Jonathan FloydIs Political Philosophy Impossible?
Thoughts and Behaviour in Normative Political Theory
Jonathan Floyd is a Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Bristol. He has written widely on questions of method and justification in political philosophy and is co-editor of Political Philosophy versus History (Cambridge, 2011).
Part I. Introduction: 1. What is this book about?
2. Synopsis of chapter one
3. Synopsis of chapter two
4. Synopsis of chapter three
5. Who am I to say this?
Part II. Symptom: Interminability: 6. Overview
7. Three questions: OQ, FQ, SQ
8. Rawls and a few of his rivals
9. A reassessment of the problem and a switch in literature
10. Isaiah Berlin: from value-pluralism, to universal evils, to liberalism
11. Rawls' second set of answers: from reasonableness to liberalism
12. United by an ideal of democracy?
13. United by an ideal of tolerance?
14. Stuart Hampshire and a second argument from universal evils
15. Joseph Raz: practical reason as a guide to political morality
16. Alasdair Macintyre: competing traditions as a guide to morality
17. Rorty's liberalism by redescription
18. A variety of further responses: denial, judgement, deferral
19. Interminability described
the impossibility thesis introduced
20. The impossibility thesis sustained
21. Summary of arguments and a sketch of what follows
Part III. Diagnosis: Mentalism: 22. Introduction
23. What mentalism is
24. Mentalism's techniques
25. Three types of mentalist evidence and a synopsis of why mentalism fails
26.1. The evidence for failure: impartial choices
26.2. The evidence for failure: considered judgements
26.3. The evidence for failure: intuitive choices of abstract principle
27. Normative dissonance in full view
28. Objections and clarifications
29. The problem restated
Part IV. Cure: Normative Behaviourism: 30. Introduction
31. Normative behaviourism: a brief sketch
32.1. Preliminaries: facts, principles, thoughts, and behavior
32.2. Preliminaries: reasonable objections, causes/purposes, reliable tendencies, and the case for experimental optimism
33. An explanatory theory of social-liberal-democracy's success
34. The relationship between normative behaviourism, psychological behaviourism, political behaviouralism, and political science more generally
35. Reasons to be convinced by social-liberal-democracy
36. Normative behaviourism defended against five objections
37. Conclusions
Part V. Conclusion: 38. Overview
39. Reiteration: out of the cave and on the way to Denmark
40. Clarification by way of a new set of comparisons
41. Concessions and reflections.
