Peter Carruthers challenges the central assumptions of many philosophers on reflective thinking and consciousness. He draws on extensive knowledge of the scientific literature on working memory to argue that non-sensory propositional attitudes (such as beliefs, goals, and decisions) are never conscious, and never under direct intentional control.
Peter Carruthers challenges the central assumptions of many philosophers on reflective thinking and consciousness. He draws on extensive knowledge of the scientific literature on working memory to argue that non-sensory propositional attitudes (such as beliefs, goals, and decisions) are never conscious, and never under direct intentional control.
Peter Carruthers is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland. He is the author of numerous articles and books in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and has co-edited seven volumes of interdisciplinary essays in cognitive science.
Inhaltsangabe
1: Introduction 2: Propositional Attitudes 3: Perception, Attention, and Consciousness 4: The Nature of Working Memory 5: The Unity of Working Memory 6: Working Memory in Action 7: Reasoning, Working Memory, and Attitudes 8: The Evolution of Reflection 9: Conclusion: The Conscious Mind as Marionette References Index of names Index of subjects
1: Introduction 2: Propositional Attitudes 3: Perception, Attention, and Consciousness 4: The Nature of Working Memory 5: The Unity of Working Memory 6: Working Memory in Action 7: Reasoning, Working Memory, and Attitudes 8: The Evolution of Reflection 9: Conclusion: The Conscious Mind as Marionette References Index of names Index of subjects
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