David Cheng Chang

The Hijacked War

The Story of Chinese POWs in the Korean War

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Drawing on newly declassified archival materials from China, Taiwan, and the United States and interviews with surviving Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war, Chang depicts the struggle over prisoner repatriation that dominated the second half of the Korean War, from late 1951 to July 1953, in the prisoners' own words.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 496
• Erscheinungstermin: 7. Januar 2020
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 233mm x 162mm x 40mm
• Gewicht: 936g
• ISBN-13: 9781503604605
• ISBN-10: 1503604608
• Artikelnr.: 48861542

Autorenporträt

David Cheng Chang is Assistant Professor of History at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
Introduction
chapter abstract
The Introduction establishes the centrality of the Chinese prisoners in the
second half of the war and suggests a new periodization highlighting the
war over prisoners. The Korean War was in fact two wars: the first was
fought over territory from June 1950 to June 1951; the second was fought
over prisoners from late 1951 to July 1953. While the first war restored
the territorial status quo ante bellum, the second war's only visible
outcome was the "defection" of some fourteen thousand Chinese prisoners to
Taiwan and seven thousand North Korean prisoners to South Korea-nearly
doubling the length of the war and inflicting numerous casualties on all
sides, including 12,300 American deaths in the last two years. The war was
hijacked by misguided US policies and a core of Chinese anti-Communist
prisoners. This chapter suggests that this surprise outcome was one reason
the war became America's "forgotten war."
1Fleeing or Embracing the Communists in the Chinese Civil War
chapter abstract
This chapter traces the divergent Civil War experiences of several future
POWs: a Nationalist paratrooper, a Nationalist-turned-Communist doctor,
three Taiwanese teenagers who joined the Nationalist army and fought on the
mainland, a Tsinghua University student-turned-Communist underground agent,
two Whampoa Military Academy cadets fleeing Manchuria, a forcibly
conscripted Sichuanese turned a proud PLA soldier, and several idealistic
students. While the Communists' ruthless persecution of the rich horrified
some young people, their vastly superior discipline, vigor, and
purposefulness-in contrast to the Nationalists-held powerful political and
emotional appeal, especially for young people who had been neglected or
oppressed under the Nationalist regime.
2Reforming Former Nationalists
chapter abstract
This chapter examines the thought reform experiences of Nationalist
officers, Whampoa cadets, and enlisted men in the Communist army in 1950,
some of whom later became defectors and anti-Communist prisoner leaders and
activists in Korea. Meticulously planned, thoroughly implemented, and
backed by the threat of violence, Communist thought reform combined intense
indoctrination with mandatory participation and performance. By the end of
1950, after a year-long indoctrination, or "thought reform," ex-Nationalist
personnel-"liberated soldiers"-seemed to have completely surrendered to
their captors, physically, emotionally, and sometimes intellectually as
well. While the Communist ideology and methods won some converts, others
remained unconvinced. To survive, however, these dissenters had to hide
their resentment under the guise of complete submission. Thanks to their
extensive and painful experiences under the Communists, ex-Nationalists
acquired the essential Communist techniques: relentless indoctrination with
mandatory participation and performance and iron discipline reinforced by
mutual surveillance.
3Desperados and Volunteers
chapter abstract
The Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPV) was a misnomer artfully chosen to
camouflage China's strategic intentions and lure the Americans into
underestimating China's commitment and strength in Korea. It was made up of
PLA units with the same designation; more than 60 to 70 percent of its
troops consisted of former Nationalists. New recruits were also added.
While some were drafted by local government using hoaxes, others
volunteered for the army in a desperate move to escape local persecution
during the "Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries"-the "bloody
honeymoon" in the first year of the People's Republic. Going to war in
Korea gave those disaffected young men their final opportunity to escape
Communist China.
4Chiang, MacArthur, Truman, and NSC-81/1
chapter abstract
This chapter first shifts the focus to Taiwan, where Chiang Kai-shek fled
and made his final stand, fearing an imminent Communist invasion in spring
1950. With the outbreak of the Korean War, Washington reversed its
hands-off policy and committed to deny Taiwan to the Communists. General
MacArthur's visit to Taiwan from July 31 to August 1, 1950, gave Chiang's
regime a morale boost and opened the door to future intelligence
collaboration. President Truman and General MacArthur met on Wake Island on
October 15. Crossing the 38th parallel had been a foregone conclusion, as
Truman had signed NSC-81/1 four days before the Inchon landing, authorizing
a rollback in North Korea. Contrary to the popular belief that they focused
on China's possible intervention, their main discussion item was the
postwar rehabilitation of the entire Korean peninsula, including the
reorientation or reindoctrination of POWs-another mandate of NSC-81/1.
5Defectors and Prisoners in the First Three Chinese Offensives
chapter abstract
This chapter covers the first three Chinese offensives from late October
1950 to early January 1951, during which the CPV achieved near complete
surprise and decisively defeated the UN Command (UNC) troops in a series of
epic battles, including the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir. Despite the
UNC's utter defeat and hasty retreat, 1,245 Chinese prisoners were captured
by the end of December 1950. This chapter sketches the experiences of
several defectors, who risked their lives to cross the lines to surrender
and provided valuable intelligence that might have saved American lives.
Some of them later became anti-Communist prisoner leaders in POW camps.
6Ridgway's Turnaround, MacArthur's Exit, and Taiwan's Entry
chapter abstract
This chapter studies the critical period from January to April 1951, when
General Matthew Ridgway, the new Eighth Army commander, successfully turned
around the war in Korea. The UNC repelled the Chinese Fourth Offensive and
launched a counteroffensive. During the intense fighting, more Chinese
prisoners were captured. Taking great risks, defectors escaped and
surrendered to the UNC, including some of the future anti-Communist POW
leaders. Even though MacArthur was dismissed by President Truman in April,
he left a little-known but highly consequential legacy: the hiring of more
than seventy interpreters from Taiwan, some of whom would play an
instrumental role in the rise of anti-Communist POWs. In addition,
Washington authorized the expansion of the prisoner indoctrination program
to include Chinese POWs.
7The Fifth Offensive Debacle
chapter abstract
This chapter dissects the Chinese Fifth Offensive (Spring Offensive)
debacle, especially the destruction of the CPV 180th Division-one of the
most humiliating defeats in Chinese Communist military history. Over three
months, 15,510 CPV soldiers were captured-more than 70 percent of the
21,074 Chinese prisoners captured in the entire war. Drawing on both
Chinese and American military sources, this chapter reconstructs the
Chinese offensive and UNC counteroffensive and siege. It shows Chinese
military leadership at all levels-from General Peng Dehuai's general
headquarters, to the III Army Group, and to the 60th Army and the 180th
Division-was arbitrary, careless, and disorderly. In the final stage of its
siege, the 180th Division's commanders made the decision to "disperse and
escape"-a code word for abandoning their troops. Using oral history and
prisoner interrogation reports, this chapter also traces CPV soldiers'
battle experiences and defectors' escapes in intimate detail.
8Civil War in the POW Camps
chapter abstract
This chapter investigates the rise of Chinese anti-Communist prisoners in
UNC prison camps in Pusan and on Koje Island, where more than 150,000
Chinese and North Korean POWs were held. Unlike the North Korean prisoners,
whose military organization remained largely intact, the Chinese Communist
officers sought to hide their identities to avoid interrogation by G-2 and
persecution by the US Army. Chinese defectors served as trusties,
cooperating with G-2 to identify Communist officers for interrogation and
helping prison authorities arrest Communist "troublemakers." As mandated by
Washington, the Civil Information and Education program began its
reindoctrination project in August 1952, relying on educated anti-Communist
prisoners as instructors. Chinese anti-Communist POWs combined Communist
methods of thought control and mandatory participation with Nationalist
methods of physical punishment. They established control over the two
largest Chinese compounds, 72 and 86, with a combined population of more
than sixteen thousand.
9The Debate over Prisoner Repatriation in Washington, Panmunjom, and Taipei
chapter abstract
Chapter 9 delineates the origin and evolution of Washington's policy on
prisoner repatriation, which unexpectedly became the main stumbling block
in armistice negotiations in Panmunjom. While Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai
took the negotiations extremely seriously and assembled China's first team
of negotiators, President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson paid scant
attention, leaving the talks in the hands of military officers without
assistance from diplomats and China experts. Voluntary repatriation was
first introduced as a bargaining position; but once it was publicized, the
United States found it impossible to retreat from this moralistic position.
As top officials withheld unsavory facts and vexing complexities, Truman
made the final decision to uphold voluntary repatriation. "The Chinese have
influenced the course of events in Koje-do and at Panmunjom," lamented the
US ambassador.
10Screening: "Voluntary Repatriation" Turns Violent
chapter abstract
In early April 1952, Communist negotiators acquiesced to the UNC's proposal
to screen prisoners in order to determine a "round number" of prisoners
wishing to return. While the screening process itself was free, horrific
violence had occurred on the eve of the screening. This chapter documents
the widespread torture and several cases of murder of pro-Communist
prisoners by anti-Communist trusties, who succeeded in intimating fellow
prisoners from choosing repatriation. In anti-Communist-controlled
Compounds 72 and 86, more than 85 percent of the sixteen thousand prisoners
refused repatriation. Just as the armistice line of 1953 changed little
from the battle line of summer 1951, it is no exaggeration to say that the
final breakdown of repatriation choices had been determined in the months
leading up to April 1952.
11General Dodd's Kidnapping and General Boatner's Crackdown
chapter abstract
This chapter narrates Koje prison commandant General Francis Dodd's
kidnapping by North Korean prisoners and his successor Haydon Boatner's
crackdown on North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoners, who had been
separated from the anti-Communists. With methodical planning and a firm
hand, "Old China Hand" Boatner tamed the newly formed Chinese Communist
Compound 602. He also broke up North Korean Compound 76, whose prisoners
had kidnapped Dodd, and restored order on Koje Island. But his success was
short-lived, as he was soon promoted and headed stateside.
12China Hands on Koje and Cheju
chapter abstract
This chapter examines the roles played by several low-ranking "Old China
Hands" on Koje and Cheju island. Philip Manhard, a junior Foreign Service
officer who began learning Chinese in 1948, was posted on Koje per
Acheson's instructions. He authored several reports highly critical of the
UNC prison authorities and anti-Communist trusties. The openly
anti-Communist Catholic Chaplain Thomas O'Sullivan also served as an
interpreter and became involved in the death of a Communist prisoner. MP
Captain Joseph Brooks, who claimed that his Chinese wife and child had been
killed by the Communists, became increasingly hostile toward Chinese
Communist prisoners. Trouble was brewing on Cheju Island.
13October 1 Massacre on Cheju
chapter abstract
Chapter 13 investigates the deadly incident on October 1, 1952, that
resulted in the deaths of fifty-six Chinese pro-Communist prisoners. US
internal investigation reports and interviews with several Chinese
witnesses and an American soldier who fired into the crowd debunk the US
official claim of a mass prison break. In the lead-up to the incident,
there had been a period of high-octane confrontation and mutual insults.
The prison authorities had ordered guards to "shoot to kill" prisoners for
any and all aggressive actions. The military police unit was led by the
openly hostile Captain Brooks; Communist prisoners were commanded by
equally bellicose leaders, who secretly ordered the assassination of
Brooks. A clash was all but inevitable.
14Exchanges and "Explanation"
chapter abstract
Chapter 14 examines the repatriation of pro-Communist prisoners in August
and September 1953 and the subsequent 90-day "Explanation" for the
anti-Communists and their eventual release to Taiwan in January 1954. This
chapter also turns to the story of the twelve Chinese and seventy-six
Korean prisoners who chose neutral nations and went to India. It highlights
the roles played by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) and
the Custodial Forces of India, which administered the anti-Communist
prisoners at Panmunjom. The prisoners' experiences are told through oral
histories, including those of China- and Taiwan-bound prisoners, and two
neutral-nation-bound prisoners, a Chinese and a North Korean, who chose
neutral nations and are now living in Argentina.
15Prisoner-Agents of Unit 8240
chapter abstract
Chapter 15 uncovers the hitherto unknown history of prisoner-turned-agents.
Between late 1951 and early 1954, several hundred Chinese prisoners
disappeared from prison camps and were declared to have "escaped." They
were drafted by a US military intelligence unit-the Far East Command
Liaison Detachment (Korea), the 8240th Army Unit. After some crude
training, they infiltrated into North Korea by air, by sea, or by land, and
had to return to the UNC side on foot. More than half of these
prisoner-agents-probably more than two hundred-were killed or captured
during missions, and some of the captured were executed by the PRC. The
program practically destroyed the best educated and most committed Chinese
anti-Communist prisoners. This chapter draws on interviews with several of
the seventy survivors who went to Taiwan, detailing their narrow escape
from death and the loss of their comrades.
16Aftermath
chapter abstract
This chapter sketches prisoners' postwar lives in Taiwan, the PRC, and
India, and subsequently Latin America. None of the 7,110 POWs who were
repatriated to China between April 1953 and January 1954 went home
directly, as they were subjected to a yearlong investigation that resulted
in the expulsion of 91.8 percent of the 2,900 Communist members from the
CCP, dishonorable discharge of 4,600 repatriates from the PLA counting from
the date of their capture, the expulsion of some 700 men from the PLA, and
the arrest of a small number of traitors and spy suspects. No one was
allowed to rejoin the PLA. What followed was lifetime stigma and
persecution. In contrast, few of the 14,000 Taiwan-bound prisoners were
allowed to quit the military, where they were closely monitored. While some
prisoners became victims of the White Terror, others found opportunities in
Taiwan's increasingly free and prosperous society.
Conclusion
chapter abstract
Voluntary repatriation and prisoner reindoctrination, the twin US policies
in the second half of the Korean War-the war over the prisoners-were major
failures, as they achieved none of their original objectives and denied the
rights of the majority of prisoners while protecting only a minority. No
one had anticipated the price for paying lip service to fighting the
Chinese Communists-with propaganda and psychological warfare-could be so
dear. The United States had paid a punishing price for its arrogance toward
the Chinese and its ignorance about the Chinese Communists in the Korean
War, but few understand why the war was fought for three years instead of
one. It is a lesson that remains to be learned.