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Produktbild: Philosophy, Politics, and Economics

Philosophy, Politics, and Economics An Introduction

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

16.11.2021

Verlag

University Presses

Seitenzahl

336

Maße (L/B/H)

23,4/15,6/2 cm

Gewicht

590 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-691-21979-0

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

16.11.2021

Verlag

University Presses

Seitenzahl

336

Maße (L/B/H)

23,4/15,6/2 cm

Gewicht

590 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-691-21979-0

Herstelleradresse

Libri GmbH
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: GPSR Kontakt

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  • Produktbild: Philosophy, Politics, and Economics

    • Preface
    • Introduction
    • 1 Rationality
      • Rationality and Choice
      • What Is Rationality?
        • Rationality as Effectiveness
        • Subjective Rationality
        • Rationality and Sound Belief
        • Rational Belief and Choice
        • Rationality and Goals
      • Actions and Goals
      • From Rational Choice to Homo Economicus
        • Optimizing—More Is Better than Less
        • Decreasing Marginal Value
        • The Law of Demand—Downward Sloping Demand Curves
        • Self-Interest
        • Constrained Maximization
      • Conclusion
      • Discussion Questions
      • 2 Ordinal Utility Theory
        • Building Blocks
        • Preferences
          • Preferences as Tastes or Desires
          • Revealed Preferences: The Behavioral Interpretation
        • Deliberation, Actions, and Outcomes
          • Actions and Outcomes
          • Preferences Over Actions
        • Ordinal Utility Theory
          • Why Accept the Axioms?
        • Conclusion
        • Discussion Questions
        • 3 Cardinal Utility
          • Cardinal Utility
            • Generating Cardinal Utilities
            • Representation of Utility
            • Interpersonal Comparisons
            • Expected Utility
          • Questioning the Axioms
            • Continuity
            • Better Prizes
            • The Allais Paradox
            • The Ellsberg Paradox
            • Prospect Theory
          • Psychology and Expected Utility Theory
            • Errors in Probability Judgments
            • Framing Effects
            • Endowment Effects
            • Do These Findings Undermine Expected Utility Theory?
          • The Relation Between Utility Theory and Rationality
            • Rationality and Maximizing Utility
          • Conclusion
          • Discussion Questions
          • 4 Efficiency and Contract
            • Rationality and Efficiency
            • Exchange and the Edgeworth Box
            • Problems with Pareto Efficiency
              • Indeterminacy
              • Path-Dependence
              • Conflicts Between Efficiency and Rationality
            • Efficiency and Welfare
              • Markets and Efficiency
            • Externalities
              • Compensation and Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency
            • Welfare, Rights, and the Liberal Paradox
            • Property Rights
              • Using Rights to Define Externalities
              • The Coase Theorem
            • Public Goods
              • Non-Excludability and the Free-Rider Problem
              • Non-Rival Consumption
              • Public Goods and State Action
              • Homo Economicus or Voluntary Cooperation?
            • Conclusion
            • Discussion Questions
            • 5 Foundations of Game Theory
              • Strategic Rationality
              • Zero-Sum Games
                • Extensive Form Zero-Sum Games
              • The Prisoner’s Dilemma
                • Rationality and Efficiency
                • Public Goods and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
              • Coordination Games
                • Chicken
                • Stag Hunt
                • Battle of the Sexes
              • Dominance and Rationalizability
              • Mixed Strategies
                • The Nash Existence Theorem
                • Mixed Strategies in a Coordination Game
                • Do People Play Nash?
              • Subgame Perfection and Backwards Induction
                • The Farmer’s Game
                • Two Kidnappers
                • Backwards Induction
                • Gauthier’s Solution
                • Nuclear Deterrence
                • Commitment
              • Conclusion
              • Discussion Questions
              • 6 Advanced Topics in Game Theory
                • Repeated Games
                  • Tit-for-Tat and the Evolution of Cooperation
                  • The Folk Theorem
                  • The Evolution of Direct Reciprocity
                • Evolutionary Games
                  • Hawk-Dove Game
                  • Evolutionary Stable Strategies
                  • Asymmetries and the Origin of Property Rights
                  • Polymorphic Equilibria
                  • ESS and Nash
                  • Evolutionary Game Theory and Rationality
                • Signaling
                • Bargaining Theory
                • Conclusion
                • Discussion Questions
                • 7 Conventions, Norms, and Institutions
                  • Conventions
                    • Conventions and Coordination
                    • How Do Conventions Emerge?
                    • Common Knowledge
                    • Conventions and Arbitrariness
                    • Convention and Contract
                  • Social Norms
                    • What Norms Do
                    • Norms and Cooperation
                    • Norms and Nash
                    • Bad Norms
                  • Institutions
                    • Two Types of Institutions
                    • Institutions and Transaction Costs
                  • Conclusion
                  • Discussion Questions
                  • 8 Social Choice Theory
                    • The Problem of Social Choice
                    • Social Choice Theory
                      • Collective Rationality
                    • May’s Theorem and Majority Rule
                      • May’s Conditions
                      • May’s Argument
                    • Arrow’s Theorem
                      • Condorcet Voting and Its Paradox
                      • Arrow’s Conditions
                      • The First Stage of the Theorem: From Local Semi-Decisiveness to Global Decisiveness
                      • The Second Stage of the Theorem: Finding the Dictator
                      • Representation and Coherence
                    • The Importance of Arrow’s Theorem
                      • Does Arrow’s Theorem Challenge Democracy?
                      • Dimensionality
                      • Collective Choice Rules
                      • Problems of Collective Choice Rules
                    • Extending Social Choice Rules
                      • Condorcet Method
                      • A Weakly Positional Method: Plurality
                      • A Strongly Positional Method: Borda Count
                      • Cardinal Methods
                      • Elimination Methods
                      • What to Choose?
                    • Path Dependency and Agenda Manipulation
                      • Path Dependency in Legislation
                      • Agenda Control in the Flying Club
                    • Strategic Voting
                      • Other Examples of Strategic Voting
                      • Logrolling: Vote Trading in Legislatures
                      • The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
                    • Conclusion
                    • Discussion Questions
                    • 9 Public Choice and Democracy
                      • Basic Spatial Model of Democracy
                        • Uncertainty and Ideology
                        • The Simple Spatial Model
                        • Complicating the Basic Spatial Model
                        • The Plurality Rule and the Two-Party System
                      • Choosing the Rules
                        • Unanimity
                        • Bicameralism
                        • Logrolling and Making Everyone Worse Off
                        • Intertemporal Coalitions
                      • Homo Economicus and the Symmetry Assumption
                        • Voting and Rationality
                        • Non-Electoral Utility
                        • The Act and Expression of Voting
                      • Conclusion
                      • Discussion Questions
                      • Bibliography
                      • Index