This volume critically discusses therelationship between democracy and constitutionalism. It does so with a view torespond to objections raised by legal and political philosophers who aresceptical of judicial review based on the assumption that judicial review is anundemocratic institution. The book builds on earlier literature on the moraljustification of the authority of constitutional courts, and on the currentattempts to develop a system on "weak judicial review". Although different intheir approach, the chapters all focus on devising institutions, proceduresand, in a more abstract way,…mehr
This volume critically discusses therelationship between democracy and constitutionalism. It does so with a view torespond to objections raised by legal and political philosophers who aresceptical of judicial review based on the assumption that judicial review is anundemocratic institution. The book builds on earlier literature on the moraljustification of the authority of constitutional courts, and on the currentattempts to develop a system on "weak judicial review". Although different intheir approach, the chapters all focus on devising institutions, proceduresand, in a more abstract way, normative conceptions to democratizeconstitutional law. These democratizing strategies may vary from a radicalobjection to the institution of judicial review, to a more modest proposal tojustify the authority of constitutional courts in their "deliberativeperformance" or to create constitutional juries that may be more aware of acommunity's constitutional morality than constitutional courts are. The book connects abstract theoreticaldiscussions about the moral justification of constitutionalism with concreteproblems, such as the relation between constitutional adjudication anddeliberative democracy, the legitimacy of judicial review in internationalinstitutions, the need to create new institutions to democratizeconstitutionalism, the connections between philosophical conceptions andconstitutional practices, the judicial review of constitutional amendments, andthe criticism on strong judicial review.
I Challenging and Defending JudicialReview.- 1. Randomized Judicial Review; Andrei Marmor.- 2. On the Difficulty toGround the Authority of Constitutional Courts: Can Strong Judicial Review beMorally Justified?; Thomas Bustamante.- 3. The Reasons without Vote: TheRepresentative and Majoritarian Function of Constitutional Courts; Luís RobertoBarroso.- II Constitutional Dialogues and Constitutional Deliberation.- 4.Decoupling Judicial Review From Judicial Supremacy; Stephen Gardbaum.- 5. Scopeand limits of dialogic constitutionalism; Roberto Gargarella.- 6. A Defence ofa Broader Sense of Constitutional Dialogues based on Jeremy Waldron's Criticismon Judicial Review; Bernardo Gonçalves Fernandes.- III Institutional Alternativesfor Constitutional Changes.- 7. New Institutional Mechanisms for Making ConstitutionalLaw; Mark Tushnet.- 8. Democratic Constitutional Change: AssessingInstitutional Possibilities; Christopher Zurn.- 9. The Unconstitutionality ofConstitutional Changesin Colombia: a Tension between Majoritatian andConstitutional Democracy; Gonzalo Ramírez Cleves.- IV Constitutional Promisesand Democratic Participation.- 10. Is there such thing as a radical constitution?;Vera Karam de Chueiri.- 11. Judicial reference to community values - A pointertowards constitutional juries?; Eric Ghosh.- V Legal Theory and ConstitutionalInterpretation.- 12. Common Law Constitutionalism and the Written Constitution;Wil Waluchow and Katharina Stevens.- 13. On how law is not like chess - Dworkinand the theory of conceptual types; Ronaldo Porto Macedo Júnior.
I Challenging and Defending Judicial Review.- 1. Randomized Judicial Review; Andrei Marmor.- 2. On the Difficulty to Ground the Authority of Constitutional Courts: Can Strong Judicial Review be Morally Justified?; Thomas Bustamante.- 3. The Reasons without Vote: The Representative and Majoritarian Function of Constitutional Courts; Luís Roberto Barroso.- II Constitutional Dialogues and Constitutional Deliberation.- 4. Decoupling Judicial Review From Judicial Supremacy; Stephen Gardbaum.- 5. Scope and limits of dialogic constitutionalism; Roberto Gargarella.- 6. A Defence of a Broader Sense of Constitutional Dialogues based on Jeremy Waldron's Criticism on Judicial Review; Bernardo Gonçalves Fernandes.- III Institutional Alternatives for Constitutional Changes.- 7. New Institutional Mechanisms for Making Constitutional Law; Mark Tushnet.- 8. Democratic Constitutional Change: Assessing Institutional Possibilities; Christopher Zurn.- 9. The Unconstitutionality of Constitutional Changesin Colombia: a Tension between Majoritatian and Constitutional Democracy; Gonzalo Ramírez Cleves.- IV Constitutional Promises and Democratic Participation.- 10. Is there such thing as a radical constitution?; Vera Karam de Chueiri.- 11. Judicial reference to community values - A pointer towards constitutional juries?; Eric Ghosh.- V Legal Theory and Constitutional Interpretation.- 12. Common Law Constitutionalism and the Written Constitution; Wil Waluchow and Katharina Stevens.- 13. On how law is not like chess – Dworkin and the theory of conceptual types; Ronaldo Porto Macedo Júnior.
I Challenging and Defending JudicialReview.- 1. Randomized Judicial Review; Andrei Marmor.- 2. On the Difficulty toGround the Authority of Constitutional Courts: Can Strong Judicial Review beMorally Justified?; Thomas Bustamante.- 3. The Reasons without Vote: TheRepresentative and Majoritarian Function of Constitutional Courts; Luís RobertoBarroso.- II Constitutional Dialogues and Constitutional Deliberation.- 4.Decoupling Judicial Review From Judicial Supremacy; Stephen Gardbaum.- 5. Scopeand limits of dialogic constitutionalism; Roberto Gargarella.- 6. A Defence ofa Broader Sense of Constitutional Dialogues based on Jeremy Waldron's Criticismon Judicial Review; Bernardo Gonçalves Fernandes.- III Institutional Alternativesfor Constitutional Changes.- 7. New Institutional Mechanisms for Making ConstitutionalLaw; Mark Tushnet.- 8. Democratic Constitutional Change: AssessingInstitutional Possibilities; Christopher Zurn.- 9. The Unconstitutionality ofConstitutional Changesin Colombia: a Tension between Majoritatian andConstitutional Democracy; Gonzalo Ramírez Cleves.- IV Constitutional Promisesand Democratic Participation.- 10. Is there such thing as a radical constitution?;Vera Karam de Chueiri.- 11. Judicial reference to community values - A pointertowards constitutional juries?; Eric Ghosh.- V Legal Theory and ConstitutionalInterpretation.- 12. Common Law Constitutionalism and the Written Constitution;Wil Waluchow and Katharina Stevens.- 13. On how law is not like chess - Dworkinand the theory of conceptual types; Ronaldo Porto Macedo Júnior.
I Challenging and Defending Judicial Review.- 1. Randomized Judicial Review; Andrei Marmor.- 2. On the Difficulty to Ground the Authority of Constitutional Courts: Can Strong Judicial Review be Morally Justified?; Thomas Bustamante.- 3. The Reasons without Vote: The Representative and Majoritarian Function of Constitutional Courts; Luís Roberto Barroso.- II Constitutional Dialogues and Constitutional Deliberation.- 4. Decoupling Judicial Review From Judicial Supremacy; Stephen Gardbaum.- 5. Scope and limits of dialogic constitutionalism; Roberto Gargarella.- 6. A Defence of a Broader Sense of Constitutional Dialogues based on Jeremy Waldron's Criticism on Judicial Review; Bernardo Gonçalves Fernandes.- III Institutional Alternatives for Constitutional Changes.- 7. New Institutional Mechanisms for Making Constitutional Law; Mark Tushnet.- 8. Democratic Constitutional Change: Assessing Institutional Possibilities; Christopher Zurn.- 9. The Unconstitutionality of Constitutional Changesin Colombia: a Tension between Majoritatian and Constitutional Democracy; Gonzalo Ramírez Cleves.- IV Constitutional Promises and Democratic Participation.- 10. Is there such thing as a radical constitution?; Vera Karam de Chueiri.- 11. Judicial reference to community values - A pointer towards constitutional juries?; Eric Ghosh.- V Legal Theory and Constitutional Interpretation.- 12. Common Law Constitutionalism and the Written Constitution; Wil Waluchow and Katharina Stevens.- 13. On how law is not like chess – Dworkin and the theory of conceptual types; Ronaldo Porto Macedo Júnior.
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