Tax Behavior and Financing Behavior of Corporate Managers
Are Corporate Financing Rules Distorted?
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This book aims to analyzing the influence of tax behavior on financing (financial leverage) behavior of corporate managers. The paper applies the generalized method of moments (GMM) to dynamic panel data. The sample used covers 21 firms, i.e. 11 banks for the period from 2011 to 2020 and 10 DFSs for the period from 2016 to 2021. It turns out that financial leverage behavior is influenced more positively by corporate income tax (CIT), then by dividends (DIVIDEND); and negatively by interest on debt (INTEREST), by cash flow (CASH_FLOW) and by past financial leverage (LEVERAGE( 1)). This paper is...
This book aims to analyzing the influence of tax behavior on financing (financial leverage) behavior of corporate managers. The paper applies the generalized method of moments (GMM) to dynamic panel data. The sample used covers 21 firms, i.e. 11 banks for the period from 2011 to 2020 and 10 DFSs for the period from 2016 to 2021. It turns out that financial leverage behavior is influenced more positively by corporate income tax (CIT), then by dividends (DIVIDEND); and negatively by interest on debt (INTEREST), by cash flow (CASH_FLOW) and by past financial leverage (LEVERAGE( 1)). This paper is one of the first to extend the literature by identifying the main determinants of financing behavior, notably the positive effect of corporate income tax (CIT).
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