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Over the past two decades, following increased enforcement of anti-corruption regulations, anti-bribery compliance solutions have become ever more important to businesses worldwide. An extensive variety of anti-bribery instruments has been developed, yet, to date, incentive systems have received relatively little research attention as a likely mechanism with which to eliminate bribery in multinational corporations. Hence, this study investigates whether and how incentive systems might be designed specifically in order to prevent corruption in multinational corporations. In particular, it evaluates how incentive systems could help to increase both compliance with formal anti-bribery procedures and anti-bribery whistleblowing. It is found that a combination of a performance matrix, a bonus for innovation and leadership in compliance, and a malus for non-compliance could indeed help to increase anti-bribery compliance. In addition, the study's results suggest that a histleblowing bonus would also be a constructive component of companies' incentive systems.