Keith N. Hylton has taught at the School of Law of Boston University since 1995. He previously served on the faculty and was tenured at Northwestern University School of Law. Professor Hylton currently teaches courses in antitrust, torts, and labor law, and writes widely in the field of law and economics, with more than forty publications in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. He has served as a Director of the American Law and Economics Association.
Part I. Economics: 1. Definitions
2. Perfect competition versus monopoly
3. Further topics
Part II. Law and Policy: 4. Some interpretations issues
5. Enacting the antitrust law
6. What should antitrust law aim to do?
Part III. Enforcement: 7. Optimal enforcement theory
8. Enforcement provision of the antitrust laws
Appendix
Part IV. Cartels: 9. Cartels
10. Conscious parallelism
11. Conclusion
Part V. Development of Section 1 Doctrine: 12. The Sherman act versus the common law
13. Rule of reason and per se rule
14. Conclusion
Part VI. Rule of Reason and Per Se Rule: 14. The case for price-fixing
15. Per se and rule of reason analysis: further developments
16. Per se versus rule of reason tests: understanding the Supreme Court's justification for the per se rule
Part VII. Agreement: 17. The development of inference doctrine
18. Rejection of unilateral contract theory
Part VIII. Facilitating Mechanisms: 19. Data dissemination cases
20. Basing point pricing and related practices
21. Basing point pricing: economics
Part IV. Boycotts: 22. Pre-Socony
23. Post-Socony
24. Post-BMI/Sylvania
25. Conclusion
Part X. Monopolization: 26. Development of section 2 doctrine
27. Leveraging and essential facility cases
28. Predatory pricing
29. Conclusion
Part XI. Power: 30. Measuring market power
31. Determinants of market power
32. Substitutability and the relevant market: cellophane
33. Multi-market monopoly and the relevant market: Alcoa
34. Measuring power: guidelines
Part XII. Attempts: 35. The Swift formula and modern doctrine
36. Dangerous probability requirement
Part XIII. Vertical Restraints: 37. Resale price maintenance
38. Vertical non-price restraints
39. Manufacturer retains title
40. Agreement
Part XIV. Tying and Exclusive Dealing: 41. Introduction
42. Early cases
43. Development of the per se rule
44. Tension between rule of reason arguments and per se rule
45. Technological tying
46. Exclusive dealing
Appendix
47. Horizontal Mergers: 48. Reasons for merging and implications for law
49. Horizontal merger law
50. Conclusion
Appendix
Part XV. Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate: 51. Vertical mergers
52. Conglomerate mergers
53. Concluding remarks
Part XVI. Antitrust and the state: 54. Noerr-Pennington doctrine
55. Parker doctrine.
