Solutions Manual to Accompany Contract Theory
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The solutions manual for Bolton and Dewatripont's Contract Theory includes complete solutions to 27 of the 54 exercises in the text. Contract Theory by Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels, covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory and presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The exercises at the end of the book not only review, chapter by chapter, the ba...
The solutions manual for Bolton and Dewatripont's Contract Theory includes complete solutions to 27 of the 54 exercises in the text. Contract Theory by Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels, covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory and presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The exercises at the end of the book not only review, chapter by chapter, the basic concepts introduced in the text but also explore additional ideas and applications based on teaching material accumulated over the years by the authors and other instructors of contract theory. The solutions manual to this essential text gives complete solutions to 27 of the 54 exercises in the text, allowing students to study and compare their answers and take greater advantage of this crucial part of the book. The solutions manual follows the structure of the text, grouping exercises by chapter. Chapters 2-6 cover such static bilateral contracting problems as screening, signaling, and moral hazard; chapters 7 and 8 treat multilateral contracting, including auctions, bilateral trade under private information, and multiagent moral hazard; chapters 9 and 10 explore problems of repeated bilateral contracting; and chapters 11-13 cover incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, contracting with externalities, and common agency.
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