Simon Haykin
Fundamentals of Cognitive Radio
Simon Haykin
Fundamentals of Cognitive Radio
- Gebundenes Buch
- Merkliste
- Auf die Merkliste
- Bewerten Bewerten
- Teilen
- Produkt teilen
- Produkterinnerung
- Produkterinnerung
Wireless communication systems increasingly use cognition to enhance their networks. With this comprehensive resource, readers will discover how the use of cognitive techniques helps to improve wireless communication. Starting with chapters on resource allocation, cellular networks, and cognitive radio, the book progresses to game theory, variational inequalities, control theory, and reinforcement learning. The material then delves into spectrum sensing, dynamic spectrum management, and transmit power control and, ultimately, investigates the dynamics of cognitive radio networks.
Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
- Prabhat ThakurSpectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks141,99 €
- Ekram HossainRadio Resource Management139,99 €
- Dominique ParetFlexray and Its Applications132,99 €
- Huadong MoCyber-Physical Distributed Systems147,99 €
- Dale StaceyAeronautical Radio Communication Systems and Networks178,99 €
- Gang TaoAdaptive Control of Systems with Actuator and Sensor Nonlinearities211,99 €
- Stamatios V. KartalopoulosFault Detectability in Dwdm138,99 €
-
-
-
Wireless communication systems increasingly use cognition to enhance their networks. With this comprehensive resource, readers will discover how the use of cognitive techniques helps to improve wireless communication. Starting with chapters on resource allocation, cellular networks, and cognitive radio, the book progresses to game theory, variational inequalities, control theory, and reinforcement learning. The material then delves into spectrum sensing, dynamic spectrum management, and transmit power control and, ultimately, investigates the dynamics of cognitive radio networks.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Adaptive and Cognitive Dynamic Systems: Signal Processing, Learning, Communications and Control
- Verlag: Wiley & Sons
- 1. Auflage
- Seitenzahl: 240
- Erscheinungstermin: 31. Juli 2017
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 237mm x 158mm x 22mm
- Gewicht: 504g
- ISBN-13: 9781118302965
- ISBN-10: 1118302966
- Artikelnr.: 38107345
- Adaptive and Cognitive Dynamic Systems: Signal Processing, Learning, Communications and Control
- Verlag: Wiley & Sons
- 1. Auflage
- Seitenzahl: 240
- Erscheinungstermin: 31. Juli 2017
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 237mm x 158mm x 22mm
- Gewicht: 504g
- ISBN-13: 9781118302965
- ISBN-10: 1118302966
- Artikelnr.: 38107345
PEYMAN SETOODEH is a Professor at the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran. SIMON HAYKIN is a Distinguished University Professor at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.
List of Figures xv List of Tables xxiii Preface xxv Acknowledgments xxvii
Acronyms xxix 1 Introduction 1 1.1 The Fourth Industrial Revolution 1 1.2
Cognitive Radio 4 1.3 The Spectrum-Underutilization Problem 7 1.4
Countrywide Measurements of Spectrum Utilization 8 1.5 Why be Interested in
Cognitive Radio Networks? 9 1.6 Directed Information Flow 11 1.7 Cognitive
Radio Networks 14 1.8 Mathematical Toolbox 17 1.8.1 Game Theory 17 1.8.2
Control Theory 18 1.8.3 Optimization under Uncertainty 19 1.9 Dominant
Sources of Uncertainty in Cognitive Radio Networks 20 1.10 Issue of
Trustworthiness 22 1.11 Vision for the Book 22 2 GameTheory 25 2.1 Game
Theory Terminology 25 2.1.1 Noncooperative Games versus Cooperative Games
26 2.1.2 Static Games versus Dynamic Games 26 2.1.3 One-Shot Games versus
Repeated Games 26 2.1.4 Games with Complete Information versus Games with
Incomplete Information 26 2.1.5 Games with Perfect Information versus Games
with Imperfect Information 26 2.2 Noncooperative Games 27 2.2.1 Nash
Equilibrium 28 2.2.2 Variational Inequalities 28 2.3 Cooperative Games 28
2.3.1 Nash Bargaining 29 2.4 Minority Games 29 2.5 Concluding Remarks 30 3
Cognitive Radio Transceiver 31 3.1 Spectrum Sensing 32 3.1.1 Attributes of
Reliable Spectrum Sensing 33 3.1.2 The Multitaper Method 33 3.1.3
Space-Time Processing 38 3.1.4 Time-Frequency Analysis 41 3.1.5
Cyclostationarity: Fourier Perspective 50 3.1.6 Rayleigh Fading Channels 54
3.1.7 Remarks on Nonparametric Spectrum Sensing 55 3.1.8 Filter-Bank
Implementation of the Multitaper Method 57 3.1.9 Cooperative Spectrum
Sensing 57 3.2 Dynamic Spectrum Management 58 3.2.1 The Tsigankov-Koulakov
Model 60 3.2.2 Self-Organizing Dynamic Spectrum Management 61 3.2.3 Dynamic
Spectrum Management Based on Minority Games 68 3.2.4 Self-Organized Maps
versus Minority Games 70 3.3 Transmit-Power Control 71 3.3.1 Waterfilling
Interpretation of Information Capacity Theorem 75 3.3.2 Iterative
Waterfilling Algorithm (IWFA) 77 3.3.3 IWFA as a Multistage Optimization
Problem in Light of System Uncertainties 80 3.3.4 Robust IWFA 80 3.3.5 The
Price of Robustness 81 3.3.6 Robust IWFA versus Classic IWFA 82 3.4
Information Value 91 3.5 Concluding Remarks 93 4 Cognitive Radio Networks
94 4.1 Cognitive Radio Networks Viewed as Spectrum-Supply Chain Networks 94
4.2 Open-access Cognitive Radio Networks 99 4.2.1 Network Dynamics 102
4.2.2 Cognitive Radio Network Viewed as a Hybrid Dynamic System 109 4.2.3
Network Stability in the Presence of Uncertainty and Time Delay 111 4.2.4
Double-layer Dynamics of Cognitive Radio Networks 115 4.3 Market-driven
Cognitive Radio Networks 121 4.3.1 Legacy Owners 124 4.3.2 Spectrum Brokers
125 4.3.3 Secondary Users 126 4.3.4 Equilibrium of the Spectrum-Supply
Chain Network 127 4.3.5 Network Dynamics 129 4.3.6 Network Stability 129
4.3.7 The Transportation Network Representation of the Spectrum-Supply
Chain Network 129 4.4 Supply Chain Efficiency 131 4.5 Concluding Remarks
133 4.5.1 Two Regimes of Cognitive Radio Networks 133 4.5.2 Supply Chain
Networks 135 4.5.3 Cognitive Radio Commercialization 136 4.5.4 The Role of
Cognition in Cognitive Radio Networks 137 5 Sustainability of the
Spectrum-Supply Chain Network 140 5.1 Unlicensed Bands as Public Goods 140
5.2 The Spectrum-Supply Chain Network as an Artificial Economy 142 5.3
Aiming for Lindahl Equilibria 144 5.4 Concluding Remarks 147 6 Cognitive
Heterogeneous Networks 148 6.1 Heterogeneous Networks 148 6.2 Horizontal
Mergers of Spectrum-Supply Chain Networks 151 6.2.1 Premerger Status 151
6.2.2 Spectrum Sharing 154 6.2.3 Infrastructure Sharing 155 6.2.4 Spectrum
and Infrastructure Sharing 155 6.3 Synergy Measure for Horizontal Mergers
155 6.4 Concluding Remarks 156 Appendix A Mathematical Model for
Open-Access Cognitive Radio Networks 157 Appendix B Proof of Theorems 167
References
Acronyms xxix 1 Introduction 1 1.1 The Fourth Industrial Revolution 1 1.2
Cognitive Radio 4 1.3 The Spectrum-Underutilization Problem 7 1.4
Countrywide Measurements of Spectrum Utilization 8 1.5 Why be Interested in
Cognitive Radio Networks? 9 1.6 Directed Information Flow 11 1.7 Cognitive
Radio Networks 14 1.8 Mathematical Toolbox 17 1.8.1 Game Theory 17 1.8.2
Control Theory 18 1.8.3 Optimization under Uncertainty 19 1.9 Dominant
Sources of Uncertainty in Cognitive Radio Networks 20 1.10 Issue of
Trustworthiness 22 1.11 Vision for the Book 22 2 GameTheory 25 2.1 Game
Theory Terminology 25 2.1.1 Noncooperative Games versus Cooperative Games
26 2.1.2 Static Games versus Dynamic Games 26 2.1.3 One-Shot Games versus
Repeated Games 26 2.1.4 Games with Complete Information versus Games with
Incomplete Information 26 2.1.5 Games with Perfect Information versus Games
with Imperfect Information 26 2.2 Noncooperative Games 27 2.2.1 Nash
Equilibrium 28 2.2.2 Variational Inequalities 28 2.3 Cooperative Games 28
2.3.1 Nash Bargaining 29 2.4 Minority Games 29 2.5 Concluding Remarks 30 3
Cognitive Radio Transceiver 31 3.1 Spectrum Sensing 32 3.1.1 Attributes of
Reliable Spectrum Sensing 33 3.1.2 The Multitaper Method 33 3.1.3
Space-Time Processing 38 3.1.4 Time-Frequency Analysis 41 3.1.5
Cyclostationarity: Fourier Perspective 50 3.1.6 Rayleigh Fading Channels 54
3.1.7 Remarks on Nonparametric Spectrum Sensing 55 3.1.8 Filter-Bank
Implementation of the Multitaper Method 57 3.1.9 Cooperative Spectrum
Sensing 57 3.2 Dynamic Spectrum Management 58 3.2.1 The Tsigankov-Koulakov
Model 60 3.2.2 Self-Organizing Dynamic Spectrum Management 61 3.2.3 Dynamic
Spectrum Management Based on Minority Games 68 3.2.4 Self-Organized Maps
versus Minority Games 70 3.3 Transmit-Power Control 71 3.3.1 Waterfilling
Interpretation of Information Capacity Theorem 75 3.3.2 Iterative
Waterfilling Algorithm (IWFA) 77 3.3.3 IWFA as a Multistage Optimization
Problem in Light of System Uncertainties 80 3.3.4 Robust IWFA 80 3.3.5 The
Price of Robustness 81 3.3.6 Robust IWFA versus Classic IWFA 82 3.4
Information Value 91 3.5 Concluding Remarks 93 4 Cognitive Radio Networks
94 4.1 Cognitive Radio Networks Viewed as Spectrum-Supply Chain Networks 94
4.2 Open-access Cognitive Radio Networks 99 4.2.1 Network Dynamics 102
4.2.2 Cognitive Radio Network Viewed as a Hybrid Dynamic System 109 4.2.3
Network Stability in the Presence of Uncertainty and Time Delay 111 4.2.4
Double-layer Dynamics of Cognitive Radio Networks 115 4.3 Market-driven
Cognitive Radio Networks 121 4.3.1 Legacy Owners 124 4.3.2 Spectrum Brokers
125 4.3.3 Secondary Users 126 4.3.4 Equilibrium of the Spectrum-Supply
Chain Network 127 4.3.5 Network Dynamics 129 4.3.6 Network Stability 129
4.3.7 The Transportation Network Representation of the Spectrum-Supply
Chain Network 129 4.4 Supply Chain Efficiency 131 4.5 Concluding Remarks
133 4.5.1 Two Regimes of Cognitive Radio Networks 133 4.5.2 Supply Chain
Networks 135 4.5.3 Cognitive Radio Commercialization 136 4.5.4 The Role of
Cognition in Cognitive Radio Networks 137 5 Sustainability of the
Spectrum-Supply Chain Network 140 5.1 Unlicensed Bands as Public Goods 140
5.2 The Spectrum-Supply Chain Network as an Artificial Economy 142 5.3
Aiming for Lindahl Equilibria 144 5.4 Concluding Remarks 147 6 Cognitive
Heterogeneous Networks 148 6.1 Heterogeneous Networks 148 6.2 Horizontal
Mergers of Spectrum-Supply Chain Networks 151 6.2.1 Premerger Status 151
6.2.2 Spectrum Sharing 154 6.2.3 Infrastructure Sharing 155 6.2.4 Spectrum
and Infrastructure Sharing 155 6.3 Synergy Measure for Horizontal Mergers
155 6.4 Concluding Remarks 156 Appendix A Mathematical Model for
Open-Access Cognitive Radio Networks 157 Appendix B Proof of Theorems 167
References
List of Figures xv List of Tables xxiii Preface xxv Acknowledgments xxvii
Acronyms xxix 1 Introduction 1 1.1 The Fourth Industrial Revolution 1 1.2
Cognitive Radio 4 1.3 The Spectrum-Underutilization Problem 7 1.4
Countrywide Measurements of Spectrum Utilization 8 1.5 Why be Interested in
Cognitive Radio Networks? 9 1.6 Directed Information Flow 11 1.7 Cognitive
Radio Networks 14 1.8 Mathematical Toolbox 17 1.8.1 Game Theory 17 1.8.2
Control Theory 18 1.8.3 Optimization under Uncertainty 19 1.9 Dominant
Sources of Uncertainty in Cognitive Radio Networks 20 1.10 Issue of
Trustworthiness 22 1.11 Vision for the Book 22 2 GameTheory 25 2.1 Game
Theory Terminology 25 2.1.1 Noncooperative Games versus Cooperative Games
26 2.1.2 Static Games versus Dynamic Games 26 2.1.3 One-Shot Games versus
Repeated Games 26 2.1.4 Games with Complete Information versus Games with
Incomplete Information 26 2.1.5 Games with Perfect Information versus Games
with Imperfect Information 26 2.2 Noncooperative Games 27 2.2.1 Nash
Equilibrium 28 2.2.2 Variational Inequalities 28 2.3 Cooperative Games 28
2.3.1 Nash Bargaining 29 2.4 Minority Games 29 2.5 Concluding Remarks 30 3
Cognitive Radio Transceiver 31 3.1 Spectrum Sensing 32 3.1.1 Attributes of
Reliable Spectrum Sensing 33 3.1.2 The Multitaper Method 33 3.1.3
Space-Time Processing 38 3.1.4 Time-Frequency Analysis 41 3.1.5
Cyclostationarity: Fourier Perspective 50 3.1.6 Rayleigh Fading Channels 54
3.1.7 Remarks on Nonparametric Spectrum Sensing 55 3.1.8 Filter-Bank
Implementation of the Multitaper Method 57 3.1.9 Cooperative Spectrum
Sensing 57 3.2 Dynamic Spectrum Management 58 3.2.1 The Tsigankov-Koulakov
Model 60 3.2.2 Self-Organizing Dynamic Spectrum Management 61 3.2.3 Dynamic
Spectrum Management Based on Minority Games 68 3.2.4 Self-Organized Maps
versus Minority Games 70 3.3 Transmit-Power Control 71 3.3.1 Waterfilling
Interpretation of Information Capacity Theorem 75 3.3.2 Iterative
Waterfilling Algorithm (IWFA) 77 3.3.3 IWFA as a Multistage Optimization
Problem in Light of System Uncertainties 80 3.3.4 Robust IWFA 80 3.3.5 The
Price of Robustness 81 3.3.6 Robust IWFA versus Classic IWFA 82 3.4
Information Value 91 3.5 Concluding Remarks 93 4 Cognitive Radio Networks
94 4.1 Cognitive Radio Networks Viewed as Spectrum-Supply Chain Networks 94
4.2 Open-access Cognitive Radio Networks 99 4.2.1 Network Dynamics 102
4.2.2 Cognitive Radio Network Viewed as a Hybrid Dynamic System 109 4.2.3
Network Stability in the Presence of Uncertainty and Time Delay 111 4.2.4
Double-layer Dynamics of Cognitive Radio Networks 115 4.3 Market-driven
Cognitive Radio Networks 121 4.3.1 Legacy Owners 124 4.3.2 Spectrum Brokers
125 4.3.3 Secondary Users 126 4.3.4 Equilibrium of the Spectrum-Supply
Chain Network 127 4.3.5 Network Dynamics 129 4.3.6 Network Stability 129
4.3.7 The Transportation Network Representation of the Spectrum-Supply
Chain Network 129 4.4 Supply Chain Efficiency 131 4.5 Concluding Remarks
133 4.5.1 Two Regimes of Cognitive Radio Networks 133 4.5.2 Supply Chain
Networks 135 4.5.3 Cognitive Radio Commercialization 136 4.5.4 The Role of
Cognition in Cognitive Radio Networks 137 5 Sustainability of the
Spectrum-Supply Chain Network 140 5.1 Unlicensed Bands as Public Goods 140
5.2 The Spectrum-Supply Chain Network as an Artificial Economy 142 5.3
Aiming for Lindahl Equilibria 144 5.4 Concluding Remarks 147 6 Cognitive
Heterogeneous Networks 148 6.1 Heterogeneous Networks 148 6.2 Horizontal
Mergers of Spectrum-Supply Chain Networks 151 6.2.1 Premerger Status 151
6.2.2 Spectrum Sharing 154 6.2.3 Infrastructure Sharing 155 6.2.4 Spectrum
and Infrastructure Sharing 155 6.3 Synergy Measure for Horizontal Mergers
155 6.4 Concluding Remarks 156 Appendix A Mathematical Model for
Open-Access Cognitive Radio Networks 157 Appendix B Proof of Theorems 167
References
Acronyms xxix 1 Introduction 1 1.1 The Fourth Industrial Revolution 1 1.2
Cognitive Radio 4 1.3 The Spectrum-Underutilization Problem 7 1.4
Countrywide Measurements of Spectrum Utilization 8 1.5 Why be Interested in
Cognitive Radio Networks? 9 1.6 Directed Information Flow 11 1.7 Cognitive
Radio Networks 14 1.8 Mathematical Toolbox 17 1.8.1 Game Theory 17 1.8.2
Control Theory 18 1.8.3 Optimization under Uncertainty 19 1.9 Dominant
Sources of Uncertainty in Cognitive Radio Networks 20 1.10 Issue of
Trustworthiness 22 1.11 Vision for the Book 22 2 GameTheory 25 2.1 Game
Theory Terminology 25 2.1.1 Noncooperative Games versus Cooperative Games
26 2.1.2 Static Games versus Dynamic Games 26 2.1.3 One-Shot Games versus
Repeated Games 26 2.1.4 Games with Complete Information versus Games with
Incomplete Information 26 2.1.5 Games with Perfect Information versus Games
with Imperfect Information 26 2.2 Noncooperative Games 27 2.2.1 Nash
Equilibrium 28 2.2.2 Variational Inequalities 28 2.3 Cooperative Games 28
2.3.1 Nash Bargaining 29 2.4 Minority Games 29 2.5 Concluding Remarks 30 3
Cognitive Radio Transceiver 31 3.1 Spectrum Sensing 32 3.1.1 Attributes of
Reliable Spectrum Sensing 33 3.1.2 The Multitaper Method 33 3.1.3
Space-Time Processing 38 3.1.4 Time-Frequency Analysis 41 3.1.5
Cyclostationarity: Fourier Perspective 50 3.1.6 Rayleigh Fading Channels 54
3.1.7 Remarks on Nonparametric Spectrum Sensing 55 3.1.8 Filter-Bank
Implementation of the Multitaper Method 57 3.1.9 Cooperative Spectrum
Sensing 57 3.2 Dynamic Spectrum Management 58 3.2.1 The Tsigankov-Koulakov
Model 60 3.2.2 Self-Organizing Dynamic Spectrum Management 61 3.2.3 Dynamic
Spectrum Management Based on Minority Games 68 3.2.4 Self-Organized Maps
versus Minority Games 70 3.3 Transmit-Power Control 71 3.3.1 Waterfilling
Interpretation of Information Capacity Theorem 75 3.3.2 Iterative
Waterfilling Algorithm (IWFA) 77 3.3.3 IWFA as a Multistage Optimization
Problem in Light of System Uncertainties 80 3.3.4 Robust IWFA 80 3.3.5 The
Price of Robustness 81 3.3.6 Robust IWFA versus Classic IWFA 82 3.4
Information Value 91 3.5 Concluding Remarks 93 4 Cognitive Radio Networks
94 4.1 Cognitive Radio Networks Viewed as Spectrum-Supply Chain Networks 94
4.2 Open-access Cognitive Radio Networks 99 4.2.1 Network Dynamics 102
4.2.2 Cognitive Radio Network Viewed as a Hybrid Dynamic System 109 4.2.3
Network Stability in the Presence of Uncertainty and Time Delay 111 4.2.4
Double-layer Dynamics of Cognitive Radio Networks 115 4.3 Market-driven
Cognitive Radio Networks 121 4.3.1 Legacy Owners 124 4.3.2 Spectrum Brokers
125 4.3.3 Secondary Users 126 4.3.4 Equilibrium of the Spectrum-Supply
Chain Network 127 4.3.5 Network Dynamics 129 4.3.6 Network Stability 129
4.3.7 The Transportation Network Representation of the Spectrum-Supply
Chain Network 129 4.4 Supply Chain Efficiency 131 4.5 Concluding Remarks
133 4.5.1 Two Regimes of Cognitive Radio Networks 133 4.5.2 Supply Chain
Networks 135 4.5.3 Cognitive Radio Commercialization 136 4.5.4 The Role of
Cognition in Cognitive Radio Networks 137 5 Sustainability of the
Spectrum-Supply Chain Network 140 5.1 Unlicensed Bands as Public Goods 140
5.2 The Spectrum-Supply Chain Network as an Artificial Economy 142 5.3
Aiming for Lindahl Equilibria 144 5.4 Concluding Remarks 147 6 Cognitive
Heterogeneous Networks 148 6.1 Heterogeneous Networks 148 6.2 Horizontal
Mergers of Spectrum-Supply Chain Networks 151 6.2.1 Premerger Status 151
6.2.2 Spectrum Sharing 154 6.2.3 Infrastructure Sharing 155 6.2.4 Spectrum
and Infrastructure Sharing 155 6.3 Synergy Measure for Horizontal Mergers
155 6.4 Concluding Remarks 156 Appendix A Mathematical Model for
Open-Access Cognitive Radio Networks 157 Appendix B Proof of Theorems 167
References