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  • Produktbild: Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind
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Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind

Aus der Reihe Academic

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

05.11.2012

Verlag

Oxford University Press

Seitenzahl

286

Maße (L/B/H)

24/16,1/2 cm

Gewicht

596 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-19-537945-7

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

05.11.2012

Verlag

Oxford University Press

Seitenzahl

286

Maße (L/B/H)

24/16,1/2 cm

Gewicht

596 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-19-537945-7

Herstelleradresse

Libri GmbH
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: gpsr@libri.de

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  • Produktbild: Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind
  • Produktbild: Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind


    • Preface


    • 1: Introduction: The Mind, the Computer, and the Alternatives


    • 1.1: The Mind as Computer


    • 1.2: The Alternatives: The Varieties of Situated Cognition


    • 1.3: Looking Ahead


    • 1.4: Strategy and Methods


    • 1.4.1: Slaying the Cartesian Beast?


    • 1.4.2: The Scope of Situated Views


    • 1.4.3: Philosophy of Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind


    • 1.5: The Book's Conclusions


    • Part I: The Thinking Organism


    • 2: Principles of Demarcation


    • 2.1: The Challenge of Demarcation


    • 2.2: Extension-Friendly Principles of Demarcation


    • 2.2.1: The Causal Principle


    • 2.2.2: Epistemic Dependence


    • 2.2.3: Metaphysical Necessity and Sufficiency


    • 2.2.4: Clark and Chalmers's Four Criteria


    • 2.3: The Parity Principle


    • 2.4: Conclusion


    • 3: Cognitive Systems and Demarcation


    • 3.1: The Success of Cognitive Psychology


    • 3.2: The Systems-based View


    • 3.2.1: In Outline


    • 3.2.2: A Technical Elaboration


    • 3.2.3: The Virtues of the Systems-based View


    • 3.3: Two Arguments against the Extended View


    • 3.4: Extension-Friendly Rejoinders


    • 3.4.1: Organism-Centered Cognition


    • 3.4.2: Abstract Properties and Extended Systems


    • 3.4.3: Growing and Shrinking Systems


    • 3.5: The No-Self View


    • 3.5.1: Cognitive Systems without Robust Selves


    • 3.5.2: The No-Self View and Arguments against the Extended Approach


    • 3.5.3: Rejoinder and Response


    • 4: Realization and Extended Cognition


    • 4.1: The Argument from Empirical Success and Methodology, Restated


    • 4.2: Extended Cognition and Realization


    • 4.3: Functionalism and the Causal Constraint on Realization


    • 4.4: The Argument from Causal Interaction


    • 4.4.1: Basic Statement of the Argument


    • 4.4.2: Premise One


    • 4.4.3: Premise Two


    • 4.4.4: Premise Four and Beyond


    • 4.4.5: A Rejoinder and a Rebuttal


    • 4.5: Wide Realization, Total Realization, and Causal Powers


    • 4.5.1: Wilson on Realization


    • 4.5.2: Semantic Externalism and Total Realization


    • 4.5.3: The Role of Relational Properties in Cognitive Science


    • 4.6: Cleaning Up


    • 4.6.1: Socially Embedded Properties and Wide Core Realization


    • 4.6.2: The Single-Neuron Argument


    • 4.6.3: Additional Support


    • Part II: Arguments for the Extended View


    • 5: Functionalism and Natural Kinds


    • 5.1: The Functionalist Argument


    • 5.2: The Natural-Kinds Argument


    • 5.3: The Empirical Response


    • 5.3.1: Short-Term External Memory?


    • 5.3.2: Cognitive Impartiality


    • 5.4: The Pragmatic Turn


    • 6: Developmental Systems Theory and the Scaffolding of Language


    • 6.1: Causal Spread and Complementary Role


    • 6.1.1: Nontrivial Causal Spread


    • 6.1.2: Environment as Complement


    • 6.2: A Case of Nontrivial Causal Spread: Developmental Systems Theory


    • 6.3: The Most Powerful Transformation: Language-Learning


    • 6.3.1: Linguistic Content and Thought Content


    • 6.3.2: Structural Effects


    • 7: Dynamical Systems Theory


    • 7.1: Dynamical Systems Theory and Cognitive Science


    • 7.2: Dynamical Systems and Extended Cognition: General Patterns of Argument


    • 7.3: Six Kinds of Dynamical-Systems-Based Model


    • 7.3.1: Model-Type One: Historical Grounding


    • 7.3.2: Model-Type Two: Organismically Internal Dynamical Interactions


    • 7.3.3: Model-Type Three: Active External Control


    • 7.3.4: Model-Type Four: Organismic Collective Variables, Extended Realizers


    • 7.3.5: Model-Type Five: Extended Collective Variable, Organismic Separability


    • 7.3.6: Model-Type Six: Extended Order Parameter, No Local Separability


    • 7.4: Evolution, Context-Dependence, and Epistemic Dependence


    • 8: The Experience of Extension and the Extension of Experience


    • 8.1: Cognitive Science and the In-Key Constraint


    • 8.2: The Phenomenology of Smooth Coping


    • 8.2.1: The Argument from Smooth Coping


    • 8.2.2: The Heideggerian Framework


    • 8.2.3: Wheeler's Appeal to Dynamical Systems Theory


    • 8.3: The Sense of One's Own Location


    • 8.4: Control-based Arguments


    • 8.5: Control Simpliciter


    • 8.6: Extended Cognition and Extended Experience


    • Part III: The Embedded and Embodied Mind


    • 9: Embedded Cognition and Computation


    • 9.1: The Embedded Approach


    • 9.2: Computation, Implementation, and Explicitly Encoded Rules


    • 9.3: Computationalism in Principle and Computationalism in Practice


    • 9.4: Timing, Computationalism, and Dynamical Systems Theory


    • 9.5: Conclusion


    • 10: Embedded Cognition and Mental Representation


    • 10.1: What Is Special about Embedded Representation?


    • 10.1.1: Detailed or Partial?


    • 10.1.2: Context-Dependent and Action-Oriented Representations


    • 10.1.3: Relational and Egocentric Representations


    • 10.2: Atomic Affordance Representations


    • 10.3: Embedded Models and External Content


    • 10.4: Innate Representations and the Inflexibility Objection


    • 10.5: Conclusion


    • 11: The Embodied View


    • 11.1: Preliminaries: Where the Disagreement Is Not


    • 11.1.1: Materialism


    • 11.1.2: Functionalism


    • 11.1.3: Arbitrary Symbols and Embodiment


    • 11.1.4: Abstract Symbols


    • 11.2: The Constraint Thesis


    • 11.3: The Content Thesis


    • 11.3.1: External Content


    • 11.3.2: Content-Determination by Causal Mediation


    • 11.3.3: Narrow Content


    • 11.4: Vehicles, Realizers, and Apportioning Explanation


    • 11.5: The Symbol-Grounding Problem


    • 11.5.1: Symbol-Grounding and Reference


    • 11.5.2: Symbol-Grounding and Narrow Content


    • 12: Summary and Conclusion


    • Works Cited


    • Index