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Produktbild: Seeing, Knowing, and Doing

Seeing, Knowing, and Doing A Perceptualist Account

36,99 €

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

18.04.2025

Verlag

Oxford University Press

Seitenzahl

244

Maße (L/B/H)

23,4/15,7/2,3 cm

Gewicht

363 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-19-780234-2

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

18.04.2025

Verlag

Oxford University Press

Seitenzahl

244

Maße (L/B/H)

23,4/15,7/2,3 cm

Gewicht

363 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-19-780234-2

Herstelleradresse

Libri GmbH
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: gpsr@libri.de

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  • Produktbild: Seeing, Knowing, and Doing

    • Preface

    • Acknowledgments

    • Introduction

    • Part One: Perception

    • Chapter 1 Perception and Perceptual Belief: Seeing and Knowing the Physical World

    • I. Perception Broadly Conceived

    • II. Four Structurally Distinct Cases of Perception

    • III. The Representational Character of Perception

    • Chapter 2 Dimensions of Perceptual Content

    • I. Three Categories of Perceptual Content

    • II. Singular Reference and the Possible Role of Russellian Propositions

    • III. Perception and Belief: Cognitive and Conceptual Aspects

    • Chapter 3 Perceptual Levels and their Action-Theoretic Counterparts

    • I. Perception and Action: The Structural Analogy

    • II. Constitutive Elements in the Visual Perception of Physical Objects

    • III. Awareness of Events and Abstract Entities

    • IV. The Epistemological Significance of Perceptual Levels

    • V. Is Perception Theory-Laden?

    • VI. The Importance of "Background Beliefs" and Perceptual Levels

    • VII. Aspectual Perception, Inference, and Recognition

    • Chapter 4 Perception as a Source of Knowledge and Justification

    • I. Perceptual Knowledge

    • II. The Hierarchical Character of Perception

    • III. Perceptual Justification: External and Internal Dimensions

    • IV. The Perceptibility of Normative Properties

    • Chapter 5 Reasons, Perceptual Grounds, and Normative Explanation

    • I. The Diversity of Reasons for Belief

    • II. Reasons as Distinguished from Grounds

    • III. Reasons and Grounds for Belief: The Practical Analogy

    • IV. Reasons as Explanations

    • V. Normative Reasons and their Grounds

    • Chapter 6 The Autonomy of Justification

    • I. Epistemological Internalism

    • II. Does Knowledge Entail Justification?

    • III. The Practice-Relativity of Justification

    • IV. An Integrated View of Knowledge and Justification

    • V. The Disjunctivist Challenge

    • VI. The Elusive Notion of the Content of Perceptual Belief

    • VII. Perception and Singular Reference

    • Part Two: Perception and the A Priori

    • Chapter 7 Perception, Intuition, and Apprehension

    • I. Perception and Intuition

    • II. Structural Parallels between Intuitional and Perceptional Discourse

    • III. Intuitions as Evidential Cognitions: Two Intuitionist Traditions

    • IV. Intuitions as Apprehensions

    • Chapter 8 Toward a Theory of the A Priori

    • I. The Concept of Self-Evidence

    • II. Understanding as Central for Knowledge of the Self-evident

    • III. Understanding and Imagination

    • IV. Major Elements in the Understanding of Propositions

    • V. Degrees of Understanding and Propositional Justification

    • VI. Comprehensional Adequacy

    • VII. Obstacles to Comprehension

    • Chapter 9 Apriority, Disputability, and Necessity

    • I. Self-Evidence and Provability

    • II. Can Rational Disagreement Extend to the Self-Evident?

    • III. The Self-Evident, the Obvious, and the Credible

    • IV. Apprehension of Abstract Entities

    • V. Apriority and Necessity

    • Part Three: Practical Knowledge

    • Chapter 10 Knowledge, Belief, and Action

    • I. Belief and Action

    • II. Two Orders of Cognitive Disposition

    • III. Belief and Knowledge, Intention and Action

    • Chapter 11 Knowing, Reasoning, and Doing

    • I. Intellectualism as a Perspective on Action

    • II. Practical Knowledge and Knowledge of the Practical

    • III. Virtual Knowledge: A Neglected Category

    • IV. The Place of Knowledge in Practical Reasoning

    • Chapter 12 Inference and Its Role in Rational Action

    • I. Inference and Inferential Belief

    • II. Inference, Reasoning, and Premise-Based Belief-Formation

    • III. Reasoning and Rational Action

    • IV. The Scope of Rational Action

    • V. Intentionality, Knowledge, and Agency

    • Conclusion: Perception, Apprehension, and Action

    • References

    • Index