Hicham Safieddine

Banking on the State

The Financial Foundations of Lebanon

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Hicham Safieddine is Lecturer in the History of the Modern Middle East at King's College London.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 272
• Erscheinungstermin: 2. Juli 2019
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 228mm x 151mm x 20mm
• Gewicht: 420g
• ISBN-13: 9781503609679
• ISBN-10: 1503609677
• Artikelnr.: 53536865

Autorenporträt

Hicham Safieddine is Lecturer in the History of the Modern Middle East at King's College London.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
1Introduction: Illusions of Financial Independence
chapter abstract
The introduction highlights the fact that although insightful studies of
colonizing projects and postcolonial Arab state formation in a late and
post-Ottoman context have covered the realms of education, military, law,
civic space, and, later, the economy, Lebanese finance has rarely if ever
been studied. This book addresses that lacuna. It explores the role of
central banking in the making of Middle Eastern states both at the level of
challenging dominant ideologies of political economy, like Michel Chiha's
laissez-faire paradigm, and at the level of rethinking institution-building
in relation to private lobbying groups like the Association of Banks in
Lebanon and government regulatory structures like the central bank. The
introduction offers an alternative reading of Lebanon's political economy
that shies away from the fetishized invocation of sectarianism as a primary
explanatory variable of historical change.
2The Long Monetary Mandate
chapter abstract
Chapter 2 traces the evolution of central banking in Lebanon first under
the Ottoman Imperial bank (BIO) and later under French occupation. The
BIO's successor, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban (BSL), became the primary
institutional guardian of a long French monetary mandate over Lebanon and
Syria. Colonial authority guaranteed BSL legitimacy and its privileged
position within an emerging national space. In return, BSL policies
reproduced the dominance of French capital in the money market. More
broadly, mandatory financial regulations, including BSL policies, played a
central role in the formation of a new monetary space stretching from
Lebanon to Iraq that underpinned the emergence of what is best described as
heteronomous national economies.
3Central Bank Reform: Ideas and Institutions
chapter abstract
The conflict over Lebanon's financial regulatory regime and economic
orientation was not only of interests, but also of ideas. Chapter 3
explores the role of a group of "money doctors" at the International
Monetary Fund and the American University of Beirut who tried to argue for
economic reform and banking regulation after World War II. They challenged
the dominant paradigm of laissez-faire espoused by followers of Michel
Chiha in public fora like the Cénacle libanais and acted as emissaries of
global currents of thought, namely, a modified version of economic
institutionalism as propounded by the U.S. economist Wesley Mitchell. The
chapter examines the ideal central bank prototypes that they believed
"underdeveloped" countries like Lebanon should adopt.
4Barons of Banking: The Untouchables
chapter abstract
Chapter 4 recounts the conflict within the bankers' ranks and vis-à-vis
state technocrats and government ministers over the form and extent of
banking regulation during the post-World War II post-World War II "merchant
republic" era." The chapter examines failed projects of setting up
development banks and traces the transformation of the banking community
into an organized and powerful lobby thanks to the efforts led by the Eddé
brothers, Raymond and Pierre. The former introduced banking secrecy
legislation. The latter spearheaded the formation of the association of
banks in Lebanon (ABL) in 1959, the first of its kind in the Arab world.
The ABL managed to prevent central banking reform from tampering with the
laissez-faire system at the basis of its power and prestige.
5Banque du Liban: A Façade of Economic Sovereignty:
chapter abstract
Chapter 5 analyzes the making of the central bank in relation to the social
reform project of Lebanese President Fuad Chehab (in office 1958-64), which
was inspired by contemporary trends of state-led management of national
economies. It is a comparative examination of the provisions of the 1964
Law of Money and Credit, which acted as the primary legal framework of
Lebanon's financial regulatory system and monetary policy. The law laid out
the statutes establishing the BDL and outlining its monetary policy mandate
and management structure. Placed in the context of Arab financial reform,
the chapter shows how the BDL under the direction of the former BIO
official Joseph Oughourlian retained a degree of managerial autonomy
vis-à-vis the government and the banks. Such autonomy that reflected
Chehab's philosophy of planned laissez-faire.
6Suits and Shadows: The Intra Affair
chapter abstract
Chapter 6 investigates the crash of one the region's top banks, Intra,
which became a subject of conspiracy theories. The crisis took place two
years after the BDL's inauguration and exposed the fragility of the
financial system. It reflected the degree to which the Lebanese state
lacked economic sovereignty and robust financial control. The chapter shows
how the collapse of Intra, founded by the Palestinian-Lebanese businessman
Yusif Beidas, was the product of structural transformation of the world's
political economy combined with contingent historical developments and
conspiratorial actions. Regionally, the outflow of Arab capital away from
Beirut was intertwined with Arab Cold War political rivalries between Cairo
and Riyadh. Locally, the structural limitations of the newly founded
central banking system combined with the decision by Lebanese governing
elites to sink Intra in order to save their market share and the
laissez-faire system sustaining it.
7Financial Regime Change: The Last Refuge of Laissez-faire
chapter abstract
The Intra crisis was itself a turning point in shaping the regulatory role
of the BDL. The chapter traces the supranational policy networks that
impacted the decision-making process. Aided by American experts like Roger
Tamraz and Eugene Black, legal restructuring of the sector took place.
Reforms included a temporary ban on entry to the banking sector, which led
to international capital taking over local shares, as well as the
introduction of a deposit insurance scheme. These new measures led to the
emergence of banker-bureaucrats and banker-technocrats like Elias Sarkis,
who was appointed BDL governor, and Salim Hoss, the first head of the
Banking Control Commission. Both, among others, oversaw construction of a
new financial regulatory regime that institutionalized and protected rather
than overhauled laissez-faire well after the civil war that broke out in
1975, the closing point of the book.
8Conclusion: Sovereign Debt, Sovereign Banks
chapter abstract
By the end of the civil war, Lebanon had become internationally synonymous
with a failed state and endemic sectarian violence. State institutions
including the military, the judiciary, the presidency, parliament, and
public education were seen as weak, corrupt, partisan, or powerless. The
conclusions show how, by contrast, the central bank remained largely
resilient in the face of war, significantly autonomous from government
intervention, and relatively immune to sectarian manipulation. Thanks to
debt-dependent postwar reconstruction projects implemented by Prime
Minister Rafic Hariri and financial engineering policies designed by the
BDL's governor, Riad Salameh, Lebanese banks were able to secure a steady
source and high level of profit via sovereign lending. Throughout Hariri's
era and following his assassination in 2005, the BDL and the big banks
remained key decision-makers in managing the debt, the currency, and the
money market.