From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s West German foreign policy underwent substantial transformations: from bilateral to multilateral, from reactive to proactive. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was an ideal setting for this evolution, enabling the Federal Republic to take the lead early on in Western preparations for the conference and to play a decisive role in the actual East-West negotiations leading to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Based on extensive original research of recently released documents, spanning more than fifteen archives in eight countries, this…mehr
From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s West German foreign policy underwent substantial transformations: from bilateral to multilateral, from reactive to proactive. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was an ideal setting for this evolution, enabling the Federal Republic to take the lead early on in Western preparations for the conference and to play a decisive role in the actual East-West negotiations leading to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Based on extensive original research of recently released documents, spanning more than fifteen archives in eight countries, this study is a substantial contribution to scholarly discussions on the history of détente, the CSCE and West German foreign policy. The author stresses the importance of looking beyond the bipolarity of the Cold War decades and emphasizes the interconnectedness of European integration and European détente. He highlights the need to place the genesis of the CSCE conference in its historical context rather than looking at it through the prism of the events of 1989, and shows that the bilateral and multilateral elements (Ostpolitik and the CSCE) were parallel rather than successive phenomena, parts of the same complex process and in constant interaction with each other.
Petri Hakkarainen is the Political Director at the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Prior to that, he worked for over five years as the Director of Foreign and Security Policy at the Office of the President of Finland. During his career at the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs since 2006 he has been stationed in Washington, Berlin and Helsinki, as well as at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam. He received his doctorate in Modern History from the University of Oxford in 2008. In 2009 his dissertation was awarded the Willy Brandt Prize for the 'advancement of outstanding young scholars' by the Chancellor Willy Brandt Foundation.
Inhaltsangabe
List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements Chapter 1. Introduction: Era of Negotiations * European Détente * The CSCE * German Foreign Policy * On Structure and Sources Chapter 2. 1966-69: Incubation of Strategies * The Early Years and the Eastern 'Propaganda Circus' * The Budapest Appeal: 'We Could Have Drafted it Ourselves' * Consultations Abroad, Electioneering at Home * Nobody Expects the Finnish Initiative * Promises of East-West Cooperation or an Instrument of Deutschlandpolitik? * Chancellery versus Auswärtiges Amt * Emphasis on Linkage: Bahr's Foreign Policy Plans on the Eve of the Election * Bonn and the Security Conference during the Interregnum * Conclusion Chapter 3. 1969-70: Bilateral Leverages and European Security * Western Support for the Linkage with Deutschlandpolitik * Horse-Trading in Moscow * Rethinking the Linkage Strategy * Berlin Surpasses Other Preconditions * Discovering the Potential of the CSCE * Conference on Security or Conference on Cooperation? * Conclusion Chapter 4. 1970-71: Transition to Western Multilateralism * Following the French Lead on Berlin Linkage * Defending the Berlin Precondition in Lisbon * Divergent Interpretations of the 'Successful Conclusion' * Nothing Quiet on the Western Front * Broadening the German Horizon in the NATO Framework * From America's Advocate to the Main Proponent of EPC * Conclusion Chapter 5. 1971-72: Towards a European Peace Order? * The Decline of the Linkage between the CSCE and Deutschlandpolitik * Hesitating on the Berlin Precondition * Blackmailing the Finns? * An Inner-German Shotgun Wedding * Europeanisation of Ostpolitik * In Defence of the Eastern Treaties and Bonn's Sovereignty * A New Flow of German Activity * Peaceful Change, Self-Determination of Peoples and Military Security * Freer Movement: Change through Rapprochement? * Berlin as a CSCE Location? * Avoiding Bilateralism * Conclusion Chapter 6. 1972-75: Deutschlandpolitik at the Conference * Alphabet Diplomacy in Dipoli * Peaceful Change, Act 1: Defending the Moscow Treaty * Peaceful Change, Act 2: Enter Genscher * Peaceful Change, Act 3: Commas for the National Interest * Basket III: Human Contacts * Follow-up and Berlin * Conclusion Chapter 7. Conclusion: Evolution instead of Revolution Sources and Bibliography Index
List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements Chapter 1. Introduction: Era of Negotiations * European Détente * The CSCE * German Foreign Policy * On Structure and Sources Chapter 2. 1966-69: Incubation of Strategies * The Early Years and the Eastern 'Propaganda Circus' * The Budapest Appeal: 'We Could Have Drafted it Ourselves' * Consultations Abroad, Electioneering at Home * Nobody Expects the Finnish Initiative * Promises of East-West Cooperation or an Instrument of Deutschlandpolitik? * Chancellery versus Auswärtiges Amt * Emphasis on Linkage: Bahr's Foreign Policy Plans on the Eve of the Election * Bonn and the Security Conference during the Interregnum * Conclusion Chapter 3. 1969-70: Bilateral Leverages and European Security * Western Support for the Linkage with Deutschlandpolitik * Horse-Trading in Moscow * Rethinking the Linkage Strategy * Berlin Surpasses Other Preconditions * Discovering the Potential of the CSCE * Conference on Security or Conference on Cooperation? * Conclusion Chapter 4. 1970-71: Transition to Western Multilateralism * Following the French Lead on Berlin Linkage * Defending the Berlin Precondition in Lisbon * Divergent Interpretations of the 'Successful Conclusion' * Nothing Quiet on the Western Front * Broadening the German Horizon in the NATO Framework * From America's Advocate to the Main Proponent of EPC * Conclusion Chapter 5. 1971-72: Towards a European Peace Order? * The Decline of the Linkage between the CSCE and Deutschlandpolitik * Hesitating on the Berlin Precondition * Blackmailing the Finns? * An Inner-German Shotgun Wedding * Europeanisation of Ostpolitik * In Defence of the Eastern Treaties and Bonn's Sovereignty * A New Flow of German Activity * Peaceful Change, Self-Determination of Peoples and Military Security * Freer Movement: Change through Rapprochement? * Berlin as a CSCE Location? * Avoiding Bilateralism * Conclusion Chapter 6. 1972-75: Deutschlandpolitik at the Conference * Alphabet Diplomacy in Dipoli * Peaceful Change, Act 1: Defending the Moscow Treaty * Peaceful Change, Act 2: Enter Genscher * Peaceful Change, Act 3: Commas for the National Interest * Basket III: Human Contacts * Follow-up and Berlin * Conclusion Chapter 7. Conclusion: Evolution instead of Revolution Sources and Bibliography Index
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