Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination
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In this book David Currie and Paul Levine address a broad range of issues concerning the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in open economies. Adopting neo-Keynesian models for which monetary and fiscal policy have short-term real effects, they analyse active stabilisation policies in both a single and multi-country context. Questions addressed include: the merits of simple policy rules, policy design in the face of uncertainty, and international policy coordination. A central feature of the book is the treatment of credibility and the effect of a policymaker's reputation for sticking ...
In this book David Currie and Paul Levine address a broad range of issues concerning the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in open economies. Adopting neo-Keynesian models for which monetary and fiscal policy have short-term real effects, they analyse active stabilisation policies in both a single and multi-country context. Questions addressed include: the merits of simple policy rules, policy design in the face of uncertainty, and international policy coordination. A central feature of the book is the treatment of credibility and the effect of a policymaker's reputation for sticking to announced policies. These considerations are integrated with coordination issues to produce a unique synthesis. The volume develops optimal control methods and dynamic game theory to handle relationships between governments and a conscious rational private sector, and produces a unified, coherent approach to the subject.
Table of contents:
Introduction; Part I. General Issues: 1. Macroeconomic policy design and control theory - a failed partnership; 2. International policy coordination - a survey; 3. The European road to monetary union; Part II. Theory and Methodology: 4. The design of feedback rules in linear stochastic rational expectations models; 5. Credibility and time consistency in a stochastic world; 6. Should rules be simple?; 7. Macroeconomic policy design using large econometric rational expectations models; Part III. Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies: 8. Macroeconomic policy design in an interdependent world; 9. Does international policy coordination pay and is it sustainable?; 10. International cooperation and reputation in an empirical two bloc model; 11. Fiscal policy coordination, inflation and reputation in a natural rate world; 12. Simple rules and international policy coordination; 13. Evaluating the extended target zone proposal for the G3.
This book is concerned with the formulation of macroeconomic policy in an international context, emphasising the role of government credibility in determining the effectiveness of intervention, and the possible gains from international cooperation.
Examines the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in an international context.
Table of contents:
Introduction; Part I. General Issues: 1. Macroeconomic policy design and control theory - a failed partnership; 2. International policy coordination - a survey; 3. The European road to monetary union; Part II. Theory and Methodology: 4. The design of feedback rules in linear stochastic rational expectations models; 5. Credibility and time consistency in a stochastic world; 6. Should rules be simple?; 7. Macroeconomic policy design using large econometric rational expectations models; Part III. Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies: 8. Macroeconomic policy design in an interdependent world; 9. Does international policy coordination pay and is it sustainable?; 10. International cooperation and reputation in an empirical two bloc model; 11. Fiscal policy coordination, inflation and reputation in a natural rate world; 12. Simple rules and international policy coordination; 13. Evaluating the extended target zone proposal for the G3.
This book is concerned with the formulation of macroeconomic policy in an international context, emphasising the role of government credibility in determining the effectiveness of intervention, and the possible gains from international cooperation.
Examines the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in an international context.