Alexander Sarch

Criminally Ignorant

Why the Law Pretends We Know What We Don't

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

The willful ignorance doctrine says defendants should sometimes be treated as if they know what they don't. This book provides a careful defense of this method of imputing mental states. Though the doctrine is only partly justified and requires reform, it also demonstrates that the criminal law needs more legal fictions of this kind. The resulting theory of when and why the criminal law can pretend we know what we don't has far-reaching implications forlegal practice and reveals a pressing need for change.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 296
• Erscheinungstermin: 26. Juni 2019
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 236mm x 155mm x 23mm
• Gewicht: 567g
• ISBN-13: 9780190056575
• ISBN-10: 0190056576
• Artikelnr.: 55184517

Autorenporträt

Alexander Sarch is a Reader (Associate Professor) and Interim Head of School at the University of Surrey, School of Law.

Inhaltsangabe

* Acknowledgements
* Introduction
* PART I: Foundations
* Chapter 1: Criminal Law Basics and the Willful Ignorance Doctrine
* Chapter 2: What Is Criminal Culpability?
* Part II: From Willful Ignorance to a Theory of Equal Culpability
Imputation
* Chapter 3: The Scope of the Willful Ignorance Doctrine (I)
* Chapter 4: The Scope of the Willful Ignorance Doctrine (II): The Duty
to Reasonably Inform Oneself
* Chapter 5: Toward a Normative Theory of Equal Culpability Imputation
* Part III: Beyond Willful Ignorance
* Chapter 6: Iterated Reckless Ignorance as a Substitute for knowledge
* Chapter 7: Substituting Willful Ignorance for Purpose?
* Chapter 8: Sub-Willful Motivated Ignorance
* Chapter 9: Corporations Keeping Themselves in the Dark
* Conclusion