Is Britain prepared to defend itself, or only to play a part in Armageddon? Examining recently released British government documents, this study presents a moral history of British defense policy. Roger Ruston analyzes government rationales for Britain's dependence on weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, arguing they are often essentially rationalizations for unstoppable political programs divorced from defense needs and morality.
Is Britain prepared to defend itself, or only to play a part in Armageddon? Examining recently released British government documents, this study presents a moral history of British defense policy. Roger Ruston analyzes government rationales for Britain's dependence on weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, arguing they are often essentially rationalizations for unstoppable political programs divorced from defense needs and morality.
former Lecturer in Ethics and Moral Theology at Blackfriars, Oxford.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction PART I: JUST WAR AND ITS ENEMIES: Should war be humanized? Weapons, targets, and the law New uses for an old theory The rules of just war Non-combatant immunity and its critics LESSONS OF THE PAST 1: APPEASEMENT: The lesson and its teachers Arms and security Appeasement or Armegeddon? The anti-Soviet element LESSONS OF THE PAST 2: STRATEGIC BOMBING: From 1917 to 1939: The theory The moral background From 1939 to 1945: The practice The official version Reprisals in ethics and law conclusions PART II: WEAPON FOR A FIRST CLASS NATION, 1941-1952: The decisive weapon The bomb is made and used Labour inherits the bomb Strategic priorities The importance of the Soviet threat - and the American presence The British bomb becomes a reality The silence of the moralists JOINING THE 'H-CLUB', 1953-1956: The year of the H-bomb Massive retaliation and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe Nuclear revisionism: graduated deterrence conclusions DETERRENCE ON THE CHEAP, 1957-1964: The new defence policy of 1957 Deterrence or defence? A say in the end of the world: Britain's independent contribution Macmillan and the test ban The question of strategy The symbolic value of possession Labour and unilateralism Unacceptable damage: How Polaris would be used Moral critique, 1957-1964 conclusions POLARIS AND DETENTE, 1965-1976: The changing outlook on defence Flexible response Detente and 'The continuing threat' American actions - British responsibilities Would Polaris always get through? conclusions CRISIS OVER MODERNIZATION, 1977-1987: The new insecurity Long range theatre nuclear weapons Replacing Polaris The INF agreement The new nuclear debate conclusions PART III: THE ETHICS OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: Preventing war The question of limits Two kinds of deterrence The limit of limits The control of nuclear war conclusions CONCLUSIONS.
Introduction PART I: JUST WAR AND ITS ENEMIES: Should war be humanized? Weapons, targets, and the law New uses for an old theory The rules of just war Non-combatant immunity and its critics LESSONS OF THE PAST 1: APPEASEMENT: The lesson and its teachers Arms and security Appeasement or Armegeddon? The anti-Soviet element LESSONS OF THE PAST 2: STRATEGIC BOMBING: From 1917 to 1939: The theory The moral background From 1939 to 1945: The practice The official version Reprisals in ethics and law conclusions PART II: WEAPON FOR A FIRST CLASS NATION, 1941-1952: The decisive weapon The bomb is made and used Labour inherits the bomb Strategic priorities The importance of the Soviet threat - and the American presence The British bomb becomes a reality The silence of the moralists JOINING THE 'H-CLUB', 1953-1956: The year of the H-bomb Massive retaliation and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe Nuclear revisionism: graduated deterrence conclusions DETERRENCE ON THE CHEAP, 1957-1964: The new defence policy of 1957 Deterrence or defence? A say in the end of the world: Britain's independent contribution Macmillan and the test ban The question of strategy The symbolic value of possession Labour and unilateralism Unacceptable damage: How Polaris would be used Moral critique, 1957-1964 conclusions POLARIS AND DETENTE, 1965-1976: The changing outlook on defence Flexible response Detente and 'The continuing threat' American actions - British responsibilities Would Polaris always get through? conclusions CRISIS OVER MODERNIZATION, 1977-1987: The new insecurity Long range theatre nuclear weapons Replacing Polaris The INF agreement The new nuclear debate conclusions PART III: THE ETHICS OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: Preventing war The question of limits Two kinds of deterrence The limit of limits The control of nuclear war conclusions CONCLUSIONS.
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