Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experience
Versandkostenfrei!
Versandfertig in über 4 Wochen
26,99 €
inkl. MwSt.
Weitere Ausgaben:
PAYBACK Punkte
13 °P sammeln!
This study examines intelligence at the operational level of war. Current U.S. Army intelligence doctrine fails to recognize an operational level intelligence function separate and distinct from tactical or strategic intelligence functions. Neither does it identify the characteristics of intelligence at the operational level. Doctrine states that intelligence at the operational level of war is merely the "fusion" of tactical and strategic intelligence. This monograph posits that the fusion of tactical and strategic intelligence is inadequate for the operational commander and that the very prop...
This study examines intelligence at the operational level of war. Current U.S. Army intelligence doctrine fails to recognize an operational level intelligence function separate and distinct from tactical or strategic intelligence functions. Neither does it identify the characteristics of intelligence at the operational level. Doctrine states that intelligence at the operational level of war is merely the "fusion" of tactical and strategic intelligence. This monograph posits that the fusion of tactical and strategic intelligence is inadequate for the operational commander and that the very proposition reflects a serious void in military thinking. This study looks at several military actions at the operational level, outlines the peculiar characteristics of intelligence associated with those actions and suggests a number of considerations for those who deal with intelligence at the operational level of war. Among the conclusions to be drawn from this paper are: the U.S. Army lacks a refined operational intelligence perspective, the operational art demands that an operational intelligence perspective be thoroughly developed and examined for its doctrinal implications, and doctrine needs to be reexamined and rewritten to describe adequately the characteristics and functions of intelligence at the operational level of war. This operational intelligence perspective then needs to be promulgated to commanders and intelligence officers at all level of the military and throughout the intelligence community. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Andere Kunden interessierten sich für
![Cover Seven Months a Prisoner; or, Thirty-six Days in the Woods. Giving the Personal Experience of Prison Life in Gordonsville [and Other Places] ... and Two Escapes, the Last Successful, From Columbia to Knoxville, Over a Distance of Four Hundred Miles](https://bilder.buecher.de/produkte/75/75115/75115292n.jpg "Seven Months a Prisoner; or, Thirty-six Days in the Woods. Giving the Personal Experience of Prison Life in Gordonsville [and Other Places] ... and Two Escapes, the Last Successful, From Columbia to Knoxville, Over a Distance of Four Hundred Miles")
