Mark Thompson
World War II Battles Reconsidered
Game Theory and Decision Science Perspectives on Gazala, El Alamein, Falaise and Arnhem
Mark Thompson
World War II Battles Reconsidered
Game Theory and Decision Science Perspectives on Gazala, El Alamein, Falaise and Arnhem
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"Written by a former Harvard professor of decision science and game theory, this book presents original insights on the strategies and tactics undertaken in four major battles of the Second World War. That the fighting at Gazala in Libya in the late spring of 1942 constituted what has been called "probably the most spectacular series of victories ever gained over a British army" was in part due to its having violated the game-theoretic Zero-Sum Maxim of Napoleon: "Do not do what your enemy wishes you to." The sensational British reversal of that disaster later that year at El Alamein in Egypt…mehr
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"Written by a former Harvard professor of decision science and game theory, this book presents original insights on the strategies and tactics undertaken in four major battles of the Second World War. That the fighting at Gazala in Libya in the late spring of 1942 constituted what has been called "probably the most spectacular series of victories ever gained over a British army" was in part due to its having violated the game-theoretic Zero-Sum Maxim of Napoleon: "Do not do what your enemy wishes you to." The sensational British reversal of that disaster later that year at El Alamein in Egypt derived largely from heeding the millennia-old military priority of command unity, which has been analyzed and re-endorsed by modern decision science. This discipline has also judged the somewhat disappointing victory of the Allies at Falaise in France in August of 1944 to have resulted from excessive risk aversion-possibly induced by three different types of fatigue. One month later, the Allied setback at Arnhem in the Netherlands called into question, from the perspective of game theory, the value of battlefield surprise. These decisions, approached from an expert perspective on game theory and presented with high-quality maps, are presented in this pioneering application of decision science to the battles of World War II."--
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: McFarland & Co Inc
- Seitenzahl: 278
- Erscheinungstermin: 3. April 2025
- Englisch
- ISBN-13: 9781476696737
- ISBN-10: 147669673X
- Artikelnr.: 74063820
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: McFarland & Co Inc
- Seitenzahl: 278
- Erscheinungstermin: 3. April 2025
- Englisch
- ISBN-13: 9781476696737
- ISBN-10: 147669673X
- Artikelnr.: 74063820
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
Mark Thompson was a full-time professor at Harvard University from 1975 to 1983 and has been a visiting professor at the Universite de Paris and the Universitat Bielefeld in North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany. He taught courses on decision science, game theory, and social program evaluation. He lives in Lexington, Massachusetts.
Table of Contents Acknowledgments deletevi Prologue 1.
A Framework for Assessing Military Decisions Rating Outcomes
7; Factors Affecting Outcomes
10; Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors
11; Informational Decisions
19; Strategic and Tactical Considerations
26; Chapter Recapitulation: A Framework for Understanding and Assessing Meta-Decisions, Situational Factors, Informational Decisions, Strategic and Tactical Considerations, and Their Consequences
40 2.
Gazala The Warring World
45; Over-Promoted and Under-Competent: The Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command at Gazalä
51; "Lamentable" British Inaction "while the Russians were fighting desperately and valiantly": Pre-Battle Decisions
53; Pushback to Prime Ministerial Pressure: Enabling the Axis to Move First
55; "Seriously worried" Rommel: The Outcome of the First Two Days
56; Baseless British Bravado, Stirring French Staunchness, and Annihilative German Efficiency: In-Battle Decisions Over Two-Plus Weeks
57; "Tobruk must be held ... and I order you to do it": Late-Battle Decision Reversal
60; "Defeat is one thing; disgrace is another": Rating the Outcome
62; At Speed into Egypt Up to a Small Depot
63; "Killing a magnificent stag": Meta-Decisions on British Commands
65; Force Strengths
67; "Ah, now we've got him": Confidence and Morale
69; "Tell[ing] a chief ... the things he most likes to hear": Concentration, Reporting, Fatigue, and Luck
71; "Rommel, Rommel, Rommel! What else matters but beating him!" Principal-Agent Disconnect
73; Cowpats and Concentration: Rating the Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command
75; Meta-Decisional Query: Whose Was the "crowning blunder" That Lost 33,000 Commonwealth Soldiers at Tobruk to Captivity?
77; "Barking out orders" versus "an awful lot of paperwork": Meta-Decisional Differences
79; "Much resented": Organizational Behavior, Military Politics, and Commander Positioning
80; "Cloud cuckoo land": Informational Delusion
82; "Continued magnificent work": Informational Processes
83; Negative Information Value: Misinterpretation
85; Positive Information Value: The American Leak
87; "But the bear blew first": Move-Order Decisions
88; Deciding: Likelihoods, Values, and Aversions to Risk and Loss
89; Conclusions
90 3.
El Alamein Prodding for Mines in Moonlight with Bayonets
92; The Zero-Sum Maxim of Napoleon Turned Around: Battle Decisions at El Alamein
95; "With an insubordinate smile": Montgomery Comes to the Eighth Army
99; "A queer little bloke": Rating the Meta-Decisional Command Changes
100; "Our last chance of an offensive": Pre-Battle Decisions at Alam Halfä
103; "The swine isn't attacking": Mid-Battle Decision at Alam Halfä
105; "Our last chance of gaining the Suez Canal had gone": Results and Explanations
107; Announcing the Imminent Axis Capture of Alexandria: The Lead-Up to October 23
108; The Battle
108; So Close to Full: "Ring the bells all over Britain for the first time this war"
110; But Not Quite: The Cut-Short Cop
111; Force Strengths: Pitchfork Against Tommy-Gun
112; Probable Failure versus Assured Complete Victory: Framing the Decision on Attack Timing
113; "Gnaw[ing] their way yard by yard": Battle Decisions of Montgomery
115; "Military interests" versus "propaganda": Pre-and Mid-Battle Decisions of the Axis
117; Post-Battle Decisions of Montgomery
119; "Cautious-to my mind, excessively so": Rommel on Montgomery
122; Was Montgomery Just "lucky ... to have such immense resources?": Eighth Army Upgrades
123; "Complete chaos existed": Informational Advantage
123; "Had we not got a single general who could even win one single battle?" Having Appropriate Resolution
125; "As lost as a dray horse on a polo field": The Escape of Rommel's Army
127; "So proud of his success to date": The Behavior Respecting Risk of Montgomery
130; Conclusions
131 4.
Falaise "Probably the most costly, controversial order given in the European theatre during World War Two"
138; "A solid shoulder" or "a broken neck": The Decision of Bradley on August 13, 1944
140; Throw Them Back "into the sea": The Counterattack through Mortain
144; Bradley as Second-Mover: Reacting to the Attack of Hitler at Mortain
145; "A kick up the fork": Decisions and Non-Decisions of Montgomery
148; Force Destruction versus River Crossing: The Decision of Bradley of August 14
150; The Outcome: "August 15 was the worst day of my [Hitler's] life"
151; The Long and the Short of the Hooks
154; A Clear Allied Triumph, If Not "the greatest achievement in military history," Yet One More Incomplete Cop: Rating the Outcome
157; "Still comparatively virgin": Explaining the Outcome
158; "Something altogether uprooted that wanders around": Rating the Decisions on the Counterattack
160; "An arrogant slap in the face": Reasons for Bradley's Decision of August 13
161; "Patton had to be saved from himself": Assessing a Major Reason for Bradley's Decision
163; "Monty happily forgave us our trespasses": Assessing Other Justifications of Bradley's Decision
164; "A great mistake": Rating Bradley's Decision of August 13
166; "Squeezing the toothpaste": Rating the Decisions on the Northern Jaw
167; "I still don't understand why the Allies did not crush us": Rating the Later Decisions
168; "Who was responsible to whom": Meta-Decisional Muddling of Responsibility
170; "Pay no attention to Monty's Goddamn boundaries": Coordinational Confusion
172; "Egregiously wrong": Inconstant Information
174; When Were the Allied Commanders Wrong?
176; What Would Napoleon Have Done?
177; Conclusions
178 Decision-Scientific Addendum to Chapter 4
182 5
Arnhem We "simply stared, stunned, like fools"
188; "Militarily the war is won": The Decision on Arnhem
191; The First Week: The Planning Fallacy Again
197; "I shall probably give it up": The Decision to Retreat
199; "Few episodes more glorious" or Jumping Off a Cliff: Ratings of the Outcome
201; Force Strengths
202; "Unquestionably would have been successful": Luck
203; "Steady, Monty.... I'm your boss": Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors
205; "Fantastic" Thoughts of Berlin, "lust for glory," and Interpersonal Tension
207; "Winc[ing]" in Recognition of Stiffened Enemy Resistance
208; Those Photographed Tanks Must Need Servicing: Informational Interpretations
210; The Underappreciated Alternative: Taking the Scheldt
212; "Napoleon would no doubt have realized ... but Horrocks didn't": Informational Processes
214; "Had the pious teetotaling Montgomery wobbled into [Allied headquarters] with a hangover, I could not have been more astonished": The Value of Surprise
216; Choosing Among Alternatives: Was Arnhem, Indeed, a Bridge Too Far?
218; Risk Aversion
218; At a Crest at Brest: The Sunk-Cost Fallacy
219; Concentration into "one really powerful and full-blooded thrust": Military Precepts Invoked
223; Conclusions
224 Game-Theoretic Addendum to Chapter 5
227
Actual Strategic Choices
231 Chapter Notes Bibliography Index
A Framework for Assessing Military Decisions Rating Outcomes
7; Factors Affecting Outcomes
10; Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors
11; Informational Decisions
19; Strategic and Tactical Considerations
26; Chapter Recapitulation: A Framework for Understanding and Assessing Meta-Decisions, Situational Factors, Informational Decisions, Strategic and Tactical Considerations, and Their Consequences
40 2.
Gazala The Warring World
45; Over-Promoted and Under-Competent: The Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command at Gazalä
51; "Lamentable" British Inaction "while the Russians were fighting desperately and valiantly": Pre-Battle Decisions
53; Pushback to Prime Ministerial Pressure: Enabling the Axis to Move First
55; "Seriously worried" Rommel: The Outcome of the First Two Days
56; Baseless British Bravado, Stirring French Staunchness, and Annihilative German Efficiency: In-Battle Decisions Over Two-Plus Weeks
57; "Tobruk must be held ... and I order you to do it": Late-Battle Decision Reversal
60; "Defeat is one thing; disgrace is another": Rating the Outcome
62; At Speed into Egypt Up to a Small Depot
63; "Killing a magnificent stag": Meta-Decisions on British Commands
65; Force Strengths
67; "Ah, now we've got him": Confidence and Morale
69; "Tell[ing] a chief ... the things he most likes to hear": Concentration, Reporting, Fatigue, and Luck
71; "Rommel, Rommel, Rommel! What else matters but beating him!" Principal-Agent Disconnect
73; Cowpats and Concentration: Rating the Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command
75; Meta-Decisional Query: Whose Was the "crowning blunder" That Lost 33,000 Commonwealth Soldiers at Tobruk to Captivity?
77; "Barking out orders" versus "an awful lot of paperwork": Meta-Decisional Differences
79; "Much resented": Organizational Behavior, Military Politics, and Commander Positioning
80; "Cloud cuckoo land": Informational Delusion
82; "Continued magnificent work": Informational Processes
83; Negative Information Value: Misinterpretation
85; Positive Information Value: The American Leak
87; "But the bear blew first": Move-Order Decisions
88; Deciding: Likelihoods, Values, and Aversions to Risk and Loss
89; Conclusions
90 3.
El Alamein Prodding for Mines in Moonlight with Bayonets
92; The Zero-Sum Maxim of Napoleon Turned Around: Battle Decisions at El Alamein
95; "With an insubordinate smile": Montgomery Comes to the Eighth Army
99; "A queer little bloke": Rating the Meta-Decisional Command Changes
100; "Our last chance of an offensive": Pre-Battle Decisions at Alam Halfä
103; "The swine isn't attacking": Mid-Battle Decision at Alam Halfä
105; "Our last chance of gaining the Suez Canal had gone": Results and Explanations
107; Announcing the Imminent Axis Capture of Alexandria: The Lead-Up to October 23
108; The Battle
108; So Close to Full: "Ring the bells all over Britain for the first time this war"
110; But Not Quite: The Cut-Short Cop
111; Force Strengths: Pitchfork Against Tommy-Gun
112; Probable Failure versus Assured Complete Victory: Framing the Decision on Attack Timing
113; "Gnaw[ing] their way yard by yard": Battle Decisions of Montgomery
115; "Military interests" versus "propaganda": Pre-and Mid-Battle Decisions of the Axis
117; Post-Battle Decisions of Montgomery
119; "Cautious-to my mind, excessively so": Rommel on Montgomery
122; Was Montgomery Just "lucky ... to have such immense resources?": Eighth Army Upgrades
123; "Complete chaos existed": Informational Advantage
123; "Had we not got a single general who could even win one single battle?" Having Appropriate Resolution
125; "As lost as a dray horse on a polo field": The Escape of Rommel's Army
127; "So proud of his success to date": The Behavior Respecting Risk of Montgomery
130; Conclusions
131 4.
Falaise "Probably the most costly, controversial order given in the European theatre during World War Two"
138; "A solid shoulder" or "a broken neck": The Decision of Bradley on August 13, 1944
140; Throw Them Back "into the sea": The Counterattack through Mortain
144; Bradley as Second-Mover: Reacting to the Attack of Hitler at Mortain
145; "A kick up the fork": Decisions and Non-Decisions of Montgomery
148; Force Destruction versus River Crossing: The Decision of Bradley of August 14
150; The Outcome: "August 15 was the worst day of my [Hitler's] life"
151; The Long and the Short of the Hooks
154; A Clear Allied Triumph, If Not "the greatest achievement in military history," Yet One More Incomplete Cop: Rating the Outcome
157; "Still comparatively virgin": Explaining the Outcome
158; "Something altogether uprooted that wanders around": Rating the Decisions on the Counterattack
160; "An arrogant slap in the face": Reasons for Bradley's Decision of August 13
161; "Patton had to be saved from himself": Assessing a Major Reason for Bradley's Decision
163; "Monty happily forgave us our trespasses": Assessing Other Justifications of Bradley's Decision
164; "A great mistake": Rating Bradley's Decision of August 13
166; "Squeezing the toothpaste": Rating the Decisions on the Northern Jaw
167; "I still don't understand why the Allies did not crush us": Rating the Later Decisions
168; "Who was responsible to whom": Meta-Decisional Muddling of Responsibility
170; "Pay no attention to Monty's Goddamn boundaries": Coordinational Confusion
172; "Egregiously wrong": Inconstant Information
174; When Were the Allied Commanders Wrong?
176; What Would Napoleon Have Done?
177; Conclusions
178 Decision-Scientific Addendum to Chapter 4
182 5
Arnhem We "simply stared, stunned, like fools"
188; "Militarily the war is won": The Decision on Arnhem
191; The First Week: The Planning Fallacy Again
197; "I shall probably give it up": The Decision to Retreat
199; "Few episodes more glorious" or Jumping Off a Cliff: Ratings of the Outcome
201; Force Strengths
202; "Unquestionably would have been successful": Luck
203; "Steady, Monty.... I'm your boss": Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors
205; "Fantastic" Thoughts of Berlin, "lust for glory," and Interpersonal Tension
207; "Winc[ing]" in Recognition of Stiffened Enemy Resistance
208; Those Photographed Tanks Must Need Servicing: Informational Interpretations
210; The Underappreciated Alternative: Taking the Scheldt
212; "Napoleon would no doubt have realized ... but Horrocks didn't": Informational Processes
214; "Had the pious teetotaling Montgomery wobbled into [Allied headquarters] with a hangover, I could not have been more astonished": The Value of Surprise
216; Choosing Among Alternatives: Was Arnhem, Indeed, a Bridge Too Far?
218; Risk Aversion
218; At a Crest at Brest: The Sunk-Cost Fallacy
219; Concentration into "one really powerful and full-blooded thrust": Military Precepts Invoked
223; Conclusions
224 Game-Theoretic Addendum to Chapter 5
227
Actual Strategic Choices
231 Chapter Notes Bibliography Index
Table of Contents Acknowledgments deletevi Prologue 1.
A Framework for Assessing Military Decisions Rating Outcomes
7; Factors Affecting Outcomes
10; Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors
11; Informational Decisions
19; Strategic and Tactical Considerations
26; Chapter Recapitulation: A Framework for Understanding and Assessing Meta-Decisions, Situational Factors, Informational Decisions, Strategic and Tactical Considerations, and Their Consequences
40 2.
Gazala The Warring World
45; Over-Promoted and Under-Competent: The Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command at Gazalä
51; "Lamentable" British Inaction "while the Russians were fighting desperately and valiantly": Pre-Battle Decisions
53; Pushback to Prime Ministerial Pressure: Enabling the Axis to Move First
55; "Seriously worried" Rommel: The Outcome of the First Two Days
56; Baseless British Bravado, Stirring French Staunchness, and Annihilative German Efficiency: In-Battle Decisions Over Two-Plus Weeks
57; "Tobruk must be held ... and I order you to do it": Late-Battle Decision Reversal
60; "Defeat is one thing; disgrace is another": Rating the Outcome
62; At Speed into Egypt Up to a Small Depot
63; "Killing a magnificent stag": Meta-Decisions on British Commands
65; Force Strengths
67; "Ah, now we've got him": Confidence and Morale
69; "Tell[ing] a chief ... the things he most likes to hear": Concentration, Reporting, Fatigue, and Luck
71; "Rommel, Rommel, Rommel! What else matters but beating him!" Principal-Agent Disconnect
73; Cowpats and Concentration: Rating the Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command
75; Meta-Decisional Query: Whose Was the "crowning blunder" That Lost 33,000 Commonwealth Soldiers at Tobruk to Captivity?
77; "Barking out orders" versus "an awful lot of paperwork": Meta-Decisional Differences
79; "Much resented": Organizational Behavior, Military Politics, and Commander Positioning
80; "Cloud cuckoo land": Informational Delusion
82; "Continued magnificent work": Informational Processes
83; Negative Information Value: Misinterpretation
85; Positive Information Value: The American Leak
87; "But the bear blew first": Move-Order Decisions
88; Deciding: Likelihoods, Values, and Aversions to Risk and Loss
89; Conclusions
90 3.
El Alamein Prodding for Mines in Moonlight with Bayonets
92; The Zero-Sum Maxim of Napoleon Turned Around: Battle Decisions at El Alamein
95; "With an insubordinate smile": Montgomery Comes to the Eighth Army
99; "A queer little bloke": Rating the Meta-Decisional Command Changes
100; "Our last chance of an offensive": Pre-Battle Decisions at Alam Halfä
103; "The swine isn't attacking": Mid-Battle Decision at Alam Halfä
105; "Our last chance of gaining the Suez Canal had gone": Results and Explanations
107; Announcing the Imminent Axis Capture of Alexandria: The Lead-Up to October 23
108; The Battle
108; So Close to Full: "Ring the bells all over Britain for the first time this war"
110; But Not Quite: The Cut-Short Cop
111; Force Strengths: Pitchfork Against Tommy-Gun
112; Probable Failure versus Assured Complete Victory: Framing the Decision on Attack Timing
113; "Gnaw[ing] their way yard by yard": Battle Decisions of Montgomery
115; "Military interests" versus "propaganda": Pre-and Mid-Battle Decisions of the Axis
117; Post-Battle Decisions of Montgomery
119; "Cautious-to my mind, excessively so": Rommel on Montgomery
122; Was Montgomery Just "lucky ... to have such immense resources?": Eighth Army Upgrades
123; "Complete chaos existed": Informational Advantage
123; "Had we not got a single general who could even win one single battle?" Having Appropriate Resolution
125; "As lost as a dray horse on a polo field": The Escape of Rommel's Army
127; "So proud of his success to date": The Behavior Respecting Risk of Montgomery
130; Conclusions
131 4.
Falaise "Probably the most costly, controversial order given in the European theatre during World War Two"
138; "A solid shoulder" or "a broken neck": The Decision of Bradley on August 13, 1944
140; Throw Them Back "into the sea": The Counterattack through Mortain
144; Bradley as Second-Mover: Reacting to the Attack of Hitler at Mortain
145; "A kick up the fork": Decisions and Non-Decisions of Montgomery
148; Force Destruction versus River Crossing: The Decision of Bradley of August 14
150; The Outcome: "August 15 was the worst day of my [Hitler's] life"
151; The Long and the Short of the Hooks
154; A Clear Allied Triumph, If Not "the greatest achievement in military history," Yet One More Incomplete Cop: Rating the Outcome
157; "Still comparatively virgin": Explaining the Outcome
158; "Something altogether uprooted that wanders around": Rating the Decisions on the Counterattack
160; "An arrogant slap in the face": Reasons for Bradley's Decision of August 13
161; "Patton had to be saved from himself": Assessing a Major Reason for Bradley's Decision
163; "Monty happily forgave us our trespasses": Assessing Other Justifications of Bradley's Decision
164; "A great mistake": Rating Bradley's Decision of August 13
166; "Squeezing the toothpaste": Rating the Decisions on the Northern Jaw
167; "I still don't understand why the Allies did not crush us": Rating the Later Decisions
168; "Who was responsible to whom": Meta-Decisional Muddling of Responsibility
170; "Pay no attention to Monty's Goddamn boundaries": Coordinational Confusion
172; "Egregiously wrong": Inconstant Information
174; When Were the Allied Commanders Wrong?
176; What Would Napoleon Have Done?
177; Conclusions
178 Decision-Scientific Addendum to Chapter 4
182 5
Arnhem We "simply stared, stunned, like fools"
188; "Militarily the war is won": The Decision on Arnhem
191; The First Week: The Planning Fallacy Again
197; "I shall probably give it up": The Decision to Retreat
199; "Few episodes more glorious" or Jumping Off a Cliff: Ratings of the Outcome
201; Force Strengths
202; "Unquestionably would have been successful": Luck
203; "Steady, Monty.... I'm your boss": Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors
205; "Fantastic" Thoughts of Berlin, "lust for glory," and Interpersonal Tension
207; "Winc[ing]" in Recognition of Stiffened Enemy Resistance
208; Those Photographed Tanks Must Need Servicing: Informational Interpretations
210; The Underappreciated Alternative: Taking the Scheldt
212; "Napoleon would no doubt have realized ... but Horrocks didn't": Informational Processes
214; "Had the pious teetotaling Montgomery wobbled into [Allied headquarters] with a hangover, I could not have been more astonished": The Value of Surprise
216; Choosing Among Alternatives: Was Arnhem, Indeed, a Bridge Too Far?
218; Risk Aversion
218; At a Crest at Brest: The Sunk-Cost Fallacy
219; Concentration into "one really powerful and full-blooded thrust": Military Precepts Invoked
223; Conclusions
224 Game-Theoretic Addendum to Chapter 5
227
Actual Strategic Choices
231 Chapter Notes Bibliography Index
A Framework for Assessing Military Decisions Rating Outcomes
7; Factors Affecting Outcomes
10; Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors
11; Informational Decisions
19; Strategic and Tactical Considerations
26; Chapter Recapitulation: A Framework for Understanding and Assessing Meta-Decisions, Situational Factors, Informational Decisions, Strategic and Tactical Considerations, and Their Consequences
40 2.
Gazala The Warring World
45; Over-Promoted and Under-Competent: The Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command at Gazalä
51; "Lamentable" British Inaction "while the Russians were fighting desperately and valiantly": Pre-Battle Decisions
53; Pushback to Prime Ministerial Pressure: Enabling the Axis to Move First
55; "Seriously worried" Rommel: The Outcome of the First Two Days
56; Baseless British Bravado, Stirring French Staunchness, and Annihilative German Efficiency: In-Battle Decisions Over Two-Plus Weeks
57; "Tobruk must be held ... and I order you to do it": Late-Battle Decision Reversal
60; "Defeat is one thing; disgrace is another": Rating the Outcome
62; At Speed into Egypt Up to a Small Depot
63; "Killing a magnificent stag": Meta-Decisions on British Commands
65; Force Strengths
67; "Ah, now we've got him": Confidence and Morale
69; "Tell[ing] a chief ... the things he most likes to hear": Concentration, Reporting, Fatigue, and Luck
71; "Rommel, Rommel, Rommel! What else matters but beating him!" Principal-Agent Disconnect
73; Cowpats and Concentration: Rating the Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command
75; Meta-Decisional Query: Whose Was the "crowning blunder" That Lost 33,000 Commonwealth Soldiers at Tobruk to Captivity?
77; "Barking out orders" versus "an awful lot of paperwork": Meta-Decisional Differences
79; "Much resented": Organizational Behavior, Military Politics, and Commander Positioning
80; "Cloud cuckoo land": Informational Delusion
82; "Continued magnificent work": Informational Processes
83; Negative Information Value: Misinterpretation
85; Positive Information Value: The American Leak
87; "But the bear blew first": Move-Order Decisions
88; Deciding: Likelihoods, Values, and Aversions to Risk and Loss
89; Conclusions
90 3.
El Alamein Prodding for Mines in Moonlight with Bayonets
92; The Zero-Sum Maxim of Napoleon Turned Around: Battle Decisions at El Alamein
95; "With an insubordinate smile": Montgomery Comes to the Eighth Army
99; "A queer little bloke": Rating the Meta-Decisional Command Changes
100; "Our last chance of an offensive": Pre-Battle Decisions at Alam Halfä
103; "The swine isn't attacking": Mid-Battle Decision at Alam Halfä
105; "Our last chance of gaining the Suez Canal had gone": Results and Explanations
107; Announcing the Imminent Axis Capture of Alexandria: The Lead-Up to October 23
108; The Battle
108; So Close to Full: "Ring the bells all over Britain for the first time this war"
110; But Not Quite: The Cut-Short Cop
111; Force Strengths: Pitchfork Against Tommy-Gun
112; Probable Failure versus Assured Complete Victory: Framing the Decision on Attack Timing
113; "Gnaw[ing] their way yard by yard": Battle Decisions of Montgomery
115; "Military interests" versus "propaganda": Pre-and Mid-Battle Decisions of the Axis
117; Post-Battle Decisions of Montgomery
119; "Cautious-to my mind, excessively so": Rommel on Montgomery
122; Was Montgomery Just "lucky ... to have such immense resources?": Eighth Army Upgrades
123; "Complete chaos existed": Informational Advantage
123; "Had we not got a single general who could even win one single battle?" Having Appropriate Resolution
125; "As lost as a dray horse on a polo field": The Escape of Rommel's Army
127; "So proud of his success to date": The Behavior Respecting Risk of Montgomery
130; Conclusions
131 4.
Falaise "Probably the most costly, controversial order given in the European theatre during World War Two"
138; "A solid shoulder" or "a broken neck": The Decision of Bradley on August 13, 1944
140; Throw Them Back "into the sea": The Counterattack through Mortain
144; Bradley as Second-Mover: Reacting to the Attack of Hitler at Mortain
145; "A kick up the fork": Decisions and Non-Decisions of Montgomery
148; Force Destruction versus River Crossing: The Decision of Bradley of August 14
150; The Outcome: "August 15 was the worst day of my [Hitler's] life"
151; The Long and the Short of the Hooks
154; A Clear Allied Triumph, If Not "the greatest achievement in military history," Yet One More Incomplete Cop: Rating the Outcome
157; "Still comparatively virgin": Explaining the Outcome
158; "Something altogether uprooted that wanders around": Rating the Decisions on the Counterattack
160; "An arrogant slap in the face": Reasons for Bradley's Decision of August 13
161; "Patton had to be saved from himself": Assessing a Major Reason for Bradley's Decision
163; "Monty happily forgave us our trespasses": Assessing Other Justifications of Bradley's Decision
164; "A great mistake": Rating Bradley's Decision of August 13
166; "Squeezing the toothpaste": Rating the Decisions on the Northern Jaw
167; "I still don't understand why the Allies did not crush us": Rating the Later Decisions
168; "Who was responsible to whom": Meta-Decisional Muddling of Responsibility
170; "Pay no attention to Monty's Goddamn boundaries": Coordinational Confusion
172; "Egregiously wrong": Inconstant Information
174; When Were the Allied Commanders Wrong?
176; What Would Napoleon Have Done?
177; Conclusions
178 Decision-Scientific Addendum to Chapter 4
182 5
Arnhem We "simply stared, stunned, like fools"
188; "Militarily the war is won": The Decision on Arnhem
191; The First Week: The Planning Fallacy Again
197; "I shall probably give it up": The Decision to Retreat
199; "Few episodes more glorious" or Jumping Off a Cliff: Ratings of the Outcome
201; Force Strengths
202; "Unquestionably would have been successful": Luck
203; "Steady, Monty.... I'm your boss": Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors
205; "Fantastic" Thoughts of Berlin, "lust for glory," and Interpersonal Tension
207; "Winc[ing]" in Recognition of Stiffened Enemy Resistance
208; Those Photographed Tanks Must Need Servicing: Informational Interpretations
210; The Underappreciated Alternative: Taking the Scheldt
212; "Napoleon would no doubt have realized ... but Horrocks didn't": Informational Processes
214; "Had the pious teetotaling Montgomery wobbled into [Allied headquarters] with a hangover, I could not have been more astonished": The Value of Surprise
216; Choosing Among Alternatives: Was Arnhem, Indeed, a Bridge Too Far?
218; Risk Aversion
218; At a Crest at Brest: The Sunk-Cost Fallacy
219; Concentration into "one really powerful and full-blooded thrust": Military Precepts Invoked
223; Conclusions
224 Game-Theoretic Addendum to Chapter 5
227
Actual Strategic Choices
231 Chapter Notes Bibliography Index