The Categories - The Original Classic Edition (eBook, ePUB)
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Finally available, a high quality book of the original classic edition of The Categories. This is a new and freshly published edition of this culturally important work by Aristotle, which is now, at last, again available to you. Enjoy this classic work today. These selected paragraphs distill the contents and give you a quick look inside The Categories: A man and an ox are both animal, and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case woul...
Finally available, a high quality book of the original classic edition of The Categories.
This is a new and freshly published edition of this culturally important work by Aristotle, which is now, at last, again available to you.
Enjoy this classic work today. These selected paragraphs distill the contents and give you a quick look inside The Categories:
A man and an ox are both animal, and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other.
...In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of man or animal, our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary substance is; the words man, animal, are predicable of more than one subject.
...Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.
...That those terms which fall under the heads of positives and privatives are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated; for it is those, as we proved, in the case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate.
...Those things, therefore, are said to be simultaneous in nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is in any way the cause of the others being; those species, also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed within the same genus.
This is a new and freshly published edition of this culturally important work by Aristotle, which is now, at last, again available to you.
Enjoy this classic work today. These selected paragraphs distill the contents and give you a quick look inside The Categories:
A man and an ox are both animal, and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other.
...In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of man or animal, our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary substance is; the words man, animal, are predicable of more than one subject.
...Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.
...That those terms which fall under the heads of positives and privatives are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated; for it is those, as we proved, in the case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate.
...Those things, therefore, are said to be simultaneous in nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is in any way the cause of the others being; those species, also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed within the same genus.
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