Beschreibung
Produktdetails
Einband
Taschenbuch
Erscheinungsdatum
11.12.2008
Verlag
VDMSeitenzahl
100
Maße (L/B/H)
22/15/0,6 cm
Gewicht
167 g
Sprache
Deutsch
ISBN
978-3-639-10313-7
We think of ourselves as having reasons for action.
But what is it about us as rational agents, about our
rationality or our being rational agents, such that
we have reasons for action? How are we motivated by a
consideration in a manner that nonrational animals
are incapable of? The most common answer, that our
ability to form desires enables our having reasons
for action, is problematic in a number of ways;
instead, our ability to form beliefs about value
provides the correct account. From this it follows
that there are few motivational restrictions on what
can be a reason for action for a particular agent. It
is in the theory of value and not in the theory of
action that limitations on reasons must be sought.
This discussion will be relevant to those interested in
the theory of reasons, the distinction between the
practically rational and nonrational, the
relationship between desires and values, and the
limitations that a theory of motivation may place on
a theory of reasons for action.
But what is it about us as rational agents, about our
rationality or our being rational agents, such that
we have reasons for action? How are we motivated by a
consideration in a manner that nonrational animals
are incapable of? The most common answer, that our
ability to form desires enables our having reasons
for action, is problematic in a number of ways;
instead, our ability to form beliefs about value
provides the correct account. From this it follows
that there are few motivational restrictions on what
can be a reason for action for a particular agent. It
is in the theory of value and not in the theory of
action that limitations on reasons must be sought.
This discussion will be relevant to those interested in
the theory of reasons, the distinction between the
practically rational and nonrational, the
relationship between desires and values, and the
limitations that a theory of motivation may place on
a theory of reasons for action.
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