This book incorporates Buddhist philosophy more explicitly into the Western analytic philosophical discussion of free will, both in order to render more perspicuous Buddhist ideas that might shed light on the Western philosophical debate, and to render more perspicuous the many possible positions on the free will debate that are available to Buddhist philosophy. This book is of interest to academics working on Buddhist and Western ethics, comparative philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, agency, and personal identity.
This book incorporates Buddhist philosophy more explicitly into the Western analytic philosophical discussion of free will, both in order to render more perspicuous Buddhist ideas that might shed light on the Western philosophical debate, and to render more perspicuous the many possible positions on the free will debate that are available to Buddhist philosophy. This book is of interest to academics working on Buddhist and Western ethics, comparative philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, agency, and personal identity.
Rick Repetti is Professor of Philosophy at Kingsborough Community College, CUNY, USA. He is the author of The Counterfactual Theory of Free Will (2010), as well as several articles on Buddhism, meditation, free will, and philosophy of religion.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction 1. Why the Buddha Did Not Discuss 'the Problem of Free Will and Determinism' 2. Why There Should Be a Buddhist Theory of Free Will 3. Uses of the Illusion of Agency: Why Some Buddhists Should Believe in Free Will 4. Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for M dhyamikas 5. Negative Dialectics in Comparative Philosophy: The Case of Buddhist Free Will Quietism 6. Free Will and the Sense of Self 7. What Am I Doing? 8. Freedom from Responsibility: Agent-Neutral Consequentialism and the Bodhisattva Ideal 9. Free Will, Liberation and Buddhist Philosophy 10. Buddhism and Free Will: Beyond the 'Free Will Problem' 11. Degrees of Freedom: The Buddha's Implied Views on the (Im)possibility of Free Will 12. Buddhist Paleocompatibilism 13. Shifting Coalitions, Free Will, and the Responsibility of Persons 14. Psychological versus Metaphysical Agents: A Therav da Buddhist View of Free Will and Moral Responsibility 15. Emotions and Choice: Lessons from Tsongkhapa 16. Grasping Snakes: Reflections on Free Will, Sam dhi, and Dharmas 17. Agentless Agency: The Soft Compatibilist Argument from Buddhist Meditation, Mind-Mastery, Evitabilism, and Mental Freedom
Introduction 1. Why the Buddha Did Not Discuss 'the Problem of Free Will and Determinism' 2. Why There Should Be a Buddhist Theory of Free Will 3. Uses of the Illusion of Agency: Why Some Buddhists Should Believe in Free Will 4. Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for M dhyamikas 5. Negative Dialectics in Comparative Philosophy: The Case of Buddhist Free Will Quietism 6. Free Will and the Sense of Self 7. What Am I Doing? 8. Freedom from Responsibility: Agent-Neutral Consequentialism and the Bodhisattva Ideal 9. Free Will, Liberation and Buddhist Philosophy 10. Buddhism and Free Will: Beyond the 'Free Will Problem' 11. Degrees of Freedom: The Buddha's Implied Views on the (Im)possibility of Free Will 12. Buddhist Paleocompatibilism 13. Shifting Coalitions, Free Will, and the Responsibility of Persons 14. Psychological versus Metaphysical Agents: A Therav da Buddhist View of Free Will and Moral Responsibility 15. Emotions and Choice: Lessons from Tsongkhapa 16. Grasping Snakes: Reflections on Free Will, Sam dhi, and Dharmas 17. Agentless Agency: The Soft Compatibilist Argument from Buddhist Meditation, Mind-Mastery, Evitabilism, and Mental Freedom
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