Roles and Relevance, Army Air and Missile Defense (AMD) in the Post 9/11 World
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In August of 2006, the world witnessed a guerilla air war. Hezbollah, a non-state actor, attacked Israel from the air. The Israeli Defense Force was unable to counter this assault and its second largest city, Haifa, came under attack from long-range rockets. In addition, Hezbollah was able to launch three armed UAVs against the Israeli capital of Tel Aviv. The UAV missions failed but the precedent had been set. These events told the world that nations which in the past could never field or employ a manned air force, were able to attack well-equipped nations from the air. The combination of com...
In August of 2006, the world witnessed a guerilla air war. Hezbollah, a non-state actor, attacked Israel from the air. The Israeli Defense Force was unable to counter this assault and its second largest city, Haifa, came under attack from long-range rockets. In addition, Hezbollah was able to launch three armed UAVs against the Israeli capital of Tel Aviv. The UAV missions failed but the precedent had been set. These events told the world that nations which in the past could never field or employ a manned air force, were able to attack well-equipped nations from the air. The combination of commercial high technology and old weapons defines the concept of guerilla air war. The emergence of guerilla air war further enables and empowers small groups to challenge wealthy nations for control of the battlefield. This monograph examines two critical issues: one, guerilla air war; and two, whether or not the existing US Army AMD structures can meet the challenge of such attacks and defeat them at the tactical level. The US Army has recently removed all tactical level AMD units. Army maneuver commanders do not posses organic surface to air systems that would enable them to engage current air threats from a guerilla air war. The US Army's AMD force has prepared for operational threats like TBMs, but these systems are judged to have limited value to the tactical commander. The monograph concludes with the argument that the removal of AMD units from the tactical level has left the Army dangerously and unnecessarily weak in certain respects. This has operational effects on the Army and the nation. As will be made clear, the Army's current AMD force is not integrated with the tactical level Army. The primary reason for this is the removal of AMD units from Corps and division level formations. By removing the AMD force from the tactical level, training has suffered and put the Army and its soldiers at risk. The most promising tactical system is C-RAM, which is revolutionizing the This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
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