This book uses economic theory to argue that worker-controlled firms are rare due to market failures rather than inherent organizational defects. The book will be of interest to scholarly researchers, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates in economics, especially in industrial organization, labor economics, comparative economics, organizational economics, and finance.
This book uses economic theory to argue that worker-controlled firms are rare due to market failures rather than inherent organizational defects. The book will be of interest to scholarly researchers, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates in economics, especially in industrial organization, labor economics, comparative economics, organizational economics, and finance.
Gregory K. Dow has been Professor of Economics at Simon Fraser University, British Columbia since 1995 and chaired the economics department during 2001¿6. He has held previous academic positions at the University of Alberta and Yale University, Connecticut. His articles have appeared in the leading journals of the profession, including the American Economic Review and the Journal of Political Economy. His previous book Governing the Firm: Workers' Control in Theory and Practice was published by Cambridge in 2003.
Inhaltsangabe
Part I. Setting the Stage: 1. The puzzling asymmetry Part II. Perfection and Symmetry: 2. Profit maximization and control rights 3. The labor-managed firm in the short run 4. The labor-managed firm in the long run 5. The labor-managed firm in general equilibrium Part III. Imperfection and Asymmetry: 6. Empirical asymmetries (I) 7. Empirical asymmetries (II) 8. The rarity of labor-managed firms Part IV. Appropriation Problems: 9. Imperfect appropriation 10. Firm formation with adverse selection 11. Partnership markets with adverse selection Part V. Public Good Problems: 12. Collective choice and investor takeovers 13. Free riding and employee buyouts Part VI. Opportunism Problems (I): 14. Transaction cost economics 15. Firm-specific investments Part VII. Opportunism Problems (II): 16. Asset ownership and work incentives 17. Capital stocks and labor flows 18. Honest and dishonest controllers Part VIII. Synthesis and Agenda: 19. Breaking the symmetry 20. Policy directions.
Part I. Setting the Stage: 1. The puzzling asymmetry Part II. Perfection and Symmetry: 2. Profit maximization and control rights 3. The labor-managed firm in the short run 4. The labor-managed firm in the long run 5. The labor-managed firm in general equilibrium Part III. Imperfection and Asymmetry: 6. Empirical asymmetries (I) 7. Empirical asymmetries (II) 8. The rarity of labor-managed firms Part IV. Appropriation Problems: 9. Imperfect appropriation 10. Firm formation with adverse selection 11. Partnership markets with adverse selection Part V. Public Good Problems: 12. Collective choice and investor takeovers 13. Free riding and employee buyouts Part VI. Opportunism Problems (I): 14. Transaction cost economics 15. Firm-specific investments Part VII. Opportunism Problems (II): 16. Asset ownership and work incentives 17. Capital stocks and labor flows 18. Honest and dishonest controllers Part VIII. Synthesis and Agenda: 19. Breaking the symmetry 20. Policy directions.
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Shop der buecher.de GmbH & Co. KG Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg Amtsgericht Augsburg HRA 13309
