24,99 €
inkl. MwSt.
Versandfertig in über 4 Wochen
12 °P sammeln
Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Society for Pure English Tract 4 (Esprios Classics)]( "Society for Pure English Tract 4 (Esprios Classics)")
Society for Pure English Tract 4 (Esprios Classics)18,99 €![The Wonder Approach: Rescuing Children's Innate Desire to Learn]( "The Wonder Approach: Rescuing Children's Innate Desire to Learn")
The Wonder Approach: Rescuing Children's Innate Desire to Learn21,99 €![Landscape of Desire]( "Landscape of Desire")
Landscape of Desire22,99 €![POSSESSION AND DESIRE Working with addiction, compulsion, and dependency]( "POSSESSION AND DESIRE Working with addiction, compulsion, and dependency")
POSSESSION AND DESIRE Working with addiction, compulsion, and dependency15,99 €![Transparent Conducting Pure and Tin Doped Indium Oxide Films - Preparation and Characterization]( "Transparent Conducting Pure and Tin Doped Indium Oxide Films - Preparation and Characterization")
Transparent Conducting Pure and Tin Doped Indium Oxide Films - Preparation and Characterization13,99 €![Pure Genius]( "Pure Genius")
Pure Genius25,99 €![Pure National Security Strategy]( "Pure National Security Strategy")
Pure National Security Strategy59,99 €
We hold various attitudes towards the world. We believe that it is going to rain tomorrow; we desire that our favourite sports team wins the championship. This thesis is a philosophical investigation into the nature of such mental states, also known as "the attitudes". In particular, I am interested in what makes an attitude the type of attitude that it is (e.g. a belief rather than a desire). According to the dominant view, attitudes have two components. The first component is their representational content. A belief that it is going to rain tomorrow represents that it is going to rain tomorrow. The second component is the attitude type: e.g. belief and desire. It is this second component that distinguishes a belief that it is going to rain tomorrow from a desire that it is going to rain tomorrow. Traditionally, philosophers have been primarily interested in the representational content of mental states. As a result, the second component of the attitudes has been neglected. In this thesis I investigate this second component. In particular, I am interested in the question of what it is for a given mental state to be the kind of attitude it is: what it is to be a belief rather than a desire.