by each presidential administration as well as
the unfolding debate within the nongovernmental expert community about
deterrence and disarmament. It highlights elements of continuity and change
in U.S. policy and posture. It concludes with a set of questions about the
next 25 years.
2The First New Problem: Nuclear-Armed Regional Challengers
chapter abstract
This chapter examines the deterrence challenges for the United States posed
by a nuclear-armed North Korea and perhaps other nuclear-armed regional
challengers in the future. It sets out a spectrum of deterrence challenges
from the lowest to the highest ends of conflict with an eye to illuminating
how such a conflict might escalate and de-escalate. In invokes the term
"theory of victory" to examine concepts developed in North Korea for
nuclear blackmail and brinksmanship.
3The New Regional Deterrence Strategy
chapter abstract
This chapter sets out the response of the United States to the new
strategic problem posed by regional challengers armed with nuclear weapons
and long-range missiles. That response emphasizes a comprehensive strategy
to strengthen regional deterrence architectures in partnership with U.S.
allies. The chapter also sets out a "blue theory of victory" as a counter
to the "red theory" in chapter 2.
4The Second New Problem: Relations with Putin's Russia
chapter abstract
This chapter reviews U.S. efforts since the end of the Cold War to move the
political and security relationship with Russia in a positive new
direction. Highlighting elements of continuity across four presidential
administrations, the chapter then explores Russia's rising disaffection and
the dramatic turn in Russian policy and posture of 2014. The chapter than
examines developments in Russian military doctrine, concluding that the
more adversarial quality of Russia's relations with the West require shifts
in NATO and U.S. doctrine
5The Evolving Relationship with China
chapter abstract
This chapter reviews U.S. efforts since the end of the Cold War to move the
political and security relationship with China in a more positive direction
and to begin a dialogue with China on nuclear issues and strategic
stability. In the absence of such a dialogue, the United States has relied
on unofficial dialogues to generate insights into Chinese thinking, as
summarized here. The chapter then examines developments in China's military
doctrine, concluding that China has a clearly elaborated set of ideas about
how to secure its interests in an armed confrontation with the United
States under the nuclear shadow.
6Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Europe
chapter abstract
This chapter reviews NATO's efforts to adjust its deterrence and defense
posture to a changed and changing world since the end of the Cold War. It
explores NATO's reactions to the March 2014 Crimea shock and sets out a
longer-term agenda for responding to further negative developments in
Russian policy and posture. It argues in favor of NATO's development of
theory of victory of its own to negate Russian nuclear-backed coercion and
aggression.
7Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia
chapter abstract
This chapter reviews the efforts of the United States, Japan, and the
Republic of Korea to adapt extended deterrence to new developments in
Northeast Asia, including primarily the emergence of a nuclear-armed North
Korea. It reviews Obama administration efforts to institutionalize and
advance a cooperative agenda. It identifies policy challenges on the
pathway forward.
8The Broader Nuclear Assurance Agenda
chapter abstract
This chapter begins with a summary of insights into the challenges of
assuring U.S. allies in Europe and Northeast Asia under the U.S. nuclear
umbrella drawn from the prior two chapters. This chapter also challenges
the reader to think more broadly about the assurance requirements of U.S.
nuclear strategy. It does so by considering the assurance requirements of 5
other sets of actors.
9Conclusions
chapter abstract
This chapter argues that the time is not ripe for additional substantial
reductions to the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategies and
to number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal. The record of U.S.
diplomacy shows that it has not been possible so far to create the
conditions to allow such further changes. This argument culminates in a
restatement of the case for U.S. nuclear weapons, derivative of the lessons
from U.S. efforts to create those conditions and to adapt deterrence to
21st century purposes.
10Implications for Future Strategy, Policy, and Posture Reviews
chapter abstract
This chapter examines the implications of chapter 9 for future reviews of
U.S. foreign and defense policy and of U.S. nuclear policy and posture. It
begins with an assessment of the enduring value of the balanced approach to
nuclear strategy, encompassing political, economic, and military means. It
then examines potential adjustments in those means in light of recent U.S.
experience.