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![Not Light Enough to Get There, Not Heavy Enough to Win: The Case of US Light Infantry]( "Not Light Enough to Get There, Not Heavy Enough to Win: The Case of US Light Infantry")
Not Light Enough to Get There, Not Heavy Enough to Win: The Case of US Light Infantry59,99 €![Physical Training Programs in Light Infantry Units: Are they Preparing Soldiers for the Rigors of Combat?]( "Physical Training Programs in Light Infantry Units: Are they Preparing Soldiers for the Rigors of Combat?")
Physical Training Programs in Light Infantry Units: Are they Preparing Soldiers for the Rigors of Combat?54,99 €![Operational Considerations for the Employment of a Light Infantry Division in a Contingency Scenario]( "Operational Considerations for the Employment of a Light Infantry Division in a Contingency Scenario")
Operational Considerations for the Employment of a Light Infantry Division in a Contingency Scenario55,99 €![Blind Man's Bluff: A Look at the Tactical Reconnaissance Capabilities of the U.S. Army's Light Infantry Division]( "Blind Man's Bluff: A Look at the Tactical Reconnaissance Capabilities of the U.S. Army's Light Infantry Division")
Blind Man's Bluff: A Look at the Tactical Reconnaissance Capabilities of the U.S. Army's Light Infantry Division54,99 €![Light Infantry and the Heavy Force: A Marriage of Convenience or Necessity]( "Light Infantry and the Heavy Force: A Marriage of Convenience or Necessity")
Light Infantry and the Heavy Force: A Marriage of Convenience or Necessity58,99 €![Have Gun, Will Travel: A Tank Company in the Light Infantry Brigade]( "Have Gun, Will Travel: A Tank Company in the Light Infantry Brigade")
Have Gun, Will Travel: A Tank Company in the Light Infantry Brigade54,99 €![Concept for the Tactical Employment of Light Infantry in Central Europe]( "Concept for the Tactical Employment of Light Infantry in Central Europe")
Concept for the Tactical Employment of Light Infantry in Central Europe54,99 €
This study is an historical and doctrinal analysis of the tactical use of the reverse slope defense by light infantry forces. It centers on examining the effectiveness of the technique in shaping the battlefield and enhancing the survivability and effectiveness of currently deployed U.S. Light Infantry forces in defensive operations. To test its hypothesis, an analysis of reverse slope principles and techniques, derived from Wellington and German and Japanese commanders is followed by a contemporary comparison of British techniques employed during the Falkland Island campaign. Among the many conclusions which could be drawn from this investigation are: the light infantry's current reverse slope doctrine lacks sufficiency; leadership is the crucial ingredient in reverse slope planning and execution; and, the reverse slope defense is not one concept, but a host of concepts which include offensive opportunities, resourcefulness, and terrain options. The study concludes that there exists sufficient historical evidence to support resurrection and implementation of the reverse slope technique in current light infantry doctrine and training. A comprehensive reverse slope doctrinal "cookbook" is provided as a basis for subsequent examination and study.