Vor Ort
Merkzettel Warenkorb
Produktbild: Philosophy of Language

Philosophy of Language

36,99 €

inkl. gesetzl. MwSt., Versandkostenfrei

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

24.09.2012

Verlag

Princeton University Press

Seitenzahl

200

Maße (L/B/H)

21,6/14/1,1 cm

Gewicht

259 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-691-15597-5

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

24.09.2012

Verlag

Princeton University Press

Seitenzahl

200

Maße (L/B/H)

21,6/14/1,1 cm

Gewicht

259 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-691-15597-5

Herstelleradresse

Libri GmbH
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: GPSR Kontakt

Noch keine Bewertungen vorhanden

Verfassen Sie die erste Bewertung zu diesem Artikel

Helfen Sie anderen Kundinnen und Kunden durch Ihre Meinung.

Kundinnen und Kunden meinen

Bewertungen (0)
Die Leseprobe wird geladen.
  • Produktbild: Philosophy of Language


    • Acknowledgments

    • Introduction

    • PART ONE: A Century of Work in the Philosophy of Language

    • CHAPTER ONE

    • The Logical Study of Language

      • 1.1 Gottlob Frege-Origins of the Modern Enterprise

        • 1.11 Foundations of Philosophical Semantics

        • 1.12 Frege’s Distinction between Sense and Reference

        • 1.13 The Compositionality of Sense and Reference

        • 1.14 Frege’s Hierarchy of Indirect Senses and Referents

        • 1.15 The Semantic Importance of Frege’s Platonist Epistemology

        • 1.16 Potential Problems and Alternative Analyses

        • 1.17 The Fregean Legacy


      • 1.2 Bertrand Russell: Fundamental Themes

        • 1.21 Quantification, Propositions, and Propositional Functions

        • 1.22 Generalized Quantifiers

        • 1.23 Denoting Phrases, Definite Descriptions, and Logical Form

        • 1.24 Russell’s Theory of Scope

        • 1.25 Thought, Meaning, Acquaintance, and Logically Proper Names

        • 1.26 Existence and Negative Existentials


      • Selected Further Reading

      • CHAPTER TWO

      • Truth, Interpretation, and Meaning

        • 2.1 The Importance of Tarski

          • 2.11 Truth, Models, and Logical Consequence

          • 2.12 The Significance of Tarski for the Philosophy of Language


        • 2.2 Rudolf Carnap’s Embrace of Truth-Theoretic Semantics

        • 2.3 The Semantic Approach of Donald Davidson

        • Selected Further Reading

        • CHAPTER THREE

        • Meaning, Modality, and Possible Worlds Semantics

          • 3.1 Kripke-Style Possible Worlds Semantics

          • 3.2 Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis on Counterfactuals

          • 3.3 The Montagovian Vision

          • Selected Further Reading


        • CHAPTER FOUR

        • Rigid Designation, Direct Reference, and Indexicality

          • 4.1 Background

          • 4.2 Kripke on Names, Natural Kind Terms, and Necessity

            • 4.21 Rigid Designation, Essentialism, and Nonlinguistic Necessity

            • 4.22 The Nondescriptive Semantics of Names

            • 4.23 Natural Kind Terms

            • 4.24 Kripke’s Essentialist Route to the Necessary Aposteriori


          • 4.3 Kaplan on Direct Reference and Indexicality

            • 4.31 Significance: The Tension between Logic and Semantics

            • 4.32 The Basic Structure of the Logic of Demonstratives

            • 4.33 Direct Reference and Rigid Designation

            • 4.34 ‘Dthat’ and ‘Actually’

            • 4.35 English Demonstratives vs. ‘Dthat’-Rigidified Descriptions

            • 4.36 Final Assessment


          • Selected Further Reading

          • PART TWO: New Directions

          • CHAPTER FIVE

          • The Metaphysics of Meaning: Propositions and Possible Worlds

            • 5.1 Loci of Controversy

            • 5.2 Propositions

              • 5.21 Why We Need Them and Why Theories of Truth Conditions Can’t Provide Them

              • 5.22 Why Traditional Propositions Won’t Do

              • 5.23 Toward a Naturalistic Theory of Propositions

                • 5.231 The Deflationary Approach

                • 5.232 The Cognitive-Realist Approach


              • 5.3 Possible World-States

                • 5.31 How to Understand Possible World-States

                • 5.32 The Relationship between Modal and Nonmodal Truths

                • 5.33 Our Knowledge of World-States

                • 5.34 Existent and Nonexistent World-States

                • 5.35 The Function of World-States in Our Theories


              • Selected Further Reading

              • CHAPTER SIX

              • Apriority, Aposteriority, and Actuality

                • 6.1 Language, Philosophy, and the Modalities

                • 6.2 Apriority and Actuality

                  • 6.21 Apriori Knowledge of the Truth of Aposteriori Propositions at the Actual World-State

                  • 6.22 The Contingent Apriori and the Apriori Equivalence of P and the Proposition That P Is True at @

                  • 6.23 Why Apriority Isn’t Closed under Apriori Consequence: Two Ways of Knowing @

                  • 6.24 Apriori Truths That Are Known Only Aposteriori

                  • 6.25 Apriority and Epistemic Possibility

                  • 6.26 Are Singular Thoughts Instances of the Contingent Apriori?


                • 6.3 ‘Actually’

                • Selected Further Reading

                • CHAPTER SEVEN

                • The Limits of Meaning

                  • 7.1 The Traditional Conception of Meaning, Thought, Assertion, and Implicature

                  • 7.2 Challenges to the Traditional Conception

                    • 7.21 Demonstratives: A Revision of Kaplan

                    • 7.22 Incomplete Descriptions, Quantifiers, and Context

                    • 7.23 Pragmatic Enrichment and Incomplete Semantic Contents

                      • 7.231 Implicature, Impliciture, and Assertion

                      • 7.232 Pervasive Incompleteness? Possessives, Compound Nominals, and Temporal Modification


                    • 7.3 A New Conception of the Relationship between Meaning, Thought, Assertion, and Implicature

                      • 7.31 The Guiding Principle

                      • 7.32 Demonstratives and Incomplete Descriptions Revisited

                      • 7.33 Names and Propositional Attitudes


                    • 7.4 What Is Meaning? The Distinction between Semantics and Pragmatics

                    • Selected Further Reading

                    • References

                    • Index